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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation examines the lived experiences of four previously active 
women who suffered traumatic spinal cord injuries and became disabled. In 
particular, it works to illuminate the differences in women’s experience of disability 
compared to previous research on men and disability. Gendered experiences of 
embodiment and impairment are revealed and a new narrative type – the resilience 
narrative - is outlined. Some practical implications of these illuminating experiences 
are offered. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 This study is based on the lived experiences of four women who were highly 
physically active and subsequently became disabled through sport or physical 
activity. I became involved in this research because, as a woman, I was interested 
in finding out if there were any differences between how active men and women 
responded to traumatic spinal cord injury. In a prior Master’s degree thesis, I 
completed a case study on an active young man who had a traumatic spinal cord 
injury; undeniably, that work has inspired me to delve further into disability studies. 
I soon found myself interested in women and disability, and I realized that there 
was little work done on women who were highly active prior to their injuries. Having 
seen how high levels of physical activity can have an effect on a man’s response to 
such injuries, I was motivated to discover if the response was similar in active 
women.  
 This research attempts to address a number of theoretical and empirical 
gaps in the current research available. In Chapter 2, I outline the current research 
and theories in a number of areas: disability, the body, narrative, identity and 
gender. While each of these topics touches on an area related to my research 
topic, this chapter also helps to demonstrate the lack of research conducted on 
previously active women who received traumatic spinal cord injuries and are now 
disabled. 
 In Chapter 3, I discuss the methodology followed during the course of the 
research and writing process. A purposive sampling process was used, and 
participants were contacted with the help of the Back-Up Trust. Informed consent 
was obtained from all participants, and confidentiality has been maintained 
primarily through the used of pseudonyms. 
 Chapter 4 reviews the results of this qualitative research in relation to the 
current research and theories outlined in Chapter 2. It covers four main topics of 
interest that arose during the interview process: the body; narrative; identity; 
dependence and independence; and relationships and motherhood. 
 Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the implications of this research and outlines 
how it helps to fill in the theoretical and empirical gaps in the current field. In 
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addition, it covers some limitations of the study, and possible future research 
directions. 
 In the beginning, I was nervous about conducting interviews with these 
women. After all, I am a woman without any known impairment, talking and 
attempting to understand the life experience of women identified with disabilities. I 
worried about how they would perceive my questions, and about whether my 
interpretations of their stories would be negatively affected by my lack of 
impairment. However, I was quickly drawn into their stories, and at once feeling 
awed at the variety of their experiences and impressed by their resilience in the 
face of adversity. I hope that this research does their stories justice. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Disability 
2.1.1 What is it? 
 Although it may seem simple, ‘disability’ is in reality a difficult concept to 
define. One reason for this is because, as Grönvik (2007) points out, the notion of 
‘disability’ has encompassed distinct meanings across decades, cultures, and 
ideologies. Likewise, Kearney and Pryor (2004) suggest that, even within 
academia, one’s definition of ‘disability’ varies according to discipline, paradigms 
and personal views. The actual definition and conceptualisation of the term 
‘disability’ has been the centre of much argument and debate, for the different 
paradigms of disability not only reflect, but also determine: our values and beliefs 
about disability; how we define disability; the causes of disability; and disability-
related social policy, resources and services (Kearney & Pryor, 2004).    
 Nevertheless, it is important that we offer a working definition of ‘disability’, 
for without a one, improving the lives of those who are disabled becomes difficult. 
As Gordon and Rosenblum (2001) said, in the modern world, “the person with a 
visible impairment inhabits a body rejected by society – and the consequences of 
that are much the same as they are for those in race and sex minority groups” (pp. 
13-14).  They go on to explain that it is important to define what disability can be, 
since without knowing this we will not know how to proceed with policy. Further: 
People with impairments – just like those in stigmatized race, sex and sexual 
orientation categories – are presumed to lack or be unable to realise the 
values and attributes the culture esteems.  They are not expected to be 
dominant, active, independent, competitive, adventurous, sexual, self-
controlled, healthy, intelligent, attractive, or competent.  Like those in other 
stigmatized categories, they risk being seen as nothing but a problem 
(Gordon & Rosenblum, 2001, p. 14) 
 
 Given the variety of definitions of disability, how might we better understand 
the concept? Given that the different definitions have come into existence based 
on certain models of disability, one way to understand the term is to examine these 
models. Today, there seem to be two main approaches to understanding disability. 
One family of definitions focuses on individual or medical characteristics, 
sometimes known as ‘social deviance’; however, the other considers disability as a 
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socially constructed phenomenon, produced by barriers of different types, and is 
often known as ‘social oppression’ (Grönvik, 2007). In other words, the two primary 
ways of defining disability were conceived by examining disability via opposing 
paradigms (or looking through different ‘lenses’): the social deviance lens and the 
social oppression lens (Thomas, 2007). In following sections, I will be reviewing the 
basis, benefits, and drawbacks of each of these approaches to disability.    
 
2.1.2 The Medical Model of Disability 
2.1.2.1 What is the Medical Model? 
 The medical model of disability is based on the World Health Organisation’s 
International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps (ICIDH), in 
which impairment denotes: “any loss or abnormality of psychological, physiological, 
or anatomical structure or function”; disability “is any restriction or lack (resulting 
from impairment) of ability to perform an activity in the manner or within the range 
considered normal for a human being”; and handicap “is a disadvantage for a 
given individual, resulting from an impairment or disability, that limits or prevents 
the fulfilment of a role that is normal (depending on age, sex, social and cultural 
factors) for that individual” (Wood, 1980, pp. 27-29).  However, the World Health 
Organisation eventually reviewed this definition of disability and remodelled it in the 
International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF). The ICF’s 
classification covers any disturbance in terms of functional states associated with 
health conditions at body, individual and society levels (Imrie, 2004).  Functional 
states include body functions and structures, activities at the individual level and 
participation in society. As the ICF suggests, disability is the variation of human 
functioning caused by one or a combination of the following: the loss or 
abnormality of a body part (i.e. impairment); difficulties an individual may have in 
executing activities (i.e. activity limitations); and/or problems an individual may 
experience in involvement in life situations (i.e. participation restrictions). The ICF 
also notes that variations in human functioning (i.e. disability) are influenced by 
contextual factors, including environmental factors or aspects of the external or 
extrinsic world such as social systems and services, and personal factors, such as 
age, ethnicity, gender, social status, etc (Imrie, 2004). 
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Nevertheless, the medical profession works from a biological perspective 
and this has led to disability being conceived of as merely a biological product 
(Brittain, 2004). Hence, there is a general view in the population that the problems 
facing people with disabilities “are the result of their physical and/or mental 
impairments and are independent of the wider sociocultural, physical, and political 
environments” (Brittain, 2004, p. 430). The medical profession has power within 
society, and this has played a significant role in creating many of the societal 
perceptions of disability that abound within the medical model discourse (Brittain, 
2004). As Grönvik (2007) explains: 
Historically, disability has been viewed as the property of the medical 
sciences.  The site of disability has been the body and the efforts to reduce, 
prohibit, and eliminate disability have focused on the individual.  
Consequently, the concept of disability has been built upon (bio-) medical 
vocabulary.  Ideas of the normal body and its normal functions have been 
the point of departure to identify disabled people…Maintaining the historical 
perspective, the medical notions of disability have been established and 
acknowledged for decades (p.761).   
 
Given the (bio-)medical view of disability, and its focus on ‘normality’, those 
outside the ‘normal range’ are deemed as deviant. This social deviance lens is 
what medical sociologists often theorise chronic illness and disability through 
(Thomas, 2007). Cockerham (2004) in the ninth edition of his book Medical 
Sociology explains: 
The basis for describing illness as a form of deviant behaviour lies in the 
sociological definition of deviance as any act or behaviour that violates the 
social norms within a given social system.  Thus, deviant behaviour is not 
simply a variation from a statistical average.  Instead, a pronouncement of 
deviant behaviour involves making a social judgement about what is right or 
proper behaviour according to a social norm…Conformity to prevailing 
norms is generally rewarded by group acceptance and approval behaviour; 
deviation from a norm, however, can lead to disapproval of behaviour, 
punishment, or other forms of social sanctions being applied against the 
offender. (p 142) 
 
 However, in order for the social deviance lens to make sense, one must 
come to understand the concepts of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’. It has been pointed 
out that “we do not come to understand ‘normalcy’ through the positive context of 
its own constitutive elements; we define ‘normalcy’ by the extensive network of 
positions that define ‘abnormalcy’ – those biologies believed to deviate too 
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dramatically from the norm” (Jarman et al., 2002, p. 567). Corker and Shakespeare 
(2002) similarly state:  
a Derridean1 perspective on disability would argue that though they are 
antagonistic, ‘normativism’ needs ‘disability’ for its own definition; a person 
without an impairment can define him/herself as ‘normal’ only in opposition 
to that which s/he is not – a person with an impairment.  Disability is not 
excluded from ‘normativism’: it is integral to its very assertion (p.7). 
 
 In fact, the concepts of norm and average were first coined in the nineteenth 
century (Hughes, 2000), and were bound up with developments in numerical 
science: statistics and the concept of the bell curve – the ‘normal curve’ (Thomas, 
2007). In fact, Davis (2002) argues: 
Before the rise of the concept of normalcy…there appears not to have been 
a concept of the normal, but instead the regnant paradigm was one 
revolving around the word ideal.  If people have a concept of the ideal, then 
all human beings fall below that standard and so exist in varying degrees of 
imperfection.  The key point is that in a culture of the ideal, physical 
imperfections are not seen as absolute, but part of a descending continuum 
from top to bottom.  No one, for example, can have an ideal body, and 
therefore no one has to have an ideal body (p.105). 
 
 Based on the concepts of norm, the medical model of disability strives to ‘fix’ 
people with impairments, and one prominent way is through rehabilitation (Gilson & 
Depoy, 2000). In this view, individuals are “defined not only by their diagnosed 
conditions, but also by the degree to which those conditions are barriers to their 
function in developmentally normative life roles” (Gilson & Depoy, 2000, p. 208). 
Therefore, in the modernised world, disability is often related to a person’s ability to 
make economic contributions: “normal” people functionally sustain the economy, 
family life, and other core fibres of the social organism (Gilson & Depoy, 2000; 
Thomas, 2007). Thus, illness and disability represents social deviance because ill 
and disabled people opt out of their productive and contributory social roles; their 
                                                
1 Jacques Derrida (1974) describes the tradition of Western philosophy as relying on a 
series of binary oppositions (i.e. good/evil, masculine/feminine), with a hierarchy in each 
binary pair in which the first term is privileged as original and authentic, whereas the 
second is derivative and subordinate.  Derrida’s ‘general strategy of deconstruction’ (1981, 
p. 41) aims to disrupt these pairs by illustrating the ways in which each of the terms in a 
binary inhabits and relies upon the other for its own presence and meaning; however, 
further detail on this perspective are beyond the scope of this paper.  For further 
information, please see the work of Derrida (1974; 1981). 
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incapacity undermines the social structure (Parsons, 1951).  To be impaired is to 
be perceived as invalid (Hughes, 1999): as Thomas (2007) states: 
Put simply, “everyone knows” that being chronically ill or disabled 
constitutes ‘”a trouble”; these are deviant and devalued social states to be 
avoided at all costs and, if encountered, then remedied if at all possible.  
But this is to understate the case: being ill or disabled diminishes a 
person’s competence – the essential presupposition of membership in 
society (p.28). 
 
2.1.2.2 Criticisms of the Medical Model 
 The medical model has held sway in modern society for many reasons. 
Brittain (2004) summarizes the main reasons:  
the power of the medical profession to define the discourse of disability, the 
legitimization of this discourse by other groups and institutions within 
society, economic arguments, fear of difference and lack of understanding, 
and the use of societal norms combined with a marginalization by members 
of society of any person or group that does not conform to those norms (p. 
435) 
 
However, in recent years many criticisms of the medical model have arisen, which 
has led activists and academics to use sociological ideas to build a distinct and 
radical sociology of disability (Abberley, 1987; Barnes & Mercer, 1996; Barnes, 
Mercer, & Shakespeare, 1999; Barnes, Oliver, & Barton, 2002; Barton, 1996; 
Finkelstein, 1980; Morris, 1996; Oliver, 1990, 1996a; Thomas, 1999). The main 
criticisms of the medical model have revolved around: 1) the assumption that 
disability is a personal tragedy; 2) its focus on fixed, biological bodies; and 3) its 
lack of social perspectives on disability.  
 The first criticism of the medical model is the assumption that disability is a 
personal tragedy. This may stem from the medical model view that disabled people 
are somehow “lacking” or “unable to play a “full role” in society (Dewsbury, Clarke, 
Randall, Rouncefield, & Sommerville, 2004). This focus on personal tragedy has 
led disabled activists to argue that the “feelings of inadequacy, self-doubt, 
worthlessness and inferiority which frequently accompany the onset of impairment” 
are the result, not of a personal response to tragedy, but of “internalized 
oppression” (Barnes et al., 1999, p. 178; Galvin, 2005). 
 A second criticism of the medical model is its focus on fixed, biological 
bodies. There is a widespread belief that ‘disability’ and ‘being disabled’ is all about 
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the body and its defects (Thomas, 2007). As Donoghue (2003) explains, “medical 
terminology…suggests that the physical limitations of the disabled are what cause 
people to be discriminative. This stands in stark contrast to the minority group 
position on disability” (p.203). 
 Linked to this emphasis on biological bodies, a third criticism of the medical 
model is its lack of social perspectives on disability. Disability theorists and activists 
have contended that society has created disability by choosing not to remove 
structural constraints that would enable more people to participate and gain access 
to social resources (Donoghue, 2003). 
 Consequently, the medical model of disability, with its emphasis on 
individuality, rehabilitation and sense of personal tragedy, has been challenged by 
the social model which emphasises that many of the disadvantages faced by 
disabled people arise because of wider society’s inability to accommodate them 
(Corker & French, 1999; Oliver, 1990, 1996b). Donoghue (2003) explains, “by 
adopting a social constructionist viewpoint, theorists and activists have contended 
that society has created disability by choosing not to remove structural constraints 
that would enable more people to participate and gain access to social resources” 
(p. 204). This challenge meant that disability was no longer conceived as, or 
reduced to, a deficit body, but re-conceptualised as a product of social organisation 
or as a consequence of the social relationships of production in a capitalist society 
(Oliver, 1990). These criticisms have led to a different model for understanding 
disability, with the formation of the Union of the Physically Impaired Against 
Segregation (UPIAS). 
 
2.1.3 The Social Model of Disability 
2.1.3.1 What is the Social Model? 
UPIAS led to the redefinition of disability by making a clear distinction 
between impairment and disability (Barnes, 1998).  According to UPIAS (1976), 
impairment concerns the biological “lacking part or all of a limb, or having a 
defective limb, or mechanism of the body”, and disability is about the social 
“disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social 
organisation which takes little or no account of people who have physical 
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impairments and thus excludes them from participation in the mainstream of social 
activities” (p.14). This definition was later broadened to accommodate all 
impairments – physical, sensory, and intellectual – and adopted by other 
organisations (Barnes, 1998). This definition works on the basis that disability is 
constituted both by impairments and the disabling environment (Barnes, 1998).  
The social model, which arose through the critiques of the medical model 
and the formation of UPIAS, asserts that disability is not caused by impairment but 
results from the social restrictions imposed upon people with impairment: 
“…ranging from individual prejudice to institutional discrimination, from 
inaccessible public buildings to unusable transport systems, from segregated 
education to excluding work arrangements, and so on” (Oliver, 1996b, p. 33).  
Therefore, in contradiction to the medical model, which views disability through a 
social deviance lens, the social model instead uses a social oppression lens 
(Thomas, 2007).  
The development of the social model of disability has lead to many benefits 
for the disabled community. For example, Thomas (2002) argues  that the social 
model of disability has been tremendously important in helping challenge the idea 
that the problems disabled people face are the inevitable, ‘tragic’ consequences of 
having impaired bodies. In addition: 
by drawing attention to economic, social and physical barriers, the social 
model leads to demands for greater accessibility of buildings, transport, and 
information, and for measures to counter discrimination in employment and 
other spheres of activity (Burchardt, 2004, p. 736).  
 
Overall then, “the social approach to disability…has played a crucial role in the 
development of the disability movement and the ongoing political struggle of 
disability rights” (Huang & Brittain, 2006, p. 354). It has helped challenge 
conventional characterizations of the disabled as abnormal, inferior, or dependent 
people who at best should be pitied or treated as objects of charitable goodwill 
(Berger, 2008). As Thomas (2008) explains: 
The social model views disabled people as socially oppressed, and it 
follows that improvements in their lives necessitates the sweeping away of 
disablist social barriers and the development of social policies and practices 
that facilitate full social inclusion and citizenship.  This ‘problem and 
solution’ perspective has fuelled the British disabled people’s movement’s 
political programme and informed the research agenda in disability studies 
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for the past three decades.  Many would agree that the results have been 
very impressive, albeit partial and incomplete – for example, anti-
discrimination legislation in the form of the Disability Discrimination Act 
(1995, 2005), “direct payments” arrangements and widespread attitudinal 
change in favour of inclusion (Thomas, 2008, p. 15) 
 
 Shakespeare (2006) similarly reviews the benefits the social model has 
accrued for the disabled community: 
The benefits of the social model approach are that it shifts attention from 
individuals and their physical or mental deficits to the ways in which society 
includes or excludes them.  The social model is social 
constructionist…rather than reductionist or biologically determinist.  Rather 
than essentialising disability, it signals that the experience of disabled 
people is dependent on social context…Rather than disability being 
inescapable, it becomes a product of social arrangements, and can thus be 
reduced, or possibly even eliminated…The social model was crucial to the 
British disability movement for two reasons.  First, it identified a political 
strategy: barrier removal.  If people with impairments are disabled by 
society, then the priority is to dismantle these disabling barriers, in order to 
promote the inclusion of people with impairments.  Rather than pursuing a 
strategy of cure or rehabilitation, it is better to pursue a strategy of social 
transformation…The second impact of the social model was on disabled 
people themselves.  Replacing a traditional deficit approach with a social 
oppression understanding was, and remains, very liberating for disabled 
individuals.  Suddenly, people were able to understand that it was society 
which was at fault, not themselves.  They didn’t need to change: society 
needed to change.  They didn’t have to be sorry for themselves; rather, they 
could be angry… Given that, in Britain, disability rights and disability studies 
have up to this point been inseparable from the social model concept, then 
clearly credit has to be paid to the mobilising power and strategic impact of 
the social model redefinition of disability.  Activists created the social model, 
which inspired new generations of activists, who fought for the structural 
changes which the social model mandated (Shakespeare, 2006, pp. 29-31) 
 
2.1.3.2 Criticisms of the Social Model 
 Recently, despite the many benefits it may have, there have been a number 
of critiques of the social model due to certain problems inherent in its definition of 
disability.  These problems revolve around: 1) impairment and the body; 2) model 
vs. theory; 3) lived experience; and 4) psycho-emotional disability. 
The first criticism of the social model is that, in its eagerness to move away 
from the medical model of disability, the social model completely ignores the issue 
of impairment. It has been argued by Hughes and Paterson (1997) that confining 
impairment to the domain of nature (which medical discourse claims as its object) 
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is to accept, without question, medical jurisdiction over matters of the body and to 
concede apolitical, medical agenda with respect to it. As they go on to explain:  
with respect to the body and impairment, the social model makes no 
concession to constructionism or epistemological relativism: it posits a body 
devoid of history. It also posits a body devoid of meaning, a dysfunctional, 
anatomical, corporeal mass…without intentionality or agency…[T]here is a 
powerful convergence between biomedicine and the social model of 
disability with respect to the body.  Both treat it as a pre-social, inert, 
physical object, as discrete, palpable and separate from the self (Hughes & 
Paterson, 1997, p. 329).   
 
Thus, as Hughes (1999) points out 
the structuralist emphasis of the social model of disability leaves it poorly 
placed to develop a sociological analysis of impairment of the body. It is also 
dualistic, since it draws a clear distinction between nature and the social, 
with impairment consigned to the former domain and disability to the latter” 
(p.160).  
 
Hughes (1999) further comments: 
The connection between impairment and oppression is lost to the social 
model of disability because impairment is regarded as something that is 
constituted entirely in the domain of nature and is, therefore, a natural fact 
beyond contestation.  In other words, the social model concedes that 
impairment is a disfigurement and therefore accepts the medico-aesthetic 
distinction between valid and invalid bodies.  This position actually adds 
legitimacy to accounts of impairment that are shaped by notions of tragedy 
and pity.  Such a position hinders the theoretical and practical basis for 
politics of pride and difference. (p.68)  
 
A second criticism of the social model relates to Oliver’s (1996b) caution 
that “the social model of disability is […] not a substitute for social theory, a 
materialist history of disability, nor an explanation of the welfare state” (p. 41).  In 
Finkelstein’s (2001) words: “sadly, a lot of people have come to think of the social 
model of disability as if it were an explanation, definition or theory, and many 
people use the model in a rather formalistic way” (p.6).  This formalistic view has 
been adopted by advocates of the social model and has lead to it, until recently, 
becoming stagnated rather than built upon and improved. 
A third criticism of the social model revolves around the lived experience of 
disability. Within the social model, lived experience becomes ‘washed out’ as only 
the social aspects of disability are explored. This, in combination with the absence 
of the body in the social model, means that much of what people with impairments 
deal with in everyday is left unexplored. As Crow (1996) explains:  
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we have tended to centre on disability as ‘all’. Sometimes it feels as if this 
focus is so absolute that we are in danger of assuming that impairment has 
no part at all in determining our experiences (p. 57).  
 
It has also been pointed out that the focus of the social model has been on the 
‘public’ experiences of oppression such as social barriers, at the expense of the 
more ‘personal’ experiences of oppression which operate at the emotional level 
(Thomas, 1999). This emphasis upon the social environment has tended to direct 
attention away from the individual which ultimately has implication for the lives of 
disabled people, since key areas of research concerning important aspects of their 
lives are not enquired into (Edwards, 2008).   
A fourth criticism of the social model is proposed by Thomas (1999), namely 
the “psycho-emotional dimensions of disability”. She states: “psycho-emotional 
disablism involves the intended or unintended ‘hurtful’ words and social actions of 
non-disabled people in inter-personal engagement with people with impairments” 
(Thomas, 2007, p. 72). This particular dimension of disability has previously been 
ignored by both the medical and social models of disability. 
 
2.1.2.3 Where do we go from here? 
These criticisms of the social model have the possibility of leading us in 
various directions. Carol Thomas, who advocates a possible redefinition of the 
social model, exemplifies one possible standpoint. Firstly, Thomas (2004) believes 
that a separation should be made between impairment and what she calls 
‘impairment effects’. According to Thomas (2007),  
impairment effects refer to those restrictions of bodily activity and behaviour 
that are directly attributable to bodily variations designated ‘impairments’ 
rather than to those imposed upon people because they have designated 
impairments (disablism) (p.136). 
 
In Thomas’ (2004) mind: 
what has been lost is an understanding that disability only comes into play 
when the restrictions of activity experienced by people with impairment are 
socially imposed, that is, when they are wholly social in origin.  Such a 
social relational view means that it is entirely possible to acknowledge that 
impairments and chronic illness directly cause some restrictions of activity.  
The point is that such non-socially imposed restrictions of activity do not 
constitute ‘disability’.  Such non-socially imposed restrictions might be better 
captured by the concept ‘impairment effects’ (p.580).   
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Gleeson (1997) feels similarly: “Far from being a natural human experience, 
disability is what may become of impairment as each society produces itself 
sociospatially: there is no necessary correspondence between impairment and 
disability” (p.194).   
In addition, Thomas (2004) feels that psycho-emotional disablism 
significantly affects disabled people in their everyday lives.  She states:  
Social barriers ‘out there’ certainly place limits on what disabled people can 
do, but psycho-emotional disablism places limits on who they can be by 
shaping individuals’ ‘inner worlds’, ‘sense of self’ and social behaviours” 
(Thomas, 2007, p. 72).   
 
In order to bring these ideas into social model research, Thomas (1999) proposes 
a redefinition of disability within the social model:  
Disability is a form of social oppression involving the social imposition of 
restrictions of activity on people with impairments and the socially 
engendered undermining of their psycho-emotional well-being (Thomas, 
1999, p. 60) 
   
Shakespeare and Watson (2001), who advocate an outright rejection of the 
social model, exemplify another possible standpoint. They argue:  
People are disabled both by social barriers and by their bodies.  This is 
straightforward and uncontroversial.  The British social model approach, 
because it ‘over-eggs the pudding’, risks discrediting the entire dish 
(Shakespeare & Watson, 2001, p. 17)  
 
There are a number of reasons that a rejection of the social model has been 
proposed. Shakespeare (2006) goes into great detail for his reasoning to reject the 
social model in his book, ‘Disability Rights and Wrongs’. In summary, one of the 
main reasons Shakespeare believes the social model should be scrapped 
altogether is the “strong opposition from within the British disability community” 
(Shakespeare, 2006, p. 39) to previous calls for reform or development of the 
model.  He states: 
alone amongst radical movements, the UK disability rights tradition has, like 
a fundamentalist religion, retained its allegiance to a narrow reading of its 
founding assumptions” (Shakespeare, 2006, pp. 33-34) 
 
In his view, “the strength and simplicity of the social model has created as many 
problems as it has solved” (Shakespeare, 2006, p. 31). He believes that the 
distinction made in the separation of disability and impairment has oversimplified a 
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complicated interaction, and since this distinction lies at the heart of the social 
model, it causes the model itself to be flawed. He explains, “the inextricable 
interconnection of impairment and disability is demonstrated by the difficulty in 
understanding, in particular examples, where the distinction between the two 
aspects of disabled people’s experience lies. While theoretically or politically it may 
appear simple to distinguish impairment from disability, qualitative research has 
found it very difficult to operationalise the social model because it is hard to 
separate impairment from disability in the everyday lives of disabled people 
(Shakespeare, 2006, p. 36). Shakespeare would instead prefer to use the term 
‘disability’ as a broader term to “describe the whole interplay of different factors 
which make up the experience of people with impairments” (Shakespeare, 2006, p. 
58). 
Shakespeare is also unhappy that the social model of disability has become  
…a kind of litmus test, by which disability activists assess interventions.  If 
an initiative or organisation appears to contradict the social model, it must 
be rejected as inappropriate, misguided or even oppressive.  The simplest 
form of this ‘disability correctness’ arises from basic terminology: the social 
model mandates the term ‘disabled people’ because people with 
impairment are disabled by society not their bodies.  The phrase ‘people 
with disabilities’ becomes unacceptable because it implies that ‘disabilities’ 
are individual deficits.  Those who refer to ‘people with disabilities’ are thus 
adopting the ‘medical model’ and must be re-educated or repudiated 
(Shakespeare, 2006, p. 32) 
 
Shakespeare believes that  
the weaknesses of the British approach now outweigh the benefits. 
Translation of ideas and ideologies from activism to academia has not been 
accompanied by a sufficient process of self-criticism, testing, and empirical 
verification. The social model of disability which has successfully inspired 
generations of activists has largely failed to produce good empirical 
research, because it relies on an overly narrow and flawed conception of 
disability (Shakespeare, 2006, p. 9).   
 
He later continues: 
Disability studies would be better off without the social model, which has 
become fatally undermined by its own contradictions and inadequacies.  To 
reject the British social model does not mean returning to the bad old days 
of medicalisation and individualist approaches before the UPIAS revolution.  
There are many other, more robust, ways of conceptualising disability, 
which retain a commitment to equality and justice for disabled people, but 
do not base the analysis on a mistaken bracketing of bodily differences 
(Shakespeare, 2006, p. 28) 
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However, although the two main directions advocated for moving on from 
the social model appear wholly different, both Thomas and Shakespeare agree 
that their views are “not, on the surface of things, a million miles apart: that 
disabled individuals live lives shaped both by impairment effects and by the effects 
of disablist social factors” (Thomas, 2008, p. 41). Indeed, Thomas and 
Shakespeare “both agree that a relational approach to understanding disability is 
needed. By relational, [Shakespeare] means that the disability is a relationship 
between intrinsic factors (impairments etc) and extrinsic factors (environments, 
support systems, oppression etc).” (Shakespeare, 2006, p. 57, italics added).  
Indeed, a number of authors have made similar statements, including Imrie (2004) 
who states that  
physical and mental impairment, in contributing to functional limitations of 
bodies, cannot be discounted as ephemeral in the construction of disability 
and disabled people’s lives. Rather, a focus on interaction between 
functionally impaired bodies and socio-cultural relations and processes is 
seen, by some, as crucial in the development of a non-reductive and non-
essentialised understanding of disability” (Imrie, 2004, p. 288, italics added).  
 
However, Shakespeare disagrees that this relational approach can be fully 
understood from within a social model perspective.  He explains:  
for some individuals impairment is a major limiting factor, which renders any 
social manipulation or barrier removal almost irrelevant. For others, 
impairment itself causes little restriction: it is the reaction of others which 
causes problems of exclusion and disadvantage. The interactional model 
can allow for this variation” (Shakespeare, 2006, p. 60).   
 
As we can see, the definition of the term ‘disability’ is still being hotly 
debated. My point here is not to settle these debates, but to signal that there are 
various ways in which we might define disability. Also, it is important to note here 
that the disagreements revolve around a central theme of this thesis; that is, the 
body. For example, as noted earlier, a main disagreement between understandings 
of disability comes down to whether there should continue be a distinction made 
between ‘disability’ and ‘impairment’, and whether those terms can be as neatly 
separated as they have been within the social model. The entire social model rests 
on the distinction between disability and impairment; therefore, how one chooses 
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to define disability in many ways determines where we go from the social model: 
(1) development and reform; or  (2) rejection.   
However, the definition of disability is also affected by how we position the 
body within the disability debate. The main topic here is the question of how to 
bring the body back into the theorising of disability, without opening up to a re-
medicalisation of disability (Grönvik, 2007). Engagement between disability studies 
and the sociology of the body is confounded by theoretical and political tensions 
(Paterson & Hughes, 1999).   
Disability studies made its way into the academy on the basis of its 
opposition to the idea, deeply rooted both within and outside social science 
disciplines, that ‘disability’ and ‘being disabled’ is all about the body and its 
deficits…from this perspective, any focus on impairment or ‘the body’ 
conceded ground to the biological reductionism that had been orchestrated 
and sustained by doctors and other health and social care professionals for 
more than two centuries…in this context it was seemed diversionary and 
wasteful of resources to spend disciplinary time and energy examining the 
impaired body (Thomas, 2007, p. 121) 
 
2.2 The Body 
2.2.1 What is it? 
 In order to understand the position of the body and its relation to disability, 
we must first understand what ‘the body’ is and why it is important.  Once again, 
this is not as simple to describe as it would seem. As Turner (1994, p. 46) explains: 
For Poststructuralism, the body is ‘the body’, an abstract, singular, 
intrinsically self-existing and socially unconnected, individual; the social 
behaviour, personal identity and cultural meaning of this entity are passively 
determined by (disembodied) authorative discourses of power.  For the new 
political movements of personal-social, cultural-environmental resistance, 
by contrast, ‘the body’ consists essentially in processes of self-productive 
activity, at once subjective and objective, meaningful and material, personal 
and social, an agent that produces discourses as well as receiving them. 
 Understanding what ‘the body’ encompasses is important for many reasons, 
but especially because  
it is our bodies which allow us to act, to intervene in, and to alter the flow of 
daily life.  Indeed, it is impossible to have an adequate theory of human 
agency without taking into account the body.  In a very important sense 
acting people are acting bodies” (Shilling, 2003, p. 8).   
 
According to Moss & Dyck (2002),  
materially, our bodies circumscribe our existences. In this sense we are 
sensual beings, ones that are tactile, emotional and sensorial…at the same 
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time, our bodies carry cultural markers that tag us as aged, raced, sexed, 
classed, sexualised, disabled and ill (p. 67).  
 
Many believe “the lived body is not just one thing in the world, but a way in which 
the world comes to be” (Leder, 1992, p. 25). “The body” is an important topic to 
research because: 
Our lives, including our health, hinge on our bodies; we depend on them; 
engage the world and the people around us with them; live in them and 
through them; do things with and to them; exist as and for them; experience 
having them and being them; feel them; and are them.  In effect, then, the 
body is implicated in everything people do, and thus demands attention 
(Smith & Sparkes, 2007, p. 27) 
 
According to Husserl (1969), the body is “the medium of all perception” (p. 
61), and it is through the body that people gain access to the world (Lyon & 
Barbelet, 1994). Within the German language, this is portrayed via the two 
separate words meaning ‘body’: “Korper” and “Leib”. The notion of a leib and 
korper interpretation of embodiment originates in works in phenomenology and 
physical anthropology (Gehlen, 1988; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Overboe, 1999). A 
korper interpretation of the body reduces it to a classification, whereas a leib 
interpretation considers the body to be an entity which experiences itself and its 
environment (Leder, 1990). According to Leder (1990), since the time of Descartes 
people have interpreted the body as korper rather than leib, which has resulted in a 
rationalization that views the physical body only as an object to be classified like 
any other thing. As Bendelow & Williams (1995) explain: 
Human beings…have a dual nature; one which is succinctly captured in the 
German language by the terms Leib, which refers to animated living through 
the experiential body (ie. the body-for-itself) and Korper, which refers to the 
objective, exterior, institutionalized body (ie the body-in-itself)…[This] 
expresses the essential ambiguity of human embodiment as both personal 
and impersonal, objective and subjective, social and natural.  Moreover, it 
serves to highlight the weakness of the Cartesian legacy for sociology 
which has resulted in an almost exclusive representation of the body as 
Korper rather than simultaneously as Korper and Leib. (p. 147). 
  
 Traditional theories of the body can be organised into two major standpoints: 
as either essentialist (material) or nonessentialist (discursive) orientations (Chau et 
al., 2008). An essentialist orientation of the body views it as a stable, homogenous, 
and objective physical entity. A nonessentialist orientation views the body as 
dynamic, heterogenous, and nonmaterial or socially constructed. Much critique of 
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both these polar orientations has led to many scholars synthesizing the two 
approaches to view the body as both material and discursive (Moss & Dyck, 2002). 
Jackson and Scott (2001) explain that sociologists began to pay attention to the 
body due to a: 
realisation that social interaction is facilitated by bodily negotiations; that we 
recognize others through their bodies, that we categorize them by age, 
gender, ethnicity – even class – through bodily attributes; that this 
recognition itself requires a set of cultural competencies through which we 
read the significance of dress, demeanour and deportment” (pp. 9-10). 
 
However, it has been noted that the sociology of the body: 
is characterised by an abundance of theorizing, but a systematic empirical 
research tradition is lacking…Research on the body has been chastised for 
privileging theorizing, of bracketing our the individual, and for ignoring the 
practical experiences of embodiment (Wainwright & Turner, 2006, p. 238) 
 
For various reasons, ‘the body’ remains one of the most contested concepts 
in the social sciences (Shilling, 2007). In many ways, “the more we focus on the 
body, the more we lose sight of the context; when the context comes into focus, 
the body fades from view” (Jackson & Scott, 2001, p. 10). In recent years, further 
attention has been brought to the study of the body, as more people begin to 
realise that: 
order begins with the body, and our understanding of ourselves and our 
world begins with our reliance on the orderly functioning of our bodies. This 
bodily knowledge informs what we say and do in the course of our daily life. 
We carry our histories with us into the present through our bodies.  The 
past is ‘sedimented’ in the body; that is, it is embodied (Becker, 1999, p. 12) 
 
In addition, Shilling (1993) has come to understand that “in the affluent West, there 
is a tendency for the body to be seen as an entity which is in the process of 
becoming: a project which should be worked at and accomplished as part of an 
individual’s self identity” (p. 4-5, emphasis in original). Finally, it has become clear 
in recent years that the body is at the heart of the social self, and that its 
constitution is both biological and cultural (Hughes, 2000); therefore, it is felt that it 
should be possible to understand the ‘impaired body’ as simultaneously biological, 
material and social – in short, bio-social in character (Imrie, 2004; Thomas, 2007). 
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2.2.2 Embodiment 
In order to discuss embodiment further, we must first understand what is 
meant by the term ‘embodiment’ and how it differs from ‘the body’. According to 
Cregan (2006): 
Embodiment – the physical and mental experience of existence – is the 
condition of possibility for our relating to other people and to the world.  
Fully able or seriously disabled, it is through our physicality that we function 
as social beings, whether in face-to-face communications, through hand-
written letters, printed missives, or by keying disembodied electronic 
symbols into a computer to ‘stay in touch’ with someone half a world away.  
Embodied social relations exists both as the content (the prior 
circumstances) and as an outcome (a consequence) of given social 
formations, given systems through which we create and gain social 
meaning (Cregan, 2006, p. 3) 
 
Embodied sociology, according to Williams & Bendelow (1998), involves: 
theorizing not so much about bodies (in a largely disembodied male way) 
but from bodies as lived entities, including those of its practitioners as well 
as its subjects.  Social institutions and discursive practices cannot be 
understood apart from the real lived experiences and actions of embodied 
human beings across time and space.  Social theory must therefore be 
rooted in the problems of human embodiment (p. 209).   
 
Indeed, Shilling (2001) has found that a number of authors  
analyse human embodiment as a distinctive phenomenon which is outside 
the exclusive control of society, yet which nevertheless provides a crucial 
link between individuals and the social milieu in which they live (p.332).  
 
Unfortunately, while embodiment is recognised as significant, it is generally 
analysed only in terms of its ties to and interdependence with other phenomena 
(Shilling, 2007). 
During the last decade ‘there has been an outpouring of literature on the 
importance of embodiment and the body as central issues for the humanities and 
social sciences’ (Featherstone & Turner, 1995, p. 2). Despite this concern with the 
body, general interpretations of sociology tended to marginalise the significance of 
embodiment to social life (Shilling, 2007). This is due to the fact that: 
If anything defines sociology as a discipline distinct from other modern 
disciplines, it is the pervasive and persistent tensions between structure and 
agency. The relative weight and value accorded to either structure or agency 
have characterized the development of the various schools of thought and 
practice associated with Western sociology (Howson, 2005, p. 16) 
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Therefore, body theorists have had to choose between this criterion of ‘classic 
sociology’ (apparently condemned to view the body as an object, and thus not 
perceived as a source of personal knowledge or understanding, nor deemed 
relevant to the production of sociological knowledge) or the more eclectic and 
flexible resources provided by cultural studies (supposedly more able to account 
for the body as lived and less likely to structurally erase the embodied subject) 
(Howson & Inglis, 2001). However, it has been pointed out that even if classical 
sociological conceptions of embodied experience are judged to be incomplete, this 
provides sociologists of the body with a prime opportunity to return to their heritage 
and to develop with the assistance of other resources, rather than simply abandon, 
the sociological tradition (Shilling, 2001). In addition to tracing the position of the 
body in sociology, contemporary sociologists have sought to utilise resources 
previously classified as being at the margins of, or outside, the discipline (Shilling, 
2001). 
Just as there were many lenses through which one could look at disability, 
so it is with the body and embodiment. A few of these lenses include: biology, 
narrative and phenomenology. As has already been mentioned, many researchers 
are moving away from a solely biological perspective towards the body, as this is 
seen as much too simplistic a notion. One of the main narrative theorists on the 
body is Arthur Frank (1995). According to Frank (1995) there are four ideal typical 
bodies, and these typical bodies are created as the body faces four problems of 
embodiment and defines itself within the four continua of responses (Frank, 1995).   
Figure 1. Body Problems (Frank, 1995) 
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However, it must be noted that “this language is an imposition on bodies; real 
people are not ideal types…actual body-selves represent distinctive mixtures of 
ideal types” (Frank, 1995, p. 29). The four general problems of embodiment are: 
control, body-relatedness, other-relatedness, and desire. The four ideal bodies are 
the disciplined body, the mirroring body, the dominating body and the 
communicative body, and they define themselves in the following way: 
Disciplined body: defines itself primarily in actions of self-regimentation that 
make itself predictable. It experiences its most serious crisis in loss of 
control.  Desire is lacking. Other relatedness is monadic.  In terms of self-
relatedness it is dissociated from itself. 
Mirroring body: defines itself in acts of consumption.  It remains predictable 
as it reflects that which is around it.  It attempts to recreate the body in 
images of other bodies:  more stylish and healthier bodies.  Other 
relatedness remains monadic.  Via consumption it is endlessly producing 
desires.  It is associated with its own surface. 
Dominating body: defines itself in force.  Tends to be male bodies.  
Characterized by a sense of lack, anxiety and fear.  Thus, this body’s 
response to its sense of its own contingency, its dissociated self-
relatedness and its dyadic other-relatedness, are all configured by lack.  
Although dyadic in its other-relatedness, it is against others rather than for 
others. 
Communicative body: is an idealized body in the process of creating itself.  
The body’s contingency is no longer its problem but its possibility.  Other-
relatedness is dyadic.  This desire for dyadic expression and sharing is 
producing.  In terms of self-relatedness it is associated with itself. (Frank, 
1995, pp. 40-52) 
 
 Frank (1995) also uses another lens through which one can examine the 
body and embodiment: phenomenology. Phenomenology of the body or 
‘embodiment’ is particularly important in that it provides sociologists with a sensitive 
and sophisticated perspective on issues such as pain, disability and death 
(Paterson & Hughes, 1999). This lens emphasizes the mind-body nexus, and its 
focus upon the ‘here and now of bodily existence and presence’ (Münch, 1994, p. 
151) acknowledges the centrality of the body in the relationship between self-
consciousness and the self (Hockey & Allen-Collinson, 2007). Merleau-Ponty 
(1962) understood human perception and ‘being’ to be an embodied phenomenon: 
our access to the world and to meaning is by way of our perceiving bodies. From 
this standpoint, the body is not so much an instrument nor an object, but rather the 
subject of perception, socially and indeed sub-culturally mediated though that 
perception may be (Hockey & Allen-Collinson, 2007). Meaning resides in the body, 
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and the body is seen to reside in the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). As we will come 
to see, the body, and embodied experience, is important to those people living in 
impaired bodies. 
 
2.2.3 Body, Embodiment and Disability 
 Within disability studies, the term ‘body’ tends to be used without much 
sense of bodily-ness as if the body were little more than flesh and bones (Paterson 
& Hughes, 1999). Such tendencies miss ‘the opportunity to add sentience and 
sensibility to our notions of self and person, and to insert an added dimension of 
materiality to our notions of culture and history’ (Csordas, 1994, p. 4). In addition, it 
fails to realise that: 
The impaired body is a ‘lived body’. Disabled people experience 
impairment, as well as disability, not in separate Cartesian compartments, 
but as part of a complex interpenetration of oppression and affliction.  The 
body is the stuff of human affliction and affectivity as well as the 
subject/object of oppression. The value of a phenomenological sociology of 
the body to the development of a sociology of impairment is that it 
embodies the addition of sentience and sensibility to the notions of 
oppression and exclusion. Disability is experienced in, on and through the 
body, just as impairment is experienced in terms of the personal and 
cultural narratives that help to constitute its meaning (Hughes & Paterson, 
1997, pp. 334 - 335) 
 
One of the many reasons that disability is believed to be a bio-social 
phenomenon is explained by Thomas (2002), who states: 
Somehow, bodies need to be theorized as, at the same time, bio-socially 
producted and culturally constructed entities.  Both biological reductionism 
and cultural reductionism need to be avoided.  Significant impairments need 
to be seen as real differences from the ‘usual’ body whilst simultaneously 
understood to be invested with meanings or representations that construct 
these differences in the socio-medical language of ‘impairment’, 
‘disfigurement’, and so forth.  In addition, we need to work on an 
understanding of the way in which the biological reality of bodies is shaped 
by, and impacts back upon, social and environmental processes and 
practices: that is, on the ways in which bodies are the effects of bio-social 
interaction (p.76) 
 
It is believed that a sociology of impairment that is phenomenological would 
facilitate the scholarly task of illustrating that the impaired body has a history and is 
as much a cultural phenomenon as it is a biological entity (Paterson & Hughes, 
1999). This sociology of impairment has been called for because it is undeniable 
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that impairment plays a part in determining a person’s sense of self, because 
unlike other bodies marked by difference (e.g. race, gender and sexual orientation) 
disabled people cannot argue that their bodies are not physiologically different from 
other bodies (Crow, 1996; Promis, Erevelles, & Matthews, 2001). Turner & 
Wainwright (2003) argue that: 
One should distinguish between the epistemological construction of the 
body, the ontology of embodiment and the phenomenology of 
embodiment…’the disabled body’, for example, might involve analysis of the 
rise of the ‘disability business’ and the political and economic role of 
stigmatic labels, but ‘the embodiment of impairment’ invokes a different 
research agenda, namely the study of the everyday world of impairment.  
One can recognise the political importance of the notion that disability is 
socially constructed without rejecting the equally important task of 
understanding the phenomenology of impairment and the experiences of 
disability in terms of social ontology (p. 277). 
 
In the study of impairment and disability, the term ‘impairment effects’ has 
recently come into usage through the work of Thomas (2007). For example, a 
woman with a spinal cord injury has a physical impairment. If this woman is unable 
to gain access to a public building because there is no elevator or wheelchair 
ramp, it is considered a disability, and thus a form of social oppression. However, 
this deprivation of opportunities will not disappear simply by the removal of all 
disablist and disabling socio-structural barriers (Smith & Sparkes, 2008a) because 
she also has impairment effects: restrictions directly associated with having a 
physical impairment and being a material body that is unable to do certain things. 
Therefore, she experiences pain and tiredness, bowel and bladder problems, and 
may be unable to physically cuddle her children. Hence, “in any ‘real’ social setting, 
impairments, impairment effects and disablism are thoroughly intermeshed with the 
social conditions that bring them into being and give them meaning” (Thomas, 
2007, p. 137). Indeed, even the World Health Organisation has come to recognise 
the bio-social nature of disability; the International Classification of Functioning, 
Disability and Health is “based on the biopsychosocial model of disability, which is 
an integration of the medical and social models.  ICF provides, by this synthesis, a 
coherent view of different perspectives of health: biological, individual and social” 
(WHO, 2002). 
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Impairment and its effects are at one and the same time of the body, or 
embodied, and socially contingent in a materialist sense – the embodied act is thus 
bio-social (Thomas, 2007); it is this biological and social quality that makes the 
body at once such an obvious, and yet such an elusive phenomenon (Shilling, 
2003). Embodiment is a social, as well as a biological, phenomenon because 
people with disabilities “are looked upon, identified, judged and represented 
primarily through their bodies, which are perceived in popular consciousness to be 
imperfect, incomplete and inadequate” (Hargreaves, 2000, p. 185).  
Given this emphasis, and calls for a focus on the body when exploring 
disabled people’s lives, how might we begin to understand ‘the body’? One way is 
through narrative. As Frank (1995) states: 
The body is not mute, but it is inarticulate; it does not use speech, yet 
begets it.  The speech that the body begets includes illness stories; the 
problem of hearing these stories is to hear the body speaking in them.  
People telling illness stories do not simply describe their sick bodies; their 
bodies give their stories their particular shape and direction.  People 
certainly talk about their bodies in illness stories; what is harder to hear in 
the story is the body creating the person (p. 27) 
 
 Indeed, “the act of narration that structures and projects our sense of 
selfhood and identity over time, along with the tellability of personal stories, is an 
embodied process” (Smith & Sparkes, 2008a, p. 219). In the following section, I will 
discuss stories and narrative, and how it is helpful in researching the body, 
embodiment and disability. 
 
2.3 Narrative 
2.3.1 What is it? 
 In the simplest terms, a narrative is a story; it has a plotline, with a 
beginning, middle and an end. According to Hendry (2007), “stories are what 
makes us human. Our narratives, be they life stories, autobiographies, histories, 
sciences, or literature are the tales through which we constitute our identities.  We 
are our narratives” (p. 495). However, narrative is also much more than that; as 
Turner (1987) explains: 
Scientific knowledge of the world is a form of narrative (a story) and like all 
narratives science depends on various conventions of language (a style of 
writing, for instance).  Narrative is a set of events within a language and 
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language is a self-referential system.  Nothing occurs outside language.  
Therefore, what we know about ‘the world’ is simply the outcome of 
arbitrary convention we adopt to describe the world.  Different societies and 
different historical periods have different conventions and therefore different 
realities (pp. 10-11) 
 
 On the other hand, some authors differentiate between a narrative and a 
story; a Narrative is taken to mean:  
a dynamic structure or template embedded in society that has a point and 
characters along with a plot connecting events that unfold sequentially over 
time and in space to provide an overarching explanation or consequence.  It 
is a construction which people rely on to tell stories (Smith & Sparkes, 
2008b, p. 5).  
 
However, a Story is:  
an actual…tale an individual or group tells and performs.  It is a verbal or 
non-verbal act of telling that is the work of a human agent embedded in a 
social world, and the process of storytelling is something they do or perform 
to transmit a message (Smith & Sparkes, 2008b).   
 
Thus, the term story is used when referring to actual tales people tell, while 
narrative is used when discussing general dimensions or properties, such as 
tellability, consequences, sequences of speech, act, structures, categorical 
content, rhetorical tropes, and/or temporality, which comprise particular stories 
(Smith & Sparkes, 2008b); however, they do acknowledge that “since narratives 
only exist in particular stories, and all stories are narratives, the distinction is hard 
to sustain” (Frank, 1995, p. 188).  
Recent research has suggested that narrative lay knowledge acts as the 
“medium through which people locate themselves within the places they inhabit 
and determine how to act within and upon them” (Popay, Williams, Thomas, & 
Gatrell, 1998, p. 619). According to Polkinghorne (1988) narrative is the “primary 
scheme by means of which human existence is rendered meaningful…People are 
story telling organisms who, individually and socially, lead storied lives” (pp. 5, 7).  
In addition, it is felt that “cultures provide prefabricated narratives for hooking up 
events of our lives…as agents of our own construction, we chose among available 
narratives, and sometimes seek stories that transgress the culturally condoned 
ones” (Richardson, 1997, p. 181). These ‘prefabricated narratives’ are what Frank, 
(1995) describes as ‘narrative types’:  
 32 
A narrative type is the most general storyline that can be recognised 
underlying the plot and tensions of particular stories.  People tell their own 
unique stories, but they compose these stories by adapting and combining 
narrative types that culture makes available (p. 75).  
 
Also emphasising the socio-cultural aspect of narrative, McAdams (2006) 
comments: 
Culture provides people with a menu of narrative forms and contents from 
which the person selectively draws in an effort to line up lived experience 
with the kinds of stories available to organize and express it.  Indeed, the 
story menu goes so far as to shape lived experience itself: we live in and 
through stories. [S]tories are made and remade, performed and edited, 
instantiated, contoured and lived out in the social ecology of everyday life 
and with respect to the norms of narrative content, structure, and 
expression that prevail in a given culture (p. 16) 
 
 Not only might narrative shed light on how socio-cultural factors shape our 
lives, but moreover, according to Eisner (1981), narrative research is important 
because “it is to the artistic to which we must turn, not as a rejection of the 
scientific, but because with both we can achieve binocular vision.  Looking through 
one eye never did provide much depth of field” (p. 9). Narrative research 
“emphasizes personal stories and narratives, the intensely individual nature of 
each person’s experience and people constantly remaking themselves as an 
active, ongoing social project” (Dhunpath, 2000, p. 545).  It also highlights the ways 
in which our culture and society shape and are shaped by individual lives (Hendry, 
2007). Georgakopoulou (2006) explains that even if life is not accepted to be 
narratively structured, the process of narrativizing it is invariably thought of as 
involving meaning making, ordering and structuring of the experience.   
 
2.3.2 Narrative, Disability and the Body 
Narrative theory is increasingly employed to understand the subjective 
experience of illness and disability (McLeod, 2000). Frank (1995) argued that 
people with serious medical conditions make sense of their lives by telling illness 
stories through their diseased bodies; thus, in an embodied sense, they give voice 
to an experience medicine cannot describe. In fact, McAdams (1993) believes that 
the maintenance of a coherent narrative thread provides a sense of meaning and 
purpose to one’s life, and Crossley (2000) theorises that creating and telling stories 
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of one’s life is a necessary part of developing and maintaining a coherent identity 
and sense of self because it is “through narrative [that] we define who we are, who 
we were and where we may be in the future” (p. 67). However, Couser (1997) 
believes that: 
pure illness narratives tend to disengage the body from the self in the way 
that medical discourse often tends to do. Full life-writing is facilitated, 
authorised or even required when one assumes that what happens to one’s 
body happens to one’s life (p.14) 
 
Frank (2005) suggests three underlying narratives of illness: restitution, 
chaos and quest narratives; however, he stresses that actual tellings combine all 
three. The restitution narrative is the most common narrative type, and has the 
plot: “yesterday I was healthy, today I’m sick, but tomorrow I’ll be healthy again” 
(Frank, 1995, p. 77). In disability terms, this becomes: “yesterday I was able-
bodied, today I’m disabled, but tomorrow I’ll be able-bodied again”. This narrative 
reflects a modernist expectation that for every suffering there is a remedy, and the 
disabled person’s own desire for restitution is often compounded by the 
expectation that other people want to hear restitution stories (Whitehead, 2006).  
The chaos narrative is the opposite of restitution: its plot “imagines life never 
getting better” (Frank, 1995, p. 97). Finally, the quest narrative meets suffering 
head on; these stories accept contingency and seek to use it (Frank, 1995).  
Illness, or disability, is the occasion of a journey that becomes a quest; while what 
is quested for may never be wholly clear, the quest is defined by the person’s belief 
that something is to be gained from the experience (Frank, 1995, p. 115).  Each of 
these narratives reflects strong cultural and personal preferences, and the strength 
of these preferences present a further barrier to listening to the ill: both institutions 
and individual listeners steer people toward certain narratives, and other narratives 
are simply not heard (Frank, 1995, p. 77). Frank (1995) explains: 
The ill body’s articulation in stories is a personal task, but the stories told by 
the ill are also social.  The obvious social aspect of stories is that they are 
told to someone, whether that other person is immediately present or 
not…From their families and friends, from the popular culture that surrounds 
them, and from the stories of other ill people, storytellers have learned the 
formal structures of narrative, conventional metaphors and imagery, and 
standards of what is and is not appropriate to tell.  Whenever a new story is 
told, these rhetorical expectations are reinforced in some ways, changed in 
others, and passed on to affect others’ stories (p.3) 
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However, it is felt that individuals experiencing chronic illness or disability 
need alternative narrative resources by which to story their lives in order to prevent 
narrative wreckage, and thereby preserve or reinstate sense of self, identity, and 
mental health (Carless & Douglas, 2007; Frank, 1995; Smith & Sparkes, 2005b). 
This is important because, according to Sparkes and Smith (2002), narrative plays 
an important role in the construction of identities and selves: 
The stories we are told, and the stories we learn to tell about ourselves and 
our bodies, are important in terms of how we come to impose order on our 
embodied experiences and make sense of events and actions in our lives. 
As individuals construct past events and actions in personal narratives, they 
engage in a dynamic process of claiming identities, selves and constructing 
lives. (p.261) 
 
2.4 Identity 
2.4.1 What is it? 
 Identity, like disability, the body, and narrative, is not as simple a concept to 
explain as it may appear. According to Scott-Hill (2004):  
Identity is concerned with the social formation of the person, the cultural 
interpretation of the body and the creation and use of markers of 
membership such as rites of passage and social categories. As such, it 
might be thought of as mediating between the personal, private world of 
everyday life and the collective space of multiple cultural forms and social 
relations: it is a pivot between the social and the individual…identity is 
social: it is constructed in and through social relations of difference. 
However, both ‘social relations’ and ‘difference’ can be conceptualised in 
various ways, with the result that ‘identity’ is not uniform in its meaning 
(p.87) 
 
Jenkins (1996) also supports the view that identities are social products when he 
contends that identities are formed in a dialectical relationship between internal 
factors (i.e., what we think our identities are) and external factors (i.e., how others 
see us and react to us), which may strengthen or contradict each other. 
Hall (1996) has suggested that within the social sciences there are two 
historical and strategic approaches to the production of identities; however, this is 
only one rather simplistic perspective, and there are many others. Nevertheless, for 
Hall (1996), one approach is “based on the assumption that there is an essential, 
natural or intrinsic meaning to any identity; this identity is based on either a shared 
social experience, origin or structure” (Watson, 2002, p. 509). The second 
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approach “denies the existence of any identity based on a shared origin or 
experience – identities exist only as opposites, they are multiple and temporal” 
(Watson, 2002, p. 509). According to Watson (2002), much of the writing on 
disability from within disability studies falls within the first approach; however, it has 
been questioned whether a ‘disabled identity’ based on these shared 
characteristics actually exists. Although identity as a disabled person is often 
presented as something fixed or stable (Huang & Brittain, 2006), Shakespeare 
(1996) suggests that it may be necessary to consider a variety of disability 
identities rather than a single essentialist disability identity. Watson (2002) 
questions: 
Do disabled people know who they are because of the fact that they have 
an impairment, because of the fact that they face discrimination or because 
of who they, ontologically, believe themselves to be? These are 
fundamental questions in any analysis of disability (p. 512) 
 
Indeed, Giddens (1991) believes that group membership is no longer synonymous 
with identity formation; he argues that we are able to choose our identity, and can 
ignore or reject identities fostered on us as a result of ascribed characteristics.  
 Charmaz (1987) has provided much insight into the fundamental loss of self 
that accompanies chronic illness. It has been demonstrated that chronic illness with 
impairment can intrude on a person’s daily life, undermine a person’s sense of self, 
and initate various identity dilemmas (Charmaz, 1987; Sparkes, 1998a). Similarly, 
acute illness with impairment as a form of “biographical disruption2” (Bury, 1982) 
can also set in motion a chain of events that results in the same consequences for 
an individual (Sparkes, 1998a), which has led to the frequent use of Charmaz’ 
(1987) theories in relation to disability as well as chronic illness. 
  
2.4.2 Identity, the Self and Disability 
The ability to recreate a stable identity following chronic illness or disability is 
an important part of maintaining a sense of self. According to Charmaz (1987): 
Being able to attain, maintain, or recreate a valued identity after an episode 
of chronic illness becomes crucially significant to these ill people who 
                                                
2 According to Bury (1997), biographical disruption is the disturbing impact that the onset 
of chronic illness (or disability) has on self-perception and identity, “exposing the 
individual to threats of self-identity and potentially damaging loss of control” (p.124) 
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become acutely aware of the hardships in doing so. To fail to regain a 
valued identity to them is not just a failed attempt but is, moreover, a failure 
of self (p.286). 
 
Charmaz’ (1987) research brought to light two interconnected issues for studying 
identity: the role of preferred identities and the development of identity hierarchies. 
Charmaz (1987) defined “preferred identities” as symbolizing “assumptions, hopes, 
desires and plans for a future now unrealized…preferred identities represent 
identity goals” (p. 284). She continues: 
The concept of identity is more than stable or discontinuous identifications 
of actions, attributes and statuses through time…the concept of identity 
encompasses the person’s vision of future selves, reflecting his or her 
hopes, aspirations, objectives and goals. In this sense, preferred identities 
serve as a source of motivation (Charmaz, 1987, p. 284) 
 
Charmaz (1987) also points out that “the timing and sequencing of the person’s 
illness figures in his or her definitions of a preferred identity” (p.291). This is one of 
the main reasons her theories have been so useful in relation to disability, as well 
as chronic illness. 
Linked to the concept of preferred identities is that of identity hierarchies. 
According to Charmaz (1987), an “identity hierarchy becomes visible as ill people, 
over time, choose different types of preferred identities, reflecting relative difficulty 
in achieving specific aspirations and objectives” (p. 285). The identity levels 
described are: (1) the supernormal social identity; (2) the restored self; (3) 
contingent personal identity; and (4) the salvaged self (Charmaz, 1987). These 
identity levels are implicit or explicit objectives for personal and/or social identity 
that chronically ill people aim to realize (Charmaz, 1987).  
The first identity level on the hierarchy is the supernormal social identity. In 
this identity level, chronically ill or disabled persons attempt to function at a more 
demanding level than their healthier counterparts, despite serious difficulties 
(Charmaz, 1987). It has been found that these ill people make every effort to 
maintain their “normal” identities so that an illness identity will not inundate who 
they believe themselves to be; in order to be taken as “normal”, they think they 
have to be and do more than “just average” (Charmaz, 1987).  
The second level on the hierarchy is the restored self. This identity level 
typically represents taken-for-granted assumptions that recovery should be the 
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sequel to illness (Charmaz, 1987). According to Charmaz (1987), although many ill 
persons simply wish to restore the threads of their former lives, three more specific 
types of restored self stand out: (1) the entrenched self; (2) the developing self; 
and (3) the assumed self.  
The first type of restored self is the entrenched self. Restoring an 
entrenched self means being wedded to a self-conception situated in the past 
(Charmaz, 1987). A person restoring an entrenched self does not aim to move to 
new, different, or “better” identities (Charmaz, 1987). In contrast: 
individuals restore a developing self out of their sense of how they should 
shape their lives. Here, the direction of their lives concerns them as well as 
the character of the self they shape, rather than commitment to specific prior 
activities and prior identities (Charmaz, 1987, p. 303) 
 
Those who aim for a developing self focus on the direction they wish to take 
toward potential selves (Charmaz, 1987). Thus, this type of restored self has much 
in common with Frank’s (1995) description of those who tell quest stories.  
The final type of restored self is the assumed self. This restored self is used 
by individuals whose “self-concepts are situated in assumptions about significant 
social relationships and social worlds with which they have long been associated” 
(Charmaz, 1987, p. 305). 
The third identity level on the hierarchy is the contingent personal identity. 
This is an identity level which “an ill person, those involved, or both, define as 
hypothetically possible, but questionable, risky, and decidedly conditional due to 
possible further illness” (Charmaz, 1987, p. 307). The three conditions under which 
individuals pursue a contingent personal identity will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 4. 
The salvaged self is the final identity level on the hierarchy proposed by 
Charmaz (1987). People who aim for this identity level do not wish to be identified 
by illness alone, and thus attempt to maintain some positive past self images.  
While Charmaz’s (1987) hierarchy is one of the most widely used in relation 
to identity during illness and disability, it is not the only identity reconstruction 
theory that has been proposed. Yoshida (1993) proposed a theory specifically for 
adults with traumatic spinal cord injury that was based around a pendulum, as 
opposed to a hierarchy. Yoshida (1993) explained:  
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The pendulum of self refers to a proposed life course of self and identity 
after the onset of traumatic spinal cord injury. This model suggests that the 
emerging self after spinal cord injury swings back and forth like a pendulum 
between the nondisabled and disabled aspects of self. Between these outer 
positions on the pendulum, individuals may pass through and experience 
different degrees of the nondisabled and disabled selves called predominant 
identity views. These predominant identity views reflect that self which is 
articulated implicitly or explicitly by the individual as the most important self 
to express over a period of time and/or within a particular situation (p.p. 222-
223) 
 
The five predominant identity views described by Yoshida (1993) were: (1) the 
former self; (2) the supernormal identity; (3) the disabled identity as total self; (4) 
the disabled identity as an aspect of the total self; and (5) the middle self. 
Movement along the pendulum was influenced by a number of experiences: (1) 
loss; (2) sustainment; (3) integration; (4) continuity; and (5) development. 
The first predominant identity view posited by Yoshida (1993) is the former 
self. This identity view is based on who the person was prior to the injury; however, 
the total former self cannot be recaptured as the experience would likely transform 
the individual in a significant way (Yoshida, 1993). This identity view consists of 
‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ aspects of the non-disabled self, where core aspects of self 
greatly define the individual. Depending on the age of the person when s/he is 
injured and their life experiences up to that point, an individual may posses more or 
less core aspects of self (Yoshida, 1993). 
The second predominant identity view is the disabled identity as total self. In 
Yoshida’s (1993) study, this was seen as a mainly negative identity. It is seen 
when an individual treats him/her self as disabled by expecting assistance from 
others without asking all of the time and/or believing that other people should know 
what a person with a SCI can and cannot do (Yoshida, 1993).  
The third predominant identity view is the supernormal identity, and is very 
similar to Charmaz’ (1987) identity level of the same name. This identity view is 
manifested when an individual engages in activities of an extraordinary nature 
requiring increased time and energy and/or the person refuses any assistance from 
others (Yoshida, 1993). 
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The fourth predominant identity view is the disabled identity as an aspect of 
the total self. This identity represents one aspect of the person, as opposed to 
encompassing or nearly encompassing the total self (Yoshida, 1993).  
Figure 2. The Pendular Reconstruction of Self: Predominant Identity Views 
(Yoshida, 1993) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, the fifth predominant identity view was that of the middle self. This 
self occurs when an individual moves closer to the middle of the pendulum, and 
refers to individuals who act upon both the non-disabled and disabled aspects of 
self (Yoshida, 1993). 
 The work done by Charmaz (1987) and Yoshida (1993) demonstrate what 
Smith & Sparkes (2006) comment on:  
researchers are united in their departure from the traditional Cartesian view 
that sees the self as a ‘thing’, existing apart from and having different 
substance than the body, and move toward theorizing selves and identities 
as active and interpretively constituted through embodied narratives (p. 
170). 
 
However, the body and the way it relates to self and identity are also 
affected by other topics, such as gender. Morris (1996) argued:  
there was a concern amongst disabled women that the way our experience 
was being politicised didn’t leave much room for acknowledging our 
experience of our bodies; that too often there wasn’t room for talking about 
the experience of impairment, that a lot of us feel pressurised into just 
focussing on disability, just focussing on social barriers (p. 13).   
 
In the following section, I will cover the topic of gender more fully, and discuss the 
effect of gender on disability and the body. 
The 
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2.5 Gender 
2.5.1 What is it? 
Gender is generally an aspect of life that is taken for granted.  Gender 
arrangements can be sources of pleasure but also sources of injustice and harm; 
thus gender is inherently political, and often the politics are complicated and 
difficult (Connell, 2002). Although some might think differently: 
being a man or a woman is not a fixed state. It is a becoming, a condition 
actively under construction…Part of the mystery of gender is how a pattern 
that on the surface appears so stark and rigid, on close examination turns 
out so fluid, complex and uncertain (Connell, 2002, p. 4) 
 
Gender, above all, is a social structure (Petersen, 2006). It is not an 
expression of biology, nor a fixed dichotomy in human life or character; it is a 
pattern in our social arrangements and in the everyday activities or practices which 
those arrangements govern (Connell, 2002). Shilling (1993) explains that the body 
itself is not an empty shell which has gender placed into it; rather it forms a basis 
for, and actively contributes towards, social relations.   
Because of this social aspect, language becomes an important aspect of 
gender, even though it does not provide a consistent theoretical framework for 
understanding it, as different languages make different distinctions (Connell, 2002).  
Connell (2002) goes on to explain: 
Many languages define a trichotomy of classes: masculine, feminine and 
neuter. Most contemporary discussions of gender in society, however, drop 
the third category and emphasize a dichotomy…In its most common usage, 
then, the term ‘gender’ means the cultural difference of women from men, 
based on the biological division between male and female (p. 8) 
 
However, there are decisive objections to this definition of disability, and it is 
felt that they key is to move from a focus on difference to a focus on relations 
(Connell, 2002).  It is felt that: 
gender is, above all, a matter of social relations with which individuals and 
groups act. Gender relations do include difference and dichotomy, but also 
include many other patterns… gender patterns may differ strikingly from one 
cultural context to another, but are still ‘gender’ (Connell, 2002, pp. 9-10)   
 
Connell (2002) defined gender, using these social and cultural aspects, as “the 
structure of social relations that centres on the reproductive arena, and the set of 
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practices (governed by this structure) that bring reproductive distinctions between 
bodies into social processes” (p. 10).   
Investigating gender alongside disability is important, because many feel 
that disabled women may suffer from “multiple oppression”. This refers to the fact 
that the effects of being attributed several stigmatized identities are often multiplied 
(exacerbated) and they can be experienced simultaneously and singularly 
depending on the context (Vernon, 1999). Therefore, in the following section, I will 
discuss the effect that gender has on people with disabilities and how body, and 
embodiment, affect gender. 
 
2.5.2 Gender, Disability, the Body, and Sport 
Physical activity and sport is particularly relevant when discussing disability, 
the body and gender. In the previous sections, I have made some mentions of the 
effect sport has on disability and the body, and how society idealises physically fit 
bodies and sporting attainment. It is argued that the bodily practices found in 
mainstream sports exclude a majority of boys and girls from being able to 
participate in it freely without recrimination; as such, they shape children’s future 
understanding of their own bodies in relation to gender, their role in sport and 
indirectly their own physical and social bodily identities (Paechter, 2003). In 
addition, whenever a comparison occurs between men’s and women’s sport – no 
matter what the sport – it seems almost impossible to explain the differences in 
ways which do not draw on and reproduce hegemonic discourses of gender 
difference (Wright & Clarke, 1999).   
In light of generally lower participation rates in sport among women, and the 
different socio-cultural significance of sport and exercise for women, it is felt that 
women’s stories of sport will differ markedly from men’s (Carless & Douglas, 
2007). It has been claimed that the influence of dominant images of gender cause 
many disabled women to “choose not to participate in sport because, in common 
with many able-bodied women, they are influenced more by commodified anti-
athletic stereotypes of femininity” (Hargreaves, 2000, pp. 186-187). There is also a 
perceived fear of failure which can act as a strong deterrent for many people (and 
especially women) with disabilities to become involved in sport; and this is 
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especially true when you consider the fact that placing themselves in a sporting 
context is very likely to exacerbate the visibility of the very physical differences that 
lead to these feelings and perceptions in the first place (Brittain, 2004). However, it 
has been found that participant’s stories of sport and exercise were: 
almost exclusively focussed on the present – the here and now – and on 
valued moments and good experiences within this present…a focus on the 
present, as opposed to the past or future, is significant in that it signifies a 
departure from the dominant restitution story of illness (Carless & Douglas, 
2007, pp. 25-26). 
 
Sexuality is also an important issue for women, especially if they are 
involved in sport or have a disability.  Patriarchal society has kept close control 
over women’s sexuality, what sexual activity is socially acceptable and to whom 
(Kallianes & Rubenfeld, 1997).  In a society obsessed with ‘perfection’ and health, 
and intolerant of difference, non-disabled people view sexual activity by disabled 
people with discomfort or alarm (Waxman, 1993). Additionally, as Cox & 
Thompson (2000) discuss: 
The discourse of heterosexuality is particularly influential in the construction 
of sportswomen’s bodies. For example, sporting discourse posits that the 
body must be physically powerful. However, heterosexual discourse, which 
depends on gendered distinctions for it’s meaning, constructs the male 
body as strong and active and the female as weak and passive. The binary 
and contradictory logic of these two discourses is evident in the valorisation 
of male athletes for possessing strength and muscularity, and in questioning 
whether a sportswoman can, in fact, be a ‘real’ (read: heterosexual) 
woman…Female athletes, who deviate from the ‘norms’ of femininity by 
having short hair and athletic bodies, are challenged overtly or covertly 
about their sexuality (p. 8). 
 
For those women who overcome the societal norms of ‘femininity’, a strong 
sporting identity can also prove somewhat of an “Achilles’ heel”; indeed, from a 
psychological viewpoint, individuals with a strong athletic identity often exhibit 
greater signs of anxiety, depression and low self-esteem when their body project 
and athletic self-identity are disrupted by a traumatic event such as a career-
threatening injury (Brewer, Van Raalte, & Linder, 1993). 
The idolization of physically fit bodies and sporting attainment has led to a 
widespread social pursuit of the ‘body beautiful’. It is believed that the ideal of 
bodily perfection “is central to the oppression of disabled people” (Huang & Brittain, 
2006, p. 352).  Mansfield (2008) feels: 
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a reality-congruent observation would be that men and women can 
experience, at the same time, liberating and repressive features associated 
with the pursuit of idealized bodies. The balance of liberating and repressive 
potential in pursuing an idealized body varies in relation to the long-term and 
complex links associated with fitness culture and gender, race/ethnicity, age, 
social class and disability (p. 100) 
 
2.6 Rational and Purpose 
In the previous sections, I have discussed at length the topics of disability, 
the body, narrative and gender, and covered much of the research that has been 
completed on them in the past and in more recent years. In addition, I have 
touched on the relationship between these topics and sport and physical activity.  
However, much work is still to be done, in each of the separate areas, and also in 
how all the different topics combine and interact.   
Although disabled people have recognised that feminism can offer much to 
disability studies, the converse is not true (Sheldon, 1999). According to Lloyd 
(2001): 
The problems experienced by disabled women can be seen to be as much 
on account of their gender as their disability. Equally, however, disabled 
women have found themselves largely ignored by feminists and their 
perspective either lost by, or directly at variance with, much feminist 
analysis. Thus disabled women have been caught between, on the one 
hand, an analysis and movement in which they have been invisible as 
women, and one in which their disability has been ignored or subsumed, on 
the other (p. 716) 
 
Smith & Sparkes (2005) have suggested, becoming disabled through sport 
is a major disruptive life event that instigates a multiplicity of difficult and complex 
issues that the person has to deal with. This is particularly so when negative life 
events disrupt the ability to engage in preferred activities, like sport, that have 
special importance to a person’s identity and sense of self. Thus, traumas like 
becoming disabled are likely to be accentuated and take on a more imperious 
position in the lives of those individuals who shape their life significantly around the 
body’s performance in sport. Although there have been some studies in recent 
years on becoming disabled through sport, these studies have focused exclusively 
on men (Smith & Sparkes, 2002, 2004; Smith & Sparkes, 2005b; Sparkes & Smith, 
2002, 2003, 2005); thus nothing is known about women’s experiences and the 
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gendered dynamics involved when they become disabled through sport.  
Nevertheless, as Sparkes (1996) points out: 
a focus on epiphanous moments in the lives of elite sport persons who 
become ill, get injured, and/or acquire a physical disability can assist our 
understanding of the multiple body-self relationships that exist in 
contemporary society, and the manner in which these relationships get 
constructed and reconstructed over time (p. 465) 
   
What, therefore, happens to women who have developed their bodies 
through sport, who have successfully negotiated a specific female identity and had 
it validated through a certain sport, but then experience a catastrophic athletic 
injury playing the very sport that has contributed so much to this process? How do 
they cope with crossing the border from the world of the able-bodied into the world 
of disability, where they remain to this day? How do they feel about their new and 
very different body? Just what types of life stories do women tell, how are they 
performed, and how does all this operate to shape both personal and public 
understandings of disability for women? Given that sport and physical activity has 
a range of sociological, psychological, and physiological health benefits, what 
promotes physical activity after becoming disabled through sport? Just what is 
involved in the process of narrative reconstruction of body-self relationships, and 
how does this process operate, for those participants who choose to becoming 
involved in disabled sport and those who choose not to do so? I hope, with this 
research, to be able to answer some of these questions by investigating women’s 
experiences of becoming disabled through sport, exploring the stories they tell, 
their construction of self, and their bodily experiences over time. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
What is qualitative research? Qualitative research is difficult to define and to 
draw a precise boundary around its meaning. This is because it can mean different 
things to different people. That said, this does not imply that one has to either 
ignore or resolve definitional difficulties; instead, it creates an imperative in which 
the difficult, but not insurmountable task is to assume the responsibility to grapple 
with what is being said within the field of research and have a position regarding 
what qualitative can mean. This can be approached in two ways. One way is via 
common characteristics, and the other is via paradigmatic assumptions.  
When looking at what qualitative research is, based on common 
characteristics, it should be noted that different characteristics will receive different 
emphases depending on the qualitative project (Creswell, 2007). For example, 
qualitative research is interested in people. It seeks to explore the subjectivities, 
meaning and complexity of an individual or group (Gubrium & Holstein, 1997). It is 
committed to close scrutiny and, instead of trying to identify cause-effect law 
relationships, focuses on the ways people interpret and make sense of their 
experiences and the social world in which they live (Gubrium & Holstein, 1997). It 
is ideographic rather than nomothetic (Sparkes, 1992). Researchers, moreover, do 
not seek to give ‘the last final word’ on a person, but offer an unfinalized account 
(Frank, 2005). Multiple forms of representation are available to them with which to 
communicate their findings (Sparkes, 2002). A researcher also uses expressive 
language and communicates in detail using thick and rich description. Moreover, 
instead of tightly prefigured, the design of a study is emergent. According to 
Denzin and Lincoln (2005): 
Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the 
world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the 
world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a 
series of representations, including fieldnotes, interviews, conversations, 
photographs, recordings and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative 
research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This 
means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, 
attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them. (p.3) 
 46 
 
Another way to begin to gain some theoretical purchase on what qualitative 
research can be, without aiming for a final answer, is to outline the paradigmatic 
assumptions that inform it. When looking at qualitative research via paradigmatic 
assumptions, we begin with a worldview, the possible use of a theoretical lens, and 
the study of research problems inquiring into the meaning individuals or groups 
ascribe to a social or human problem (Creswell, 2007). In the choice of qualitative 
research, inquirers make certain assumptions: 
These philosophical assumptions consist of a stance toward the nature of 
reality (ontology), how the researcher knows what she or he knows 
(epistemology), the role of values in research (axiology), the language of 
research (rhetoric), and the methods used in the process 
(methodology)(Creswell, 2003, p. 6) 
 
In relation to ontology, when researchers conduct qualitative research, they 
embrace the idea of multiple realities; different researchers embrace different 
realities, as so also the individuals being studies and the readers of the qualitative 
study (Creswell, 2007).   
Qualitative epistemology is subjectivist, and is related to how the researcher 
knows what she or he knows, and in a qualitative study this means that 
researchers try to get as close as possible to participants being studied, in order to 
‘know what they know’ from firsthand information. Further, epistemologically 
speaking, the nature of knowledge is subjective and relative, in the sense that 
there can be no one “God’s eye view” (Sparkes, 1992, p. 27) or all embracing 
‘Truth’ concerning the social world.  Thus, as Smith (1989) comments, “truth – or 
what we come to accept as true in terms of intentions, purposes, and meanings – 
is the result of socially conditioned agreement, arising from dialogue and reasoned 
discourse” (p.171).   
For this study, I have adopted to use narrative research. Included in 
narrative research are biographical studies, autobiographies, life histories and oral 
histories (Creswell, 2007). In this specific type of qualitative design, “narrative is 
understood as a spoken or written text giving an account of an event/action or 
series of events/actions, chronologically connected” (Czarniawska, 2004, p. 17). 
But why should we conduct qualitative research? Qualitative research aims 
to capture qualities that are not quantifiable, such as feelings, thoughts, 
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experiences and so on (Gralton & Jones, 2004). The reason for turning to 
qualitative research is as follows: its inductive approach, its focus on specific 
situations or people, and its emphasis on words rather than numbers (Maxwell, 
1996). Maxwell goes on to explain the five primary strengths of qualitative 
research. Firstly, it allows an understanding of the meaning. In a qualitative study, 
we are interested not only in the physical events and behaviour that is taking place, 
but also in how the participant makes sense of this and how their understandings 
influence their behaviour. Second, it allows an understanding of the particular 
context within which the participants act, and the influence that this context has on 
their actions; this is particularly important when studying a small number of 
individuals.  Third, qualitative research allows the identification of unanticipated 
phenomena and influences, which allow the researcher to generate new, grounded 
theories.  Fourth, it allows an understanding of the process by which events and 
actions take place.  Finally, it enables development of causal explanations 
(Maxwell, 1996, pp. 17-20).   
 
3.2 Methods of Data Collection 
3.2.1 Sampling and Access 
As much as one might want to, it is impossible to study everyone 
everywhere doing everything (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Patton (1990) states, 
“Qualitative inquiry typically focuses in depth on relatively small samples, even 
single cases (n=1), selected purposefully” (p.169).  This is a strategy in which 
particular settings, persons, or events are selected deliberately in order to provide 
important information that cannot be obtained as well from other choices (Maxwell, 
1996).  In qualitative inquiry, sampling is driven by the desire to illuminate the 
questions under study and to increase the scope or range of data exposed – to 
uncover multiple realities (Crabtree & Miller, 1992).   
 As Sears (1992) states, “the power of qualitative data, however, lies not in 
the number of people interviewed but in the researcher’s ability to know well a few 
people in their cultural contexts.  The test of qualitative inquiry is not the unearthing 
of a seemingly endless multitude of unique individuals but illuminating the lives of a 
few well-chosen individuals.  The ideographic often provides greater insight than 
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the nomothetic” (p.148).  And as Wolcott (1995) puts it, “What can we learn from 
studying only one of anything? Why, all we can!” (p.171).     
There are many different sampling strategies in qualitative inquiry.  In 
regards to this study, I used one main type of sampling: purposive. This type of 
sampling involves subjects being selected because of some characteristic (Patton, 
1990); however, purposive sampling comes in many forms. In this study, I used 
criterion based purposive sampling, which searches for cases or individuals who 
meet certain criteria. In the case of this study, I was looking for three main criterion: 
(1) the participants were women; (2) the participants were highly active prior to 
their accidents; and (3) the participants suffered a spinal cord injury while 
participating in a sport or physical activity.  
Contact was made initially with the participants via the Back-Up Trust, which 
supports those affected by spinal cord injury. To ensure confidentiality, it was 
agreed that an open letter from ourselves explaining the project, along with a brief 
questionnaire seeking demographic details, would be distributed in one of the 
newsletters circulated by the network. The questionnaire ended by asking the 
respondent to indicate if they would agree to be interviewed, and if so, to provide 
their name and address in a stamped addressed envelope that was also supplied. 
Because the sensitive nature of the topics discussed could elicit strong emotions, 
the participants were supplied with a document containing a list of professional 
support and information networks that they could contact if they felt the need.  
 
3.2.2 Interviews 
 For this study, I chose to use interviews as my main data-gathering 
technique because this method is able to focus onto areas of the participants’ lives 
and experiences. It also allowed me the flexibility to follow through on areas of 
interest that the participants introduced. This flexibility was possible because 
interviewing is not merely the exchange of asking questions and getting answers; 
rather, it is a process involving two (or more) people, and their exchanges lead to 
the creation of a collaborative effort called the interview (Fontana & Frey, 2005). 
There are many different types of interview, and a variety of terms to 
describe each one; however, in general, the three main types are: structured 
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interviews, semi-structured interviews and unstructured interviews. For this study, I 
chose to use semi-structured interviews for a number of reasons. The semi-
structured interview has a more specific research agenda than the unstructured 
interview, but the informants in both types of interview describe the situation in 
their own words and in their own time (Holloway, 1997). In a semi-structured 
interview, an interview guide aides the researcher in focusing on the issues to be 
covered, while still giving informants the opportunity to report on their own thoughts 
and feelings (Holloway, 1997). Esterberg (2002) feels that semi-structured 
interviews are particularly useful for exploring a topic in detail or in constructing 
theory. The strength of this kind of interview is that the researcher adopts a flexible 
approach to data collection, and can alter the sequence of questions or probe for 
more information with subsidiary questions (Gralton & Jones, 2004), as opposed to 
a structured interview, which is formatted in a survey-style, and can often neglect 
the depth and complexity of the participants’ experiences (Marvasti, 2004). 
 The purpose of my semi-structured interviews here was to learn about the 
life stories of the participants; therefore these can also be defined as life story 
interviews. According to Linde (1993):  
the notion of the life story means something like ‘what events have made 
me what I am’, or more precisely, ‘what you must know about me to know 
me’, where knowing a person specifies a range of linguistic and social 
activities and relations by the knowers (p. 20).   
 
Corradi (1991) further explains: 
In sociology, the term ‘life story’ refers to the results of a research approach 
that consists of collecting an individual’s oral account of his or her life or of 
special aspects of it; the narrative is initiated by a specific request from the 
researcher and the ensuing dialogue is directed by the latter towards his or 
her field of inquiry...life stories aim to explain and give meaning to social 
phenomena (p.106).   
 
Linde (1993) points out that when listening to life stories, one must be aware that 
we change our stories at least slightly for each new listener. We change a story for 
a given listener as our relation to that person changes, as new events occur, as we 
acquire new values that change our understanding of past events, and as our point 
of view, our ideology, or our overall understanding changes. 
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3.2.3 Ethical Issues 
 There is no fixed or final definition of ethics in qualitative research, because 
unlike quantitative research which uses universal ethical guidelines, qualitative 
research uses non-foundational or relativist ethics. This does not mean that 
anything goes, but that ethics are always in progress. There are many guides as 
part of an on-going list that serve as a starting point for qualitative ethics, but these 
are not meant to serve as models. The importance of ethics is stressed by O’Reilly 
(2005):  
We are moving into people’s daily lives, talking to them, watching them, 
asking them questions, thinking about what they are saying, writing about 
what they are saying, analysing what they are doing, and sometimes being 
critical about all these things.  Some would consider this an inherently 
unethical activity. Luckily, rather than causing us to abandon research 
because of ethical problems, the result of the ongoing debates has generally 
led researchers into becoming more thoughtful, more informed, more 
reflexive, and more critical of their own actions, perspectives and 
responsibilities (p.59).   
 
Following some of the ethical guides that have been suggested for 
qualitative research, informed consent was gained from the participants after full 
disclosure of the aims of the study, and their rights to withdraw from the study at 
any time was made clearly known to all participants. In addition, to strive to 
preserve the anonymity and confidentiality of the participants in this study, names 
and locations have been changed (Lewis, 2003).    
 
3.3 Analyses 
 According to Schwandt (2001): 
broadly conceived, [analysis] is the activity of making sense of, interpreting, 
or theorising data.  It is both art and science, and it is undertaken by means 
of a variety of procedures that facilitate working back and forth between data 
and ideas. Analysis begins with the process of organising, reducing, and 
describing the data and continues through the activity of drawing 
conclusions or interpretations from the data and warranting those 
interpretations. If data could speak for themselves, analysis would not be 
necessary (p. 6).   
 
However, Smith and Sparkes (2005a) comment that: 
[t]here is no one form of, or ‘best way’ to conduct analysis. The approach 
chosen will depend on the purposes of the research and the questions being 
asked...in this light, advocating one kind of analysis over another seems 
less productive than asking how we might fruitfully combine different forms 
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of analysis, for certain purposes, in order to explore the whats and hows of 
storytelling, and generate different and more complex understandings of the 
world of sport and physical activity and everyday life...the two approaches 
complement each other and can be developed in tandem (p. 235) 
 
Given that there are multiple ways of conducting an analysis, this study will 
be analysed using content and structural analysis (Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, & 
Zilber, 1998), both of which focus on what is being said, not how it is being said 
(Sparkes, 2005). These two types of analysis were chosen in order to gain a 
deeper understanding of the participants’ experiences, and were based on the 
strengths of these strategies.  
According to Smith and Sparkes (2005b), when using content analysis, the 
researcher seeks central themes, typologies, or instances of paradigmatic 
categories within the narratives told and looks at the content or defined categories 
of the story as manifested in separate sections of the narratives told. As a part of 
this process, themes are allowed to emerge and concepts are developed from 
stories in an inductive manner (Smith & Sparkes, 2005b). Here,  
the original story is dissected, and sections or single words belonging to a 
defined category are collected from the entire story or from several texts 
belonging to a number of narrators (Lieblich et al., 1998, p. 12) 
 
Content analysis was chosen because it is valuable for developing general 
knowledge about the core themes that make up the content of the stories 
generated (Sparkes, 1999). It also has the potential to vividly reveal the lived 
experiences via the storied themes presented (Smith & Sparkes, 2005a).   
Structural analysis was also used because it considers the form, kind, 
purpose and conventions that structure the telling of the story (Sparkes, 1999).  
Structural analysis “focuses on the formal plot and organisation of the narrative to 
tease out the distinct structures that hold it together with a view to identifying it as a 
particular narrative type” (Smith & Sparkes, 2005b, p. 1096). According to Lieblich 
et al. (1998), “analysing the structure of a story will therefore reveal the individual’s 
personal construction of his or her evolving experience” (p.88). This type of 
narrative analysis is useful because it provides important insights into the ways 
stories told by specific groups are patterned, and the manner in which key 
elements, such as threats to self-esteem and identity, connect with this pattern 
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(Sparkes, 1999). Additionally, as Gergen (1999) has suggested, the choice of 
narrative a person adopts, but may not be fully aware of, can have a strong 
influence on what kind of story he or she is likely to tell. Smith and Sparkes 
(2005a) further explain: 
In this sense, analyses of structure and form, and identifying what type of 
plot-line people may embody, offers the opportunity to illuminate the ways 
personal stories are connected to and shaped by wider public and 
metanarratives. In doing so, there is the possibility of, for instance, first 
recognizing entrenched cultural narratives and dominant ‘master’ narratives 
and then understanding how they constrain and/or empower people (p.233).   
 
3.4 Representation 
 In recent years, qualitative studies have begun to show a more widely 
ranging array of tales.  Tierney (1999) makes the comment: 
What one assumed was the correct way to present data is no longer 
accepted without question; even the idea of data raises postmodernist 
eyebrows where one questions the meaning of what makes a fact a fact, 
what makes a text a text (p.307) 
 
While scientific and realist tales are still the most commonly used ways to 
represent quantitative and qualitative studies, respectively, there is now a lot of 
variety in the way studies are being represented. Confessional tales, 
autoethnography, poetic representations, ethnodrama and fictional representations 
are now becoming much more widely accepted in the academic community; 
nevertheless, I have decided to write this study in the form of a realist tale, 
because as Fine (1999) states, “there can be little doubt, even among the critics of 
the realist approach, that some of the classic naturalistic ethnographies have 
produced startling, compelling, and practical results that have demonstrated their 
worth” (p.538). Therefore, realist tales do have a contribution to make (Sparkes, 
2002).  
A realist tale is, essentially, a qualitative tale reported in a quantitative 
manner.  Realist tales are defined by three main characteristics: (1) experiential 
authority; (2) the participant’s point of view; and (3) interpretive omnipotence.  
The first main characteristic of realist tales is experiential authority. In this 
type of tale, the most striking characteristic is the almost complete absence of the 
author from most segments of the finished text (Van Maanen, 1988). The author 
uses the passive voice in order to construct authority and objectivity “so as to 
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obscure and apparently distance the disembodied author from the data” (Sparkes, 
2002, p. 44).  
The second main characteristic of realist tales is the participant’s point of 
view. Realist tales are characterised by extensive, closely edited quotations (Van 
Maanen, 1988). These are used to convey to the reader that the views expressed 
are not those of the researcher but are rather the authentic and representative 
remarks transcribed straight from the mouths of the participants, thus 
foregrounding the participants’ voices, and allowing the reader to gain important 
insights into the participants’ perceptions of the injury experience (Sparkes, 2002).  
Finally, interpretive omnipotence is the third main characteristic of realist 
tales. This relates to how “the interpretations of the author are made compelling by 
the use of a string of abstract definitions, axioms, and theorems that work logically 
to provide explanation. Each element of the theory is carefully illustrated by 
empirical data.” (Van Maanen, 1988, pp. 51-53). According to Sparkes (2002), 
“when well-constructed, data-rich realist tales can provide compelling, detailed and 
complex depictions of a social world” (p.55).  Although often subjected to criticism, 
realist tales are surely useful, as they permit us to build knowledge, comfortable in 
the belief that we are learning about the contours of the world (Fine, 1999).  
 
3.5 Criteria 
According to Schwandt (1996), criteria for qualitative inquiry are “standards, 
benchmarks, and in some cases, regulative ideals, that guide judgements about 
the goodness or ‘quality’ of inquiry processes and findings” (p.22). In the past, the 
work of Lincoln and Guba (1985) was frequently used to set criterion with which to 
judge work in what they called the ‘naturalistic’ paradigm. As criteriologists, they 
believed that these criteria for judging qualitative work could be permanent and 
universal (Sparkes & Smith, 2009). As Sparkes and Smith point (2009) out, 
the inherent danger of such a criteriological approach is that specific 
predetermined criteria are wittingly or unwittingly called upon in an 
exclusionary manner to produce a closed system of judgement that can only 
operate within a very narrow range of what constituted legitimate research 
(p.494) 
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In addition, there were a number of specific problems revolving around these 
criteria, which Guba and Lincoln (1989) later recognized: 
Relying solely on criteria that speak to methods, as do the parallel criteria, 
leaves an inquiry vulnerable to questions regarding whether stakeholder 
rights were in fact honoured. To put the point more bluntly, prolonged 
engagement and persistent observations (or any other methods one might 
choose) do not ensure that stakeholder constructions have been collected 
and faithfully represented. So reliance on pure or pristine method alone is 
insufficient to guarantee that the intent of the inquiry has been achieved 
(p.245) 
 
With regard to judging qualitative research, this study follows the work of 
Smith (1993), Sparkes (1998b) and Sparkes and Smith (2009) by taking the view 
that criteria are usefully thought of as a list of characterizing traits that have been 
developed as a ‘starting point’ for qualitative inquiry, rather than an absolute or 
preordained standard against which to make judgement. In other words, it is a 
description of what one might do, but is not a mandate of what one must do across 
all contexts and on all occasions (Sparkes & Smith, 2009). Because of this list-like 
quality, however, Smith and Deemer (2000) offer the following warning: 
The use of the term list should not be taken to mean that we are referring to 
something like an enclosed and precisely specified or specifiable shopping 
or laundry list. Put differently, to talk of a list in this sense is not at all to talk 
about, for example, and accumulation of 20 items, scaled 1 to 5, where 
everyone’s presentation proposal is then numerically scored with a cut-off 
point for acceptance. Obviously, to think of a list in these terms is to miss 
the entire point (p.888) 
 
Sparkes (2002) argued that the difference between alternative forms of 
inquiry, “in terms of their process and products, need to be acknowledged so that 
each can be judged using criteria that are consistent with their own internal 
meaning structures and purposes” (p.199). Therefore, from lists made by a number 
of authors, I have chosen some criteria that I feel are appropriate for judging this 
research.  
Firstly, substantive contribution looks at whether a piece contributes to the 
understanding of social life (Richardson, 2000).  Secondly, impact questions 
whether the paper affects the reader and whether or not it generates new 
questions (Richardson, 2000). Thirdly, reflexivity examines whether the author is 
cognizant of the epistemology of postmodernism, as well as issues to do with data 
gathering, ethical issues and self-awareness (Richardson, 2000). Fourthly, 
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coherence looks at the way different parts of the interpretation create a complete 
and meaningful picture (Lieblich et al., 1998). Finally, width examines the 
comprehensiveness of the evidence (Lieblich et al., 1998). 
 
3.6 Summary 
 Overall, this study uses qualitative research, following a social constructivist 
paradigm, on four women who have suffered spinal cord injuries.  Data was 
collected through semi-structured interviews.  Ethical guidelines such as informed 
consent, ability to withdraw, and confidentiality were all discussed with the 
participant and permission was granted for the research.  The data obtained in this 
study has been analysed using content and structural analysis, because of the 
strengths these analyses.  The thesis will be presented in the form of a realist tale; 
however, criteria based on the ‘letting go’ perspective have been suggested as 
suitable judgement criteria for the study.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
 
4.1 Introduction to the Participants 
This study involves four active women who became disabled while 
participating in sports or physical activities. In this chapter I will give a short 
introduction for each woman, in order to give the reader a bit of insight into their life 
and history. 
Amanda (all participants a have been assigned pseudonyms), now 47 years 
of age, lives in a rural community with her son, Michael. Growing up, she was the 
eldest of four children and was the first in her family to learn to drive and to get a 
passport. After A-levels, she worked as a microbiologist before studying to become 
a nurse. She was always active and loved to dance, and did her first parachute 
jump as a fundraiser for a local hospital. She immediately loved skydiving and 
soon dedicated the majority of her free time (and money) to the sport. In 1995, at 
the age of 32, her parachute tangled on opening in a training dive. Following 
procedure, she released the tangled chute and attempted to release her second 
parachute. Unfortunately, due to a defect in the harness she was using, the first 
parachute did not fully release and the reserve tangled up in the dangling main 
chute. This resulted in her falling 13,500 feet at full speed. Her injuries were 
significant, and she was not originally expected to survive; however, among her 
many injuries, she damaged her spinal cord at the level of C 5/6.  
Rachel, now 35, lives in a large town near her sister, Claire. While both she 
and her sister attended school in the United Kingdom, for much of her childhood 
her parents lived in the Middle East. This led to spending school holidays with her 
parents overseas. During her school years she kept active with school sports and 
horse riding. In 1994, at the age of 20, she was on holiday visiting with her parents 
when she dove into shallow water and damaged her spinal cord at the level of C4, 
C5 and C6. 
Michelle, now 48 years old, lives with her mother at their house in a rural 
community. She rode horses from a very young age, and was involved in show 
jumping and teaching. After finishing school she found work as a secretary for a 
catalogue company, which left her weekends free to work with the horses. In 1984, 
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at the age of 23, she was clipping a horse when it was frightened by a bird and 
knocked her back. When she fell she hit her head on a brick wall. She was still 
able to move her arms and legs so, unaware that she may have a spinal injury, the 
paramedics moved her to the ambulance without a backboard or neck brace. It is 
unclear whether her injury was made worse by this treatment. The doctors were 
suddenly made aware of the seriousness of her injuries when she stopped 
breathing after she arrived at the hospital. Like Amanda, her injury occurred at the 
C5 / C6 level in her spine. 
Karen, now 42, lives with her husband and son at their stud farm in a rural 
community. She was interested in horses from a young age, and owned her first 
horse at age 11. She left school at 15 after finishing all of her exams and 
immediately started working on a horse farm as a live-in stable hand. She worked 
at this job for eight or nine weeks, and had just turned 16 when she had her 
accident. She was riding a young horse that she later found out had not been 
broken. After trotting over a placing pole, the horse began bucking and threw her 
off. She was immediately aware of a loss of sensation, as her spinal cord was 
damaged at the C6 / C7 level. 
With these brief biographical descriptions in mind, I will now discuss the 
findings of this study in relation to: (1) the body; (2) narrative; (3) identity; (4) 
dependence; and  (5) relationships. 
 
4.2 Body 
 One of the main issues that can come into play when conducting research 
on the body is that, in everyday life, we pay little attention to our bodies. Leder’s 
(1990) description of ‘dys-appearance’ illustrates the significance of the social 
atmosphere on the body-self, stating that in everyday life our experience is 
characterised by the disappearance of our body from awareness, saying the “body 
not only projects outward in experience but falls back into unexperienceable 
depths” (Leder, 1990, p. 53). However, this customary mode tends to be 
profoundly disrupted in the context of factors such as pain and disease (Bendelow 
& Williams, 1995). Here, the body becomes unceasingly present in experience, 
albeit in an alien and dysfunctional manner; thus “the body appears as a thematic 
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focus of attention, but precisely in a dys-state” (Leder, 1990, p. 84). Nevertheless, 
this dys-appearance of the body also allows researchers to more deeply 
understand the experience of impairment, because people can reflect on their 
bodies rather than taking them for granted.  
 Previous research, using this dys-appearance of the body to study the effect 
of disability on men’s embodied masculinity, found that men suffered a loss of their 
masculinity following a traumatic SCI (Sparkes & Smith, 2002). This is because the 
body is often the “central foundation of how men define themselves and how they 
are defined by others” (Gerschick & Miller, 1995, p. 183). In this study, I was 
interested in how active women viewed their body following a traumatic SCI, and 
whether they would feel a loss of their femininity similar to the men’s loss of 
masculinity. I was also interested in whether the body is also the “central 
foundation” of how women define themselves. One way to examine the embodied 
self is to explore how women’s experience of their bodies compared to Frank’s 
(1995) description of ideal bodies. 
 
4.2.1 Ideal Bodies 
 As explained in chapter two, Frank (1995) described four ideal body types, 
which are created as the body faces four problems of embodiment and defines 
itself within four continua of responses. While real people are not ideal bodies, they 
will often represent distinctive mixtures of ideal types (Frank, 1995). Figure 1. (p. 
26) is a representation of the four body problems, the continua of responses, and 
the ideal bodies thus created. 
 Of the four ideal body types described by Frank (1995), the two that were 
most frequently in evidence in the stories told within the interview setting were the 
communicative and the mirroring bodies. According to Frank (1995): 
the communicative body-self is not only an ideal type, but also an idealized 
type.  Its specifications are not only descriptive but provide an ethical ideal 
for bodies. Again, no actual body fits this ideal for long, though many bodies 
may approximate it in different ways (p.48).  
 
He goes on to explain further that 
the communicative body accepts its contingency as part of the fundamental 
contingency of life…bodily predictability, if not the exception, should be 
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regarded as exceptional; contingency ought to be accepted as normative 
(Frank, 1995, p. 49). 
  
In this study, three of the women especially seemed to exhibit this aspect of 
the communicative body: Michelle, Rachel and Karen. While none of them ever 
specifically mentioned bodily predictability or contingency, all of them appeared to 
take their disability in stride and move on with their lives. For example, Michelle 
commented: 
It’s just one of those things, like the accident, you can’t do anything about 
it…well then you just have to get on with it, haven’t you? 
 
 Similarly, Karen commented: 
It’s still never going to stop happening to people, and how people deal with 
it and their families deal with it around them…You know, it happens, and it 
can happen and life doesn’t need to stop. It doesn’t need to stop. It is what 
you make it, and that’s it.   
 
 Finally, Rachel explained: 
I was awake throughout the whole thing…I knew, you know. And I knew it 
wasn’t going to get any better, do you know what I mean?...I can honestly 
say that I was never depressed about [the SCI]. It’s just sort of, that’s it, you 
know? That’s what’s happened so we had to deal with it…it’s just 
something that you just dealt with. 
 
 These comments signal how these women accepted bodily contingency as 
a part of life, and viewed it as normative. In addition to this acceptance of 
contingency, the communicative body is associated with itself; this association and 
contingency are contextualised by the qualities of being dyadic and producing 
desire. The communicative body, like the disciplined, mirroring and dominating 
bodies, is not simply biological; it is also a story. The communicative body 
communes its story with others; the story told through communicative bodies 
invites others to recognise themselves in it (Frank, 1995). Indeed, these women 
explained the importance speaking to other people and sharing their stories. 
Michelle remarked: 
I’ve always been chatty, and then when I had my accident, I didn’t speak, 
and one of my friends in the village said “Michelle, you’ve lost the use of 
your legs, you didn’t lose the use of your voice...you can either speak to 
people or you don’t”. You didn’t realise that you’re not speaking…and then 
you realise soon, if you don’t ask for help, people are frightened to ask, 
frightened that they’ll upset you…or maybe you could be a bit rude to them 
back. 
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 Karen also mentioned the importance of talking to others: 
I think the biggest thing with people is talking to them; explain, let them 
see…you know, I’ve always been that type of person I suppose. It’s like, all 
my staff, the girls who have worked for me…because we’re only a small 
business, you get very fond of a lot of them. But even in their interview 
when I don’t know them, it’s like…always talk to me, whether you have a 
problem with work, home life, finances, what have you. I can’t help you if I 
don’t know about it. 
 
 Even Amanda, who shows little other evidence of having a communicative 
body, stresses the value of talking to others: 
At first at Michael’s school, people sort of didn’t speak to me. They were 
avoiding me because they didn’t know what to say to me.  So the kids sort 
of avoided me too, and then eventually the kids just got used to me being 
“Michael’s mum” and…they got used to me being in a wheelchair…it’s the 
parents that feel awkward and not the kids actually. I think people will deal 
with you with a bit of “Uh, I’m scared!”; but they’re not actually scared of 
you, they’re scared of how they will deal with you, cause of their 
inexperience….If you’re just completely natural and open with them, I think 
it puts people at ease a bit.  But people I think are generally scared when 
they see you because they don’t know how to react. 
 
 The second ideal body exhibited by the women in this study was the 
mirroring body. Frank (1995) explains  
the mirroring body defines itself in acts of consumption. The body is both the 
instrument and object of consuming: the body is used to consume, and 
consumption enhances the body: feeding it, clothing it, grooming it…this 
body-self is called mirroring because consumption attempts to recreate the 
body in the image of other bodies: more stylish and healthier bodies (p.43).  
 
He stresses that the primary sense of this reconstruction is visual – the body seeks 
to become an image of the image it idealizes (Frank, 1995). While the mirroring 
body is similar to the communicative body in that it is associated with itself and it 
produces desires, these desires are monadic, unlike the communicative body’s 
dyadic desires. In addition, for the mirroring body-self, the body is now a surface, 
with the visual being the primary (Frank, 1995).   
 Whereas only three of the women in this study displayed salient features of 
the communicative body, all four of the women in this study displayed aspects of 
the mirroring body-self. Of the body problems that create these ideal body types, 
the one most commonly cited by these women was that of predictability. However, 
unlike the predictability of performance sought by the disciplined body, these 
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women yearned for predictability of appearance; the mirroring body fears 
disfigurement. For example, Rachel commented: 
I just want to keep looking nice if I can…at the end of the day I am a woman 
and I want to look like a woman and dress nicely and things…I still would 
never dream of leaving the house without makeup on or anything like 
that…people won’t approach you if you don’t look nice…and if you don’t 
care about yourself, then people are going to think “well why 
bother”…Clothes and everything…I’m very paranoid about short trousers, 
cause I’m sitting all the time, and it’s just like you thought, “what if my 
[urinary] leg bag hangs down and people will see my [urinary] leg 
bag…sometimes you had to be a bit blasé about it, but I just think, 
“no!”…just the small things…it’s very shallow really. 
 
 Rachel’s worries about her urinary leg bag showing are a clear example of 
the disfigurement the mirroring body fears. Her clothes and appearance mean a 
great deal to her, because she feels that not meeting certain expectations will 
make her unapproachable. Karen also suggested a mirroring body during the 
interviews, and reinforced how the body is both a social construction and a 
biological reality (e.g. pressure sores): 
I am a huge jeans fan. I don’t go out if I can’t wear my jeans. You know, I’m 
not allowed to wear jeans when you have a spinal injury cause of all the 
seams and they’ll give you pressure sores – crap!  Absolute crap. I daresay 
if you bought the wrong type or fit, skinny ones that cut you up the ass then 
yes they would. But of course, I need a 36” leg to look good, I’m six foot 
nearly…I can’t wear dropped waists, I hate bootlegs…all I want to do is buy 
a pair of jeans and I can’t…I never feel I look nice at times. You know, when 
you want to dress up. I will dress up all winter; I love dressing up during the 
winter…I don’t like dressing up during the summer…that’s when you think, 
“this is due to the chair and the accident”. But that’s the only time I ever get 
down, is when I want to try and dress up and look nice. 
 
 Moreover, Michelle illustrates how the mirroring body focuses on the visual, 
external body: 
I don’t like skirts and dresses now, cause they’re too much distress. I mean, 
when you’re going along and your skirt blows up…I wore trousers before so 
I wear them now…You always like to be nice when you go out, your hair 
done and your makeup on and nice clothes…I think there’s a time and a 
place [for dressing up]…I’ve never been a girly-girl…someone’s birthday, 
and you all find something nice to wear and you get your hair done and 
your makeup on, but I don’t do it every morning! I didn’t before [the 
accident]…makeup and horses don’t go together. 
 
 Finally, while Amanda commented on her frustrations with clothing, she 
seemed less affected by her external appearance than the other participants. 
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Nevertheless, she was also aware of how appearances could affect how others 
viewed her: 
I can’t wear what I’d like, I have to wear what’s comfortable…if I look at a 
pair of trousers now, I look at the seams and look for, are there rough 
seams because they’re going to cause pressure sores. So I can’t wear what 
I used to wear, and I don’t have the same choice…I hate wearing clothes, 
cause they’re just so cumbersome. In the summer, I’ll go out in just shorts 
and a crop top…And my physio went out with me one day and he didn’t 
even notice what I was wearing until we were in the middle of the street and 
he noticed everybody on the bus was staring at me…I was so prejudiced 
without knowing before my accident. I remember seeing somebody in a 
wheelchair before my accident and she was dressed, but her clothes were 
all ruffled up and her hair wasn’t combed properly at the back and I 
remember thinking “oh she’s let herself go”. She hasn’t let herself go, she’s 
got “Home-don’t-care” not brushing her hair and not putting her clothes 
straight and I was completely unaware of that.  
 
 These comments clearly show that all of the women in this study, at some 
point, displayed the body-self of the mirroring body. They also signal that the 
women’s psycho-emotional well-being was all affected by the mirroring body’s fear 
of disfigurement, and how that disfigurement would be viewed by the general 
population. Indeed, as we can see by Karen’s comment that she “gets down” when 
she wants to look nice, the visual surface of the body can have a lot to do with how 
these women feel about themselves. This preoccupation with body image was 
another main issue that emerged from these women’s stories. 
 
4.2.2 Body Image and the ‘Body Beautiful’ 
 Body image relates to a person’s perceptions, feelings and thoughts about 
his or her body, and is usually conceptualised as incorporating body size 
estimation, evaluation of body attractiveness and emotions associated with body 
shape and size (Grogan, 1999, 2006; Muth & Cash, 1997). It has been found that 
unwanted physical changes to our bodies due to illness, accident and ageing can 
affect our body image, resulting in reduced quality of life and self-esteem 
(Anderson, 2000; Gannon, 2000; Rumsey & Harcourt, 2004; Thomas-McClean, 
2000). Paquette and Raine (2004) found that women’s narratives revealed that 
body image is not a static construct, but has multiple elements, and is dynamic and 
fluctuating.     
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 Authors have argued that our society values bodily characteristics that 
people with physical disabilities are less likely to possess, including physical 
fitness, sporting attainment and the ‘body beautiful’ as it is represented in the 
media (Lawrence, 1991; McCabe & Ricciardelli, 2001). Many women not only face 
challenges using their bodies to their full potential but are also challenged to create 
socially perfect bodies because of images of grace, beauty and femininity (Cronan 
& Scott, 2008). The media portray the external body as something that can be 
perfected by one’s choices in behaviour (Chau et al., 2008). Feminist writers have 
argued that disabled women are particularly vulnerable to the psychological and 
emotional damage that can result from discursive representations of the idealised 
female body – a consequence of the intermeshing of disability and gender 
discourses (Meekosha, 1998; Thomas, 2007; Wendell, 1996; Wilde, 2004). Indeed, 
body image was an important aspect that came into play in these women’s stories.  
 The images of the “body beautiful” and the expectations that the external 
body can be perfected affected the women in this study greatly, even when they 
felt it did not. For example, Michelle stated: 
[I’ve] never been like, a magazine-y person that wants to be like that, no. 
 
Yet she also commented on a number of issues related to the “body beautiful”, and 
was especially concerned about her weight: 
I think whether you put weight on, or don’t – cause that’s the easiest thing 
from sitting down, you do put weight on…I think the worst thing is you put 
weight on…around your stomach, you’ve got no stomach muscles, you 
can’t even pull it in, and you’re trying hard anyways…your legs are there, 
you don’t want them to be horrible do you? 
 
Thus, even though Michelle felt that the images in magazines of the body beautiful 
was never something she strived to attain, the possibility of weight gain in the 
chair, and the way her stomach looks is something that played on her mind. While 
Karen failed to mention any specific media sources, she did comment on the 
frustration of trying to buy clothes and look nice: 
What can I wear? You know, I have to be so careful, cause you can’t wear 
a low waist thing…you always have to watch because you always end up 
with a bit of a belly, whether that’s just natural, everyone with a wheelchair 
seems to have a bit of a belly. But is that because I’ve had a child or what? 
No stomach muscles…It does affect how you feel about yourself…Which is 
why I prefer dressing up in the winter…everyone else has got their skimpy 
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summer dresses on…I just don’t look nice in summer clothes. I don’t feel 
good in summer clothes. 
 
 For Rachel, whilst she displayed agency and never simply locked into media 
portrayals of the ideal female body, her body image appeared to be subtly affected 
by celebrities and images in the media, as well as her friends: 
I just think you know, Victoria Beckham and the size they get to, its just like, 
is that a real goal? And then it is inevitably like, constantly on a diet, but it 
doesn’t happen. I’m often baffled…what do they eat in a day, or do they 
actually eat? It’s a constant enough thing that I think it’s a very high 
standard to keep up to if you’re going to buy into it…I was one of those that 
lived on a diet, I’m much more paranoid now about my weight and 
everything…I just know if I don’t really watch what I’m doing I will just get 
big quickly…I know I’ve always been a big girl, broad and tall, and my 
friends are always skinny, so I’ve always struggled to be…I’ve always been 
in a constant battle with weight I’d say. It’s just a high standard to try 
and…to try and not put yourself to that standard, although it’s difficult not to. 
 
In addition, Rachel seemed greatly affected by her perceptions of her sister: 
I still want to make sure I look ok…Claire doesn’t bother, she’s lucky she’s 
naturally attractive, so she doesn’t need to put the work in…she can just 
stick her hair back and look good, you know? But it’s something I’ve always 
had to work at. 
 
 Finally, Amanda seemed to be aware of the effect the media had on others, 
but claimed that age had helped her resist simplistic portrayals of the female body 
and “get past it”: 
There’s the usual hype about “you must be super-slim”…that’s such a big 
industry and it makes so much money I don’t think we’ll ever combat it.  
Cause it’s nothing to do with health or anything really, it’s to do with big 
corporations making money…so there is a lot of pressure, but I think I’ve 
got past it. And it’s age, I don’t think it’s anything to do with [the disability] 
experience, it’s just as you get older you are swayed less by it 
 
However, age in itself seems to have brought about some changes in Amanda’s 
body image: 
I’m menopausal, so I’ve found that…I haven’t actually put on weight, but 
everything’s just got looser…Whereas I just wore what was comfortable 
before, now I feel that it’s essential to wear a bra because [I’m] just so 
saggy…so there’s body changes like that which is quite saddening. But 
that’s the same as if I was walking around. 
 
 Overall, all the women in the study do seem to be affected by body image 
issues; for example, worry over weight gain and matters of self-esteem. However, 
their body image concerns are all affected in varying degrees by the media, 
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friends/family and age. In addition, while they all appear to be aware of body image 
issues, each seems to be at a varied level of acceptance and comfort with their 
body. 
 
4.2.3 Developing Comfort with the Changed Body 
 Chau et al. (2008) conducted a study on women living with spinal cord injury 
and found that there was a fluid, three-stage process by which women became 
comfortable with their changed bodies (see Figure 3). This process is felt to span 
from early rehabilitation to community reintegration (Chau et al., 2008). 
“Discomfort” in the analysis referred to a sense of uneasiness related to one’s own 
body, while during the second phase, “moving towards comfort”, individuals 
employed strategies progressing from social isolation to representing themselves 
in a positive light through appearance and behaviour. The final phase, “comfort”, is 
fulfilled by educating others about visible disabilities and by surrounding oneself 
with an accepting environment (Chau et al., 2008).  
 The women in this current study were found to be at various phases in this 
process. The first phase of developing comfort with the changed body is discomfort 
– this often occurs during the early phases of rehabilitation when individuals are 
just beginning to familiarise themselves with their new bodies (Chau et al., 2008). 
Amanda showed us her discomfort with her changed physical body immediately 
following the accident when she commented: 
I was really shocked at my body image when I had the accident…I didn’t 
have a lot of mirrors and like, I’ve got a mirror there now, and I have that so 
I can see that I’m sitting straight in the wheelchair, but I actually don’t look 
in a mirror half as much as I used to. Probably, if I’m honest, I avoid looking 
in a mirror, because that’s not how I feel. 
 
Another source of discomfort according to Chau et al. (2008) stems from the loss 
of control experienced when in a rehabilitation facility, and usually related to the 
areas of privacy and treatment approaches. Karen felt this discomfort acutely in 
her rehabilitation experience: 
Never really getting to grips with the physio, that was the one thing. You 
know, “you should be able to do, you should be able to do…”. The 
transfers, if I ever managed to do it I seemed to pinch my skin and end up 
having a week in bed than cause I got a pressure sore. That was what got 
me down more than anything, was “you should be able to do, you’ve got to 
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build your strength”…Do you know how hard I’m trying?…I felt I was put in 
a box, that I should be able to this, I should be able to do that, I should be 
able to do something else. My lesion is C6/C7, which is like, if you’re C6 
you’re one, if you’re C7 you can do this and you can do that. And I’ve got 
bits I can do which I shouldn’t be able to and bits I can’t do which I should 
be able to…just because you’re a level doesn’t mean that you can do this, 
and if you’re that level you can do that.  But they viewed it as that…And I 
was expected to do it 
 
Figure 3. Developing Comfort with the Changed Body (Chau et al., 2008)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rachel also felt discomfort due to feelings of a loss of control immediately 
following her accident, indicating that her acceptance of the contingency of the 
body (noted earlier) took some time to develop. However, in her case it does not 
appear that this discomfort was tied directly to the rehabilitation experience. 
Instead it seems to be related to self-confidence: 
I’m very nervous in my chair…it’s just like, very worried about falling out of 
my chair…getting onto the balancing bed, or whatever it’s called, you know, 
practicing my balancing and everything, I just couldn’t do it…I was just in 
tears and wanted to get off 
 
Amanda, like Karen, felt discomfort due to her rehabilitation experience. 
Specifically, she felt her physiotherapy was like a factory line: 
DISCOMFORT 
MOVING 
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COMFORT 
! The changed physical body 
! The loss of control 
• Lack of privacy 
• Lack of individualised treatment 
! Altered social interactions 
• Unprepared for community 
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Rehab shouldn’t be called rehab. It felt like able-bodied individuals go into 
this big factory as individual people, and at the other end of the factory on a 
conveyor belt came disabled people sat in a wheelchair. And they’re all on 
the same drugs, have the same life and the same carers, and absolutely 
everything prescribed by somebody else. And this somebody has trained 
them and taken away any spirit and hope they’ve got…I felt like a piece of 
meat on a conveyor belt…that was the torture…being paralysed was the 
easy bit, it was coping with everything else! 
 
In addition to her rehabilitation, Amanda felt dehumanising feelings 
associated with the care addressing bodily functions (Chau et al., 2008), and 
especially feminine issues: 
Women’s stuff, I thought that there’d be a way of dealing with it if you’re in a 
wheelchair, and somebody would enlighten me and tell me how to deal with 
it. But no, there was nothing…in the early days, the first nine months I came 
home…I didn’t have a bath for nine months because my bathroom wasn’t 
converted…so for nine months I had bed baths. And so my day when I was 
on a period would be: two women would come in and bed bath me, give me 
a quick wash down below and then they’d stick a sanitary towel in my 
knickers which they would then sit me on all day without changing because 
I’d chosen not to go the tie-two-tampons-together route…and in the 
evening, they would hoist me out of the chair…my clothing and everything 
would be stained, they would take them all off, give me a quick wash, stick 
another in place and that’s how it would be dealt with. And my clothes 
would be put in a bucket somewhere for somebody else to deal with. 
 
 Finally, individuals would feel discomfort due to altered social interactions, 
including feeling ill-prepared for living in the community (Chau et al., 2008). Karen 
described this discomfort when she said: 
I didn’t realise the impact of spinal [injury]…I don’t think I even knew about it 
as such to be honest. I’d never heard of it, you know, never cropped up in 
our lives. So I suppose I was frightened, because I didn’t know, that was the 
biggest thing. If I was older I probably would have known more, I would 
have realised the impact on my life it was going to have…I don’t ever 
remember talking to any counsellors about it. I don’t ever remember 
anybody saying to me, “you will never walk again”…I don’t ever remember 
anybody coming and saying “ it will affect this in your life, it will affect that in 
your life, you will never be able to do that…” you know?...The most scary 
time was coming home, everything’s safe in hospital 
 
 Another source of discomfort is how the changes to the physical body 
created a dependence on others. Opinions of this dependence varied widely in the 
women of this study, but all of them admitted to a greater need to be dependent on 
other people. For example, Michelle commented: 
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You’ve got to be dependent on someone…like I can get in the car and 
drive, but I need someone to give me a hand in, and I can’t put my chair in 
and get in the car on my own, so I do need help. 
 
In the study conducted by Chau et al. (2008), they found a significant source 
of discomfort stemmed from being stared at by others. However, in this study, 
none of the women expressed this issue. In fact, Rachel commented: 
I’ve just had a really good experience being in a wheelchair…I don’t think 
people are like that anymore, you know? People are very open to it. 
 
Similarly, for Karen: 
A lot of people have got much more aware, not necessarily of spinal 
injuries, but of just wheelchair bound, physically unable people, the whole 
works. There isn’t the stigma like there used to be…whether it’s the fact that 
people don’t end up shut away anymore, you have got a life…I suppose it’s 
just the usual getting used to everybody looking at you to start with, but in 
the end I think you probably find that you worry about it more than other 
people, and then it just doesn’t matter 
 
Michelle appeared to feel more noticed in a wheelchair; nevertheless, like Rachel 
and Karen, she did not appear to feel discomfort from this attention: 
People do notice you in a wheelchair, would be silly if anyone said they 
didn’t. Like, children are the best, cause they just ask you questions straight 
out. 
 
 Overall, it appeared that Amanda and Karen felt the greatest discomfort with 
their bodies since the injury. While Rachel originally did experience some 
discomfort with her body due to lack of control, her rehabilitation experience 
appeared to have been more positive than Amanda and Karen’s experiences. The 
only discomfort Michelle appeared to show with her changed body is her 
dependence on others; like Rachel, her rehabilitation experience seemed to be a 
more positive one. 
 The phase moving toward comfort consisted of a progression of strategies 
in response to the challenges imposed by a changed body (Chau et al., 2008). 
This progression was achieved first by social isolation, and eventually developed to 
portraying a positive representation of oneself through appearance and behaviour 
(Chau et al., 2008). Two women in this study, Karen and Rachel, appear to have 
advanced through this phase at some point. Displaying the social isolation 
common in the first progression of this phase, Karen commented: 
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Karen: [My ex-boyfriend] came to see me in hospital about three months 
later, and I wouldn’t see him. I couldn’t physically look at him…I was still in 
traction, I hadn’t washed my hair. I didn’t want him to see me like that at all. 
 
Interviewer: Have you seen him again? 
 
Karen: No, never to this day. And I feel really bad about how he made the 
effort to come and see me in hospital…but it’s like 25 years now, been long 
gone. But I couldn’t let him see me like that…I didn’t want his pity either. 
 
Rachel also appeared to have a reduced social life following the accident, even 
though she claimed to have the same friends: 
It varies, I’ll go out and do something, but I don’t really go out very often I 
must be honest. It’s sort of at the weekends with my sister…the thought of 
an electric wheelchair at the moment I just can’t get my head ‘round. You 
know, I can’t imagine going somewhere by myself. And I think when I do 
walk, you know, get pushed around and everything, I do feel quite self-
conscious. 
 
 The second part of the moving toward comfort phase is that of positive self-
representation (Chau et al., 2008); this is often an attempt to preserve their pre-
injury identity and body image. Once again, Michelle, Rachel and Karen appear to 
exhibit this aspect of moving toward comfort more than Amanda. Michelle 
commented: 
Interviewer: What would you say makes you feel most womanly or 
feminine? 
 
Michelle: Just getting your hair done and everything, your hair and your 
makeup on, put a girly top on and things 
 
Similarly, Karen commented on how she felt when she would prepare for a ball: 
We used to do the whole hump ball thing…it was like, going into the hire 
shops to find [a gown]. I never thought that I could look good and feel good 
in a ballgown, you know…I’ve been to three balls then, I’ve been to a lot 
more since…it has worried me about how I will feel in it compared to 
everybody else…it’s my only time when I say “right, this is it, I’m going to 
have my hair done, I’m going to have my nails done, I’m having a facial, this 
is my minute to be feminine”. I thoroughly enjoy putting my dress on and 
feeling good…I know I’m going to be accepted by the people around me 
and they don’t care, not about how I look, but about the fact that I’m in a 
chair. 
 
Finally, Rachel summed up the positive self-representation phase when she said: 
I take pride in my appearance…I still want to make sure I look ok, and don’t 
look scruffy…I think it just makes me more approachable. 
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 The final phase of the process described by Chau et al. (2008) is comfort; 
this is attained when participants express a sense of ease with their changed 
bodies, and is characterised by participants’ willingness to openly discuss issues 
related to living with an SCI in both familiar and unfamiliar environments (Chau et 
al., 2008). In this study, one context in which comfort is expressed is educating 
others. While this communion with others in a dyadic fashion is customary for a 
communicative body, the only participant who appeared to educate others to any 
extent was Amanda. Amanda frequently participated in 200-mile cycle challenges 
to raise money for charity, and also participated in other fundraising for spinal 
research: 
The day they take the photos [of the cyclists] I hate it because they stick the 
four wheelchairs in front and it’s a big thing. But you cope with it, because 
it’s a means to an end. We cycle to raise money for charity…so you do it. 
 
 The other context in which comfort is expressed is immersion within an 
accepting environment. This seems to be the most commonly exhibited phase in 
the process for all of the women in this study. Whether it is with family, or specific 
friends, all of the women have a certain social circle in which they feel comfortable 
and treated as ‘normal’. Michelle commented: 
There’s a couple of us have our birthdays together, so we always go for a 
Chinese banquet, well I’m just the same. I’ll get my hair done…put my 
makeup on, buy something nice new to wear and I go out. It’s the same as 
we would have done beforehand, we’d all get together in a big crowd so 
we’ll go and have a banquet in between our birthdays 
 
Similarly, Rachel said: 
I’ve got a lot of friends, but I’ve only got a select few that are very special 
friends…cause we were that small unit…it just hasn’t changed, and 
obviously they’re married and stuff now but…it’s still just as good as we 
ever were really…that’s the kind of friends I need 
 
While Michelle and Rachel appear to have kept the same friends from prior 
to their accidents, Amanda and Karen had to rebuild their social circles; 
nevertheless, they now surround themselves in a new social circle in which they 
feel comfortable. Amanda stated: 
I’ve got two friends…I consider them more my family than my family…Dave 
is my next of kin, because he’s actually my physio as well…and Jen is a 
friend that I’ve known for about thirteen years now…I have nobody from 
before the injury, including my family, that has really stood by me. 
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Likewise, Karen commented: 
There was a group of about ten of us, having the summer of our lives. I 
mean, they say summer of ’69, ours was summer of ’89. It was great…our 
group of people are exactly the same as us, farmer types…we’re much 
happier cooking a meal or going to somebody else’s house than going out 
to posh restaurants. Whether I’ve just been exceptionally lucky, or whether 
they’ve just seen me for who I am and not what it was…I never felt at any 
point that nobody has accepted me, or been embarrassed by me. 
 
 Becoming comfortable with the changed body after a SCI is important. 
Discomfort with the body and negative body image can lead to unhealthy weight 
loss practices (Battle & Brownell, 1996), restrained eating (Paa & Larson, 1998), 
eating disorders (Thompson, Heinberg, Altabe, & Tantleff-Dunn, 1998), depression 
(Perlick & Silverstein, 1994; Pinhas, Toner, Ali, Garfinkel, & Stuckless, 1999; 
Wiederman & Hurst, 1998), and poor self-esteem (Tiggeman & Stevens, 1999). 
Chau et al. (2008) point out that “the physical changes associated with a spinal 
cord injury affect a person socially, emotionally, and psychologically” (p. 220). 
While there are many ways in which researchers can investigate these effects, one 
commonly used research technique is the study of narrative. 
 
4.3 Narrative 
 As noted in previous chapters, the study of narrative is the study of the ways 
in which humans experience the world (Dhunpath, 2000). However, as Smith and 
Sparkes (2007) explain, “narratives are not conceptualized as unmediated 
representations of internal cognitions, as springing from individual mind, or as 
simply personal. They are social actions and drawn from cultural repertoire” (p. 
26). Given that our personal stories are drawn from a cultural repertoire, just what 
stories do the women in this study draw on? In other words, what kinds of 
narratives do they appropriate from culture and then tell to help make sense of 
their SCI experience? One dominant type of narrative is the restitution story. 
 
4.3.1 The Restitution Narrative 
 As explained in previous chapters, the plot of the restitution has the basic 
storyline: “yesterday I was healthy, today I’m sick, but tomorrow I’ll be healthy 
again” (Frank, 1995). In terms of spinal cord injury, this plotline adapts to 
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“yesterday I was able-bodied, today I am disabled, but tomorrow I’ll be able-bodied 
again”.   
In their interviews with men injured via sport, Smith and Sparkes (2004; 
2005b) found that the vast majority of their participants had a preference for this 
narrative. During this research, none of the women displayed a classic restitution 
narrative inasmuch as they sought continuity with their former lives, but did not 
pursue a former state of health. However, the idea of walking again was not 
completely ruled out. That is, elements of restitution still permeated their stories. 
For example, Amanda commented: 
Interviewer: How have things changed for you since the injury? 
 
Amanda: …Having had that experience I think has made me a better and 
stronger person. So I wonder what I would be like if I just got up and walked 
again tomorrow. You know, it would be interesting to see. 
 
However, at no point in her story does she give a statement of her intent to walk 
again, and thus actively pursue a restitution narrative. Indeed, Michelle doesn’t 
understand the desire to walk expressed by others: 
Michelle: We were always taught “you want your arms and hands, you don’t 
want your legs”…you’ve got your arms and you’ve got your hands, you can 
do most things for yourself. But now, you listen to some of these younger 
ones and they’re “I want to learn to walk”. And I said, “you can’t use your 
hands, you can’t move your arms, what good’s walking to you?” 
 
Interviewer: So you’ve never really thought about a cure? 
 
Michelle: Yeah, you do, you’d be stupid if you didn’t…but it’s not worth 
spending every waking hour travelling the country, when you know…it’s not 
even a maybe yet, it’s still very out of reach at the moment. 
 
Interviewer: Do you keep up to date on any of the research that’s going on? 
 
Michelle: Yeah, spinal magazines, people at the hospital…you do keep 
your eyes and ears open… 
 
Karen similarly commented on others’ desire for restitution, and other people’s 
strong preference for SCI people to walk again becomes a story she has to contest 
with – despite not believing she will ever walk again: 
You know, they all have this “I am going to walk again” and that’s one of the 
things that’s never…I don’t know whether if I’d been a lower lesion, if 
there’d always be that hope in the back of my mind. I suppose I’ve always 
got used to the idea it’s never going to happen in my lifetime. And I’m not 
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going to kid myself that it is. It ain’t going to happen and that’s it. You know, 
I severed my spinal cord, my neck is held together with a blinking coat 
hook, and I’m lucky that I can even hold my head up 
 
Finally, Rachel commented on her version of restitution: 
Interviewer: Do you ever imagine walking again? 
 
Rachel: Oh God, yeah…but I don’t hold out for a cure, at all.  And I wouldn’t 
put myself forward for something like that, I would be a bit scared. I mean, I 
was offered this thing a while ago, that they put something in your arm and 
it makes your arm move, and I just think I’d be a bit like…not wanting a 
foreign body, I just wouldn’t want that at all. 
 
 For all of the women, one of the main aspects that seem to prevent them 
from fully embracing the restitution narrative is the question of time. Michelle, 
Karen and Rachel all comment on their belief that a cure is still out of reach, and 
give that reason as the basis for not actively seeking restitution. These women 
believe that the search for a cure – the time spent from getting research from the 
bench to the clinic – will not happen in their lifetime. Thus, for the four women in 
this study, it seems nonsensical to seek restitution. Sparkes and Smith (2003) 
found that men in the restitution narrative recount their life in the future as they wait 
for a cure that will return them to an able-bodied state of being. Thus, this research 
on women stands in contrast to the research conducted by Smith and Sparkes on 
men and SCI.   
Accordingly, although all the women commented on thinking about a cure, 
none of the women told their stories in this manner, which indicates that none of 
them actually displayed the restitution narrative. This displays that while they have 
thought they would like to walk again, they don’t think it will happen. Thus, they 
don’t take on this narrative as a key way to shape their experiences of SCI. In 
other words, restitution has been a story that has permeated their consciousness, 
but they have decided not to take it on board (Frank, 2006). Nevertheless, one of 
the woman’s’ stories did have some similarities with the stories told by the men in 
Smith and Sparkes’ (2004; 2005b) studies in terms of the connections with chaos 
and quest narratives.  
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4.3.2 The Chaos Narrative 
 According to Frank (1995), the chaos narrative is the opposite of restitution: 
its plot imagines life never getting better. He further explained: 
If narrative implies a sequence of events connected to each other through 
time, chaos stories are not narratives. When I refer below to the chaos 
narrative, I mean an anti-narrative of time without sequence, telling without 
mediation, and speaking about oneself without being fully able to reflect on 
oneself. Although I will continue to write of chaos stories as being told, 
these stories cannot literally be told but can only be lived (Frank, 1995, p. 
98). 
 
 In addition, control and chaos exist at opposite ends of a continuum. Frank 
(1995) explained: 
The restitution story presupposes the control that is necessary to effect 
restitution. The ill person does not have this control herself, but those taking 
care of her do, which for the restitution story is close enough. The chaos 
story presupposes lack of control, and the ill person’s loss of control is 
complemented by medicine’s inability to control the disease. Chaos feeds 
on the sense that no one is in control. People living these stories regularly 
accuse medicine of seeking to maintain its pretence of control – its 
restitution narrative – at the expense of denying the suffering of what it 
cannot treat (p. 100). 
 
 In this study, out of four participants, only one participant showed any hints 
of the chaos narrative. It appears Amanda used this anti-narrative shortly after 
being injured, and continued with a chaos story for a significant period after 
returning home. The comments made by Frank (1995), of medicine seeking to 
maintain its pretence of control, came through in Amanda’s story strongly: 
Rehab shouldn’t be called rehab. It felt like able-bodied individuals go into 
this big factory as individual people, and at the other end of the factory on a 
conveyor belt come disabled people sat in a wheelchair. And they’re all on 
the same drugs, that have the same life and the same carers, and 
absolutely everything prescribed by somebody else. And this somebody 
else has trained them and taken away any spirit and hope they’ve got, and 
has downtrodden them into thinking “this is the only life that’s available to 
you”. 
 
 In addition, this medical pretence of control, and Amanda’s chaos led to her 
boyfriend of 2 years leaving her within a few months of the accident. This led her 
further into the chaos story: 
That was one of the hardest things, because I felt that I’d lost another part 
and I hadn’t had a chance to prove them all wrong. He just listened to 
everybody else and made a decision…I felt he was taken away from me 
while I was disabled, while I was in hospital, and it was unfair, because I 
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didn’t have a chance to prove everybody wrong…I was still weak, I was still 
at their mercy, I was still being dictated to.  At that point, this was all around 
the time that I was telling my GP I wanted to die, that I was having “home-
don’t-care” looking after me, that somebody was deciding when it was 
convenient for me to go to the toilet. It was really the worst time of my life, 
and you just reach saturation point. And whatever else happens you 
just…have to get your head down and get through it. 
 
 However, Amanda was somehow able to reject this anti-narrative and find 
her way another narrative. Exactly how individuals shift narratives in relation to SCI 
is still unknown (Smith & Sparkes, 2005b), but Amanda believed it was her anger 
at her treatment that changed her view: 
I was absolutely convinced that I was not going to live like that, and so I 
wanted to die. The only reason I’m still here is because there was nobody 
to assist me with suicide, because if I could have got the top off a bottle of 
tablets, I’d have done it. I gave into it, and I think when I came home and 
could see what was happening to my house…my house was getting dusty 
and neglected, and my life was just being taken apart bit by bit. And nobody 
looked after anything, including me, as I had. And I sort of just felt, well, if I 
was dead, if there was no hope, I wouldn’t be feeling so angry, so irritated 
that everything’s been taken apart. So I obviously still am the same person 
and that’s when it started…I think it’s just sheer hating being dictated to by 
other people, and being told by people that are less intelligent than me, that 
don’t know me and have no insight into my life, how it’s going to be. I really 
hate that.   
 
 Clearly, Amanda is not in the chaos narrative when she tells these stories. 
However, she gives indications that at a point soon after her injury, chaos did 
indeed control her narrative. The narrative she is currently in, that is quest, (see 
next section), adds sense and stability to the chaos she experienced, and her 
anger at her treatment, Amanda suggests, is what helped her leave it behind. 
Frank (1995) comments: “Exercising responsibility requires a voice, and the 
chaotic body has no voice” (p.109). For Amanda, anger gave her back the voice 
she lost to chaos, and allowed her to take back the control that had been stripped 
from her. Indeed, the voice she reclaimed helped her fight back for what she felt 
she, and others in her position, deserved. Of course, anger is not necessarily 
always a good thing. For example, bodies that are angry can do physical and/or 
symbol violence in relation to other bodies. These bodies dominate others (Frank, 
1995) and risk turning on others and themselves. But, at least for Amanda, a sense 
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of anger at her treatment during the rehabilitation process and beyond helped 
stimulate movement out of chaos and into a different kind of narrative. 
 
4.3.3 The Quest Narrative 
 According to Frank (1995): 
restitution stories attempt to outdistance mortality by rendering illness 
transitory. Chaos stories are sucked into the undertow of illness and the 
disasters that attend to it. Quest stories meet suffering head on; they accept 
illness and seek to use it…what is quested for may never be wholly clear, 
but the quest is defined by the ill person’s belief that something is to be 
gained through the experience (p.115)  
 
This is the only narrative which Frank (1995) described in which the “teller has a 
story to tell – it speaks from the ill person’s perspective and holds chaos at bay” (p. 
115).   
 After surviving the anti-narrative of chaos, Amanda was the only participant 
who displayed hints of the quest narrative. This is surprising, given that Frank 
(1995) believed that the communicative body is told in quest stories. In fact, 
Amanda was the only participant out of the four women in this study to show no 
strong affiliation to the communicative body. Thus, in this study, the communicative 
body is telling a story other than quest. Nevertheless, Frank (1995) commented 
that those telling a quest narrative often used metaphors of a ‘journey’ within their 
stories. Indeed, Amanda used similar metaphors: 
It’s like taking a wrong turning on a road, and if you could just backtrack and 
go down that road, it’s just a few seconds away. And that was an 
overwhelming feeling…that I could see normal, I could see my life there, 
and I could see the parachute opening normally and this is what’s 
happened, and it’s just a few seconds away. And then it’s a few days away 
and a few weeks away and a few years away. The point where it went 
wrong is a very specific thing for me, and that’s the point where my life took 
a different turning.   
 
Unlike the other narratives described by Frank (1995), the range of quest 
stories is so broad that further specification is useful; therefore, quest stories have 
at least three facets: memoir, manifesto, and automythology. However, Amanda 
does not display all three of the facets required in a quest story. 
The first facet of quest, memoir, combines telling the illness story with telling 
other events in the writer’s life; this can also be described as an interrupted 
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autobiography (Frank, 1995). In this facet of quest, trials are not minimised, but are 
told stoically, with no special insight claimed at the end. Amanda often displayed 
this first facet of quest: 
I thought that the fact that I was medically trained before my accident has 
had a big affect on how I’ve reacted to it. I’ve always been very active, I 
danced from when I was six years old. I did ballet, came home, hung my 
ballet shoes on the back of my bedroom door and got on the plane [to the 
USA]. I didn’t actually come back into the bedroom until several months 
later when I was carried back in, and one of the first things I saw was my 
ballet shoes on the back of the door…being paralysed was the easy bit, it 
was coping with everything else! 
 
 The second facet of quest is the manifesto. According to Frank (1995) the 
truth that has been learned in these stories is prophetic, often carrying demands 
for social action. Amanda clearly presented this aspect of quest: 
[TV station] made a documentary about the pregnancy, and I went along 
with it because I felt it was important to document it…If they were going to 
do this, I wasn’t going to go without a fight, and I was going to scream it 
from the rooftops. The country pay social services to act on our best behalf, 
and I was going to tell the country what they were doing. 
 
Amanda’s call for social action continues further in her fundraising efforts for spinal 
research and other charities, and also in her business, where she’d “like to train 
really good carers and send them to other people”. Another aspect of this 
manifesto facet of quest is that those who tell manifesto stories do not want to go 
back to a former state of health, which is often viewed as naïve illusion. Amanda 
does not fully fit with this aspect, as earlier comments show:   
I look at people that are couch potatoes and don’t do any sort of sport and 
abuse their bodies, and I think “if I just had a body that worked, I just 
wouldn’t do that”. You don’t realise what you’ve got, but you never do until 
you’ve lost it… 
 
 Nevertheless, she does not actively strive for her former state of health, or 
search for a ‘cure’ for her SCI. 
The final aspect of quest is the automythology. This is represented in the 
metaphor of the Phoenix, that reinvents itself from the ashes of its own body 
(Frank, 1995). Automythology fashions the author as one who not only has 
survived, but has been reborn; it reaches out, but its language is more personal 
than political (Frank, 1995). This, however, is the facet of quest that Amanda 
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exhibits little of. Although there are obvious changes in her life since the injury, she 
claims to feel no different within herself: 
I think my life if I hadn’t been injured would have been very different, but I 
don’t think I’ve changed…I’ve gained a lot of confidence as I’ve got 
older…it’s probably not anything to do with the fact that I’m injured, it’s just 
you gain confidence as you get older. 
 
 In the end, out of the four participants, only Amanda showed any strong 
affinity for any of Frank’s (1995) narrative types, and even she did not match the 
descriptions of the narrative types as clearly as those in the study on men and SCI 
by Smith and Sparkes (2004, 2005). Accordingly, what kind of story are the other 
women telling? What kinds of narrative do they drawn on from the cultural 
repertoire available to them? 
 
4.3.4 The Resilience Narrative 
Because the majority of these women appear to exhibit no strong affinity for 
any of the three common narratives used in illness and disability, it seems that 
there must be some other narrative that they are using. In this case, I propose to 
call this new narrative the resilience narrative. Resilience has been researched 
mostly in children who have overcome adverse situations to lead fairly normal adult 
lives (Monroe & Oliviere, 2007). However, in recent years more research has been 
conducted on resilience in more varied situations (Edward, 2005; Miller, 2002; 
Patterson, 2002; Richardson, 2002). Nevertheless, there has still been little 
research done on resilience in relation to traumatic SCI (White & Driver, 2008), and 
none conducted specifically on women and SCI.  
Here, the resilience narrative can be defined as a story in which the person 
‘bounces back’ from SCI, quietly adapts to a new body, and is malleable in terms 
what types of self they perform. Importantly, what sets the resilience narrative apart 
from other narratives, like quest, is a plot in which people claim to continue on with 
their lives with a minimal amount of change. Their sense of self might be malleable 
(as I show later) and their bodies may sometimes commune with other bodies, but 
a person minimises the effects of SCI on other aspects of their life by ‘getting on’ 
with life. It may be a life they didn’t choose, but he or she will be resilient, ‘bounce 
back’, and ‘get on with life’ with minimal fuss or change.  
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Whilst all the four participants told a resilience story, this type of narrative 
was especially apparent in the stories told by Michelle, Rachel and Karen. For 
example, Michelle remarked:     
It’s just like everything else, it’s life, you just get on with it. You don’t brood 
over it, you just get on with it, don’t you? 
 
 Likewise, for Rachel: 
It’s just something you sort of dealt with…it’s not the end of the world…I 
think you can still give a lot more…I think you learn ways to adapt and 
changed and just deal with it really…Just live every day and get on with 
it…it’s just some instinct really…it’s not going to change, you know? 
  
Furthermore, the resilience narrative can be seen in action in the following 
comments by Karen: 
You just learn to do things, you find the best way for you…I can’t live my life 
one foot on the break…I do think that sick people are unhappy people and 
I’m not…I’m lucky I get out of bed in the morning, and I want to get out of 
bed in the morning cause I want to get on with my day with the horses and 
what have you…I’m lucky I’m a very strong person…there were several 
people…you knew almost instantly whether they’d cope with it or whether 
they wouldn’t…whether they’d get on in life or whether they’d just shrivel up 
and become nobody. 
 
Whilst the participants told resilience stories throughout the interviews, one 
of the main differences between the three participants who displayed a strong 
resilience narrative relates to family and social support. What helped three of the 
participants to adopt a resilient narrative related to the social support offered by the 
family.  According to Zaider and Kissane (2007): 
The family is a crucial resource…Family members often serve as primary 
caretakers; they guide the provision of support for loved ones…actively 
participate in decision-making processes and serve as liaisons and proxy 
informants to healthcare practitioners. The journey of illness is thus a 
shared one, resonating powerfully across the family group (p.67). 
 
 Indeed, the three women who appear to be using the resilience narrative all 
had deeply supportive families and friends. Michelle’s family adapted their home so 
that she would have a bedroom and bathroom downstairs, and her friends 
encouraged her to remain involved with horses. She replied: 
Interviewer: Who is there for you emotionally? Who is your support system? 
 
Michelle: My mum I suppose. My whole family and my friends…I think it’s 
everyone, you just get on with things in life…the first [horse] trap that was 
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bought for me was off my friends as a Christmas present – [They said] 
“here you are, find yourself a pony because we’re not finding a pony for 
you, you can do something yourself”…and that was the way I was treated 
by everybody 
 
 Karen’s family also adapted their home so she could easily live with them. 
When she got married, her parents moved out and she remained in the adapted 
home with her husband. She commented: 
I was exceptionally lucky in the fact that I’d got a very supportive family 
around me…when I came out [of hospital] my mum and dad were pretty 
good, and I’d got myself adapted, and I had like a flat piece down there, 
and then they lived in this half of the house. And I had my independence. 
   
Rachel’s family moved back to the UK following her accident to be closer to 
her. In fact, she lived with her sister for a number of years following her accident, 
and still lives close by: 
Rachel: I’m lucky cause we’re a strong family unit, and I have a lot of really 
good friends that are just there…[Family is] just really important to me.  
Mummy and daddy and Claire, they’re everything to me, and I would be lost 
without them. With support as well as, you know, they’ve never treated me 
any differently…I’m a lot closer with my father now, he’s very protective.  
And my sister…I think before I didn’t really used to see my family. When I 
was [overseas] I was always out. Claire and I were in the same school and 
university, but we didn’t really hang out together very much. So I see them 
a lot more now, and I’m a lot closer to them now, I’d say. 
 
Interviewer: How do you think the relationship you have with your friends 
and family has affected your experience of spinal cord injury? 
 
Rachel: it’s made it a lot easier. I do put a lot of it down to my friends and 
family, that I got through it and everything like that. Definitely.   
 
 However, unlike the other three women, Amanda’s family retreated from her 
following her accident. This may have affected how she told her story, and may be 
why she had more in common with the quest narrative than the resilience 
narrative: 
There’re some people that are born into a family that copes. And my family 
aren’t those people…they just can’t cope. And they dealt with my injury, and 
the way things are…by just running away, that’s just how they deal with it.  
It’s not that they’re bad people, it’s just that they are…I consider them 
weak…my family were absolutely terrified when I first came home, because 
everybody was saying “oh she’ll have to come home, her family will have 
to….” And that absolutely terrified them…so the family was really grateful I 
didn’t go home.   
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 Finally, social comparison also seemed to have played a role in creating this 
resilience narrative. Social comparison “refers to relating one’s own actual or 
potential characteristics to those of other individuals, which may have 
consequence for how individuals feel and for how they evaluate their situation” 
(Buunk, Zurriaga, Gonzalez, Perol, & Lopez Roig, 2006). For the women who told 
resilience stories, knowing that their lives could be much worse seems to help 
them stay positive. In social comparison terms, then, the women adopted a 
downward comparison style. For example, Michelle stated: 
Well just get on with it, don’t think about what could have been, just get on 
with it…and always say, look around, there’s always somebody worse off 
than yourself, there’s always somebody to think “oh I’m glad I’m not like 
that”…I don’t have to have a machine breathe for me, do I? 
 
 Similarly Karen commented: 
You know, never feeling sorry for yourself because there’s always 
somebody far, far worse off than you. Far, far worse off, so again just 
making you strong I suppose…there was a girl in the bed next to me and 
she’d had a riding accident and was incomplete, a lot lower than me…What 
I can remember about her now is just whinging and whining the whole time, 
and her parents were trying to be supportive, but I hope I was never like 
that, because nothing was ever right for her, nothing. 
 
 This downward comparison in terms of helping them perceive that their 
situations are not so bad as other people’s situations may have much to do with 
the creation of resilience within the women using this narrative. However, with only 
three participants displaying this new narrative of resilience, caution must be taken 
on this view. Nevertheless, the women’s stories do offer us a great deal. They 
allow us to clearly see that there are other narratives being told after spinal cord 
injury, which may help us when examining other aspects of these women’s lives, 
such as identity levels. 
 
4.4 Identity 
 Crossley (2000) suggests that any valid portrayal of human selves and 
behaviours requires an understanding of the inextricable and complex connection 
between narrative and identity.  According to Scott-Hill (2004): 
Identity is concerned with the social formation of the person, the cultural 
interpretation of the body and the creation and use of markers of 
membership such as rites of passage and social categories.  As such, it 
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might be thought of as mediating between the personal, private world of 
everyday life and the collective space of multiple cultural forms and social 
relations: it is a pivot between the social and the individual (p. 87) 
  
 The importance of identity as a means of understanding the complex 
relationship between individuals, society and biology (Watson, 2002) has led to 
many sociologists being interested in the idea of disability identities and 
biographical disruption, as defined in the literature review.  
 As previously mentioned, one of the most well-known theories concerning 
the identity levels of the chronically ill was developed by Charmaz (1987). The 
identity hierarchy she proposed has also frequently been used in relation to 
traumatic events such as SCI, since Charmaz (1987) commented that the ‘type 
and degree of the illness often figure in forming identity objectives’ (p. 288). She 
went on to say: 
Personal and social meanings of illness in general and the experienced 
illness in particular, shape identity construction and definitions of stigma.  
Some persons aim for high identity levels, requiring much effort to 
overcome stigmatizing identifications and to live autonomous lives. Others 
aim for lower identity levels to avoid stigmatizing identifications, rather than 
risk more attention focused on themselves. (Charmaz, 1987, p. 299) 
 
However, while Charmaz’ (1987) theory of an identity hierarchy is often 
used in relation to traumatic injuries as well as long term illnesses, not all of the 
participants seemed to fit completely into this theory. Two participants, Amanda and 
Karen, appeared to show identity levels not specified on the hierarchy proposed by 
Charmaz (1987). These two participants did, however, display identities as 
identified in Yoshida’s (1993) study on identity reconstruction following traumatic 
spinal cord injury. This particular theory on identity reconstruction following a 
traumatic spinal cord injury bases itself, not on a hierarchy, but on a pendulum. 
Yoshida (1993) explained: 
The pendular shape of identity reconstruction among individuals with 
traumatic spinal cord injuries represents an oscillation between 
conceptually distinct, but empirically overlapping types of identities which 
encompass the non-disabled and/or disabled aspects of self.  Central to the 
pendular shape is the expression of identity reconstruction as a dual 
directional process (p. 220)  
 
However, while Yoshida’s theory was based around participants swinging through 
this pendulum of identity levels, none of these participants exhibited this oscillation. 
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They more closely aligned with a sense if identity in terms of levels. Therefore, I 
will be continuing to use the identity hierarchy proposed by Charmaz (1987) as my 
main template when discussing the identity levels of the participants in this study, 
and inserting some new levels into her hierarchy based on descriptions in 
Yoshida’s (1993) theory. 
According to Charmaz (1987) it is not uncommon for ill people to begin at 
the supernormal level in the identity hierarchy, then rapidly decrease their identity 
aspirations: 
Initially, these individuals wish to do more than before so that they can 
succeed in new areas and compete in new realms, in addition to all that 
they had ordinarily done earlier. They aim for a supernormal identity level.  
Then, as they discover that doing so is much harder than they anticipated, 
they scale down their aspirations to handling a life without the added 
competition and goals. At this point, they strive for a restored self. As further 
hardships develop, uncertainty and risk underlie their efforts. By now, they 
scale down their identity objectives to a contingent personal identity.  Last, 
when an uncertain future persists, they settle for a salvaged self (Charmaz, 
1987, p. 293) 
 
This general spiral down the hierarchy, at first glance, would seem to have 
more in common with chronic illness than the sudden injury suffered by the 
participants in this study. In some instances, people can gradually raise their 
identity level as a result of receiving assistance and encouragement.  Still others 
move up and down the hierarchy. However, in this study all of the participants did 
appear to slowly slip down the hierarchy as time passed following their injury. 
While not all of the participants aimed as high as the supernormal identity level 
from the start, every participant changed identity levels at some point, and this 
change was always in a downward movement through the hierarchy; therefore, I 
will discuss those identity levels displayed by the participants in hierarchical order 
from highest to lowest, beginning with the supernormal identity.  
 
4.4.1 Supernormal Identity 
 According to Charmaz (1987), chronically ill persons who pursue 
supernormal identities “wish to reject the negative identifying images conferred 
upon them by illness” and instead “seek to construct a personally valued and 
socially credited identity in conventional worlds” (p. 296). In this identity level, 
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success values of independence, hard work, deferred gratification and 
achievement are most clearly visible. Charmaz (1987) states that there are four 
conditions for pursuing a supernormal identity: 
(1) the person had achieved a place in the external world through 
extraordinary achievement in the past; (2) the person defines another arena 
for attaining extraordinary success; (3) the person assumes that handling 
illness demands competition and struggle; and (4) the person believes he or 
she will lose what is most important unless supernormal efforts are made 
(p. 297) 
 
 Out of the four participants in this study, only one showed any affinity at all 
for the supernormal identity level – this person was Amanda. Amanda clearly 
shows her attempt to “reject the negative identifying images” conferred upon her by 
her disability when she stated: 
I wanted to commit suicide…over the next year I told my GP I didn’t want to 
live like this. And what you’re really saying is “I can’t live the life you’re 
telling me”, not “I want to die”. And that is exactly what I’ve done. If I’d have 
done what the establishment told me I would have to do, I would be taking 
lots of drugs now…I’d have bedsores, infections, things like that. I’ve had 
none of that, but I’m a tyrant about my own care. 
 
She further displays her rejection of the negative identifying images of her 
disability when she said: 
Immediately people saw me as different…I didn’t feel any different. I am a 
person, and this is my life…I haven’t changed. 
 
 Amanda had met the first condition for pursuing a supernormal identity prior 
to her injury by achieving the junior champion title in 4-way skydiving competitions. 
According to Amanda, before her accident, “everything was skydiving”. The second 
condition, in which she defines another arena for attaining extraordinary success, 
is less clear; for while Amanda keeps active, participates in 200 mile cycle 
challenges, travels the world and cares for her son, her foremost area of 
extraordinary success since the accident has been in fighting for her rights to 
proper care and support. She appears to meet the third condition, the assumption 
that handling SCI requires competition and struggle, more than the second. 
However, both are apparent when she said: 
I’ve always thought that whatever care, whatever equipment, whatever 
support you get should enable you, and a lot of it added to the disability.  It 
made the disability bigger…I’ve fought tooth and nail to get the life I have 
now. Three years after my accident I had my son, and rather than support 
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me, Social Services took me to court and was going to take my child into 
care at birth, because they said I was too disabled to look after him. So then 
I had a fight that lasted virtually the whole pregnancy to keep my son…I’ve 
fought to not only employ my own carers, but to be funded, and…I’ve 
fought for funding for physiotherapy…Everything has happened in spite of 
social services care…instead of because of them. 
 
 Nevertheless, these comments also show us the things Amanda believes 
are most important – personal care and her son among other things – and her 
knowledge that unless she continues to fight “tooth and nail” she may well lose 
them. Therefore she meets all four conditions for seeking a supernormal identity. In 
addition, Charmaz (1987) states that those aiming for supernormal identities seek 
to construct ones that are not only personally valued, but also socially credited in 
conventional worlds. Amanda’s extraordinary achievements seem to be aimed 
much more strongly towards obtaining a personally valued identity; however she 
also attains socially credited identities via her cycle challenges and volunteer work.  
 While Amanda indeed shows a strong affinity for the supernormal identity 
level, she also displays aspects of other identity levels. One of the other identity 
levels she exhibits is the restored self, which is the next level down in the 
hierarchy. Not only did Amanda lock into this self, the other participants also 
exhibited this sense of self – but with some key differences among them. 
 
4.4.2 Restored Self 
 The next level of identity on the hierarchy is the restored self. People aiming 
for this identity level anticipate returning to their former lives and wish to construct 
a similar physical self (Charmaz, 1987). Unlike the other identity levels on the 
hierarchy, a restored self can take on three specific types: (1) the entrenched self; 
(2) the developing self; and (3) the assumed self.   
 All four of the participants showed an affinity for some type of restored self 
at varying stages following their accidents; however, there was one major 
difference. While there are three specific types of restored self, a common aspect 
of all of them is that the individual strives to attain a similar physical self from prior 
to the injury. However, none of the participants aimed to construct a similar 
physical self, which is one of the main aspects of any type of restored self. This is 
clearly shown in Karen’s statement: 
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I’ve always got used to the idea [a cure] is never going to happen in my 
lifetime, and I’m not going to kid myself that it is. 
 
Similarly, Michelle said: 
I’m not into this…like you’ll believe one day they’ll have a cure, or they’ll 
make you walk, or there will be something…but you can’t live your life, just 
waiting for that. 
 
Therefore, while I go on to discuss other aspects of restored selves that the 
participants displayed, none of them aimed for a classic example of a restored self 
as defined by Charmaz (1987). Nevertheless, all of the participants at some point 
mentioned that they felt they were the “same person” they always had been, which 
indicates feelings of continuation with their former lives. It may be that for women, 
the end goal of the restored self is not physical, but mental restoration.     
 The first type of restored self is known as the entrenched self, and 
represents patterns of action, conviction and habit built over the years (Charmaz, 
1987). These unchanged patterns had been a source of self-respect before illness 
(Charmaz, 1987). In the years directly following her accident, Michelle appeared to 
have the strongest affinity for this type of restored self; however, both Amanda and 
Rachel also showed aspects of it. Amanda commented: 
I lived alone, miles away from my family or anybody, so I was very self-
contained…my dad was a very practical person, he used to do everything 
that needed to be done to the house himself, and as we were growing up, 
he taught us all…so even when I moved into my home, I wired the lights, I 
wallpapered, I put the bathroom tiles on the wall….I took for granted the fact 
that I could do everything for myself, I didn’t need anybody’s help.  
 
Amanda’s attempts to be independent and self-sustaining continued in every way 
possible following her accident: 
When I employ people, they always say “what exactly will I be doing?”, and 
the easiest way that I can explain it to them is “you’ll be doing exactly what 
anybody else does, except that you need to assist me…you don’t need to 
know how to do anything, because my brain and my mouth work just fine, 
so I’ll be able to tell you how to do everything, I just can’t physically do it for 
myself” 
  
Similarly, both Amanda and Rachel commented that since their accidents, in 
their dreams they continue to walk. Rachel stated: 
I think the thing that’s strange is when you dream at night you always 
dream that you’re walking. I think I’ve only once or twice dreamed I’m in a 
wheelchair. 
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Amanda also commented on her dreaming: 
When you dream, you walk around in your dreams, because your body 
image is of a person walking around, it’s not of a person sitting down. And I 
suppose I’ve never got used to this person sitting down because…maybe 
my image of somebody in a wheelchair and my image of how I am, don’t 
match up. 
 
Although Amanda and Rachel do not explicitly or consciously seek to lock into a 
restitution narrative in their verbal, conscious stories, perhaps these images of 
walking in their dreams might be an insight to Amanda and Rachel’s unconsciously 
entrenched selves. Clearly, this is very speculative. But, these insights do allow us 
deepen our appreciation of Amanda and Rachel as complex human beings who 
not only tell stories in their waking lives to make sense of SCI, but also dream in 
narrative too. 
 Furthermore, it must be remembered that Michelle is the participant who 
appears to have the strongest affinity for the entrenched self in the years 
immediately following her accident. She commented: 
I had a secretary job…after I had my accident I still went back and worked 
for them for nine years…the horses are still there, so they need looking 
after 
 
In addition, after leaving the hospital, Michelle returned home and was cared for by 
her parents. That situation has remained the same in the twenty-five years since 
her accident. 
 The second type of restored self is the developing self, where the person 
emphasises reconstructing his or her ability to shift and change as well as to 
explore new identities as possibilities emerge (Charmaz, 1987). Frequently those 
who emphasise the developing self have not yet become tied to identifying 
permanent commitments (Charmaz, 1987). Largely due to her age at the time of 
her injury, Karen, not surprisingly, showed the greatest affinity for the developing 
self. At the time of her accident, she was sixteen years old, had just finished school 
and was in the first few months of her chosen career path. She commented: 
When I reflect back, if there could ever have been a good time for it to 
happen in my life, it probably was then, because it was such a turning point, 
you know, from childhood to adulthood. I’d made no plans, I’d got nowhere 
in my life, there was nothing that was going to be interrupted…like I say, in 
reflection, when you hear about families being turned upside down, children 
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having to go through it, having got a career, then career getting completely 
smashed out the window...in a funny sort of way, it probably happened at a 
good point in my life, because then I could pick up and carry on. 
 
This undeveloped sense of self possibly allowed Karen an easier transition 
following the accident. Because she was in a new environment, making new 
friends and attempting to adapt to a new situation, this adaptation was simply able 
to continue following her accident. However, with the exception of Michelle, all of 
the women, regardless of their age at the time of the accident commented on the 
fact that one never knows what their life would be like; therefore it was impossible 
for them to say exactly how their lives differ from what it may have been. Amanda’s 
response to how things have changed for her since the accident is similar to what 
Karen and Rachel also said:  
Interviewer: Has anything dramatically changed since having the injury? 
 
Amanda: It’s hard to say, because you don’t know what your life would have 
been like otherwise.   
 
While for Karen this sort of comment might be put down as a sign of an 
undeveloped sense of self, it is unlikely that all three of these women, at such 
differing ages at the time of their accidents, would lack a fully developed sense of 
self. For Amanda and Rachel, this is the only hint of a developing self that they 
exhibit; however, Karen’s affinity for the developing self continued further. 
Karen further displayed a developing self in her ability to shift and change. 
Throughout her story she emphasised her ability to adapt to her new situation: 
It’s just, you know, adapting to everything. You know, silly things like you 
put the kettle on something that’s higher than it and it tips into the cup 
alright…I mean, the only thing that we’ve ever had in the house here is the 
slope there [into the kitchen] so I can get down to the washing machine, 
and the lift. Everything else is more or less as it would be…I remember 
spending a whole day in court arguing whether I wanted an electric 
toothbrush or not…I don’t need an electric toothbrush, somehow I manage 
to wedge my toothbrush in my fingers and I can use a normal one.  
Nowadays everybody has an electric toothbrush, but I don’t, and I don’t 
want an electric toothbrush. 
 
Karen showed further adaptation as she went on to say: 
I don’t need the riding – I thought I would but I don’t.  Just being involved 
with horses is enough for me 
 
 89  
 The third type of restored self is known as the assumed self, where 
individuals have constructed typically unstated and taken-for-granted assumptions 
through habits and customs about who they are and what their lives mean. Who 
these people “really” are can be discerned only in their own social milieu 
(Charmaz, 1987). Out of the four participants, only Michelle and Rachel showed 
any affinity towards an assumed self. This is likely due to the social support that 
they had at the time of the accident, which has continued until the current time. 
Both Michelle and Rachel relied heavily on family support immediately following 
the accident and even now. However, as has already been mentioned, Amanda’s 
family retreated from her following the accident. In addition, while Karen’s family 
was highly supportive following her accident, they stepped back in their support 
once she was married and living alone with her husband. Michelle clearly 
displayed the social milieu which helped define her sense of self with her horse 
riding, which became carriage driving following her accident. She said: 
I still do a lot of riding for the disabled, we do that on a Thursday afternoon.  
I train with one of the groups. We also belong to different driving groups, so 
there’s always lots of jobs like that to do. I still go and watch the show 
jumping, but I don’t get very much time for that. 
 
In these comments, Michelle shows how much her social life revolves around 
horses and driving. In addition, the way she switches between “I” and “we” when 
telling her story points out another aspect of the assumed self – a merging of her 
identity within intimate relationships. In this case, that merging is with her family, 
and in particular her mother. Rachel also shows some of this aspect of the 
assumed identity, in her close relationship with her own family, and in particular, 
her sister: 
Interviewer: What does family mean to you? 
 
Rachel: They’re just really important to me. You know, mummy, daddy and 
Claire, they’re sort of everything to me. You know, I would be lost without 
them. [Claire has] sort of been there a lot…she’s been great for me, and if it 
wasn’t for her I think things would be very different. 
 
 It is clear that at some point or another after their respective accidents, all of 
the participants displayed an affinity for at least one, if not multiple types of 
restored self. However, for all of them, this was only one of a number of different 
identity levels that they have experienced since their injuries.  
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4.4.3 Disabled Identity as an Aspect of the Total Self 
 This is the first of the identity levels described by Yoshida (1993) that I insert 
into the identity hierarchy proposed by Charmaz (1987). Karen, and to some extent 
Amanda, appeared to be the only people in this study who exhibited this identity 
level. That is, for these women, the disabled identity represents one aspect of the 
person, as opposed to encompassing or nearly encompassing the total self. 
People, like Karen, in this stage of the identity hierarchy considered both their non-
disabled and disabled aspects of self, in varying proportions. Karen shows this 
when she said: 
Luckily, two or three years later, they decided to do a bladder implant on 
me, and that worked and that was the best thing I’d ever done and ever had 
in my life. No more catheters, no more leg bags, but I do have to plan 
everywhere I go and everything I do, with whether they have a disabled loo. 
 
The bladder implant allowed her to feel less disabled again, by getting rid of the leg 
bag and catheter; nevertheless, she still needed to acknowledge the disabled 
aspect of her self with the planning she was required to do in regards to facilities. 
In addition, she clearly shows that she has not yet reached the middle self because 
she has not yet accepted the level of dependency in her life: 
I do wish I had my independence a little bit more…if I go to a show Aaron is 
always with me, if we were moving lorries, I couldn’t drive those anyway.  
My sister’s house, I can’t get in because she’s got another ten steps up to 
it…we don’t go there very often at all 
 
 While Amanda does not actively display this identity level, it appears that 
she may have exhibited it at some point since her injury: 
When I broke my neck I didn’t know how to switch a computer on, and I was 
just trapped in my living room, because I couldn’t get out of my living room.  
So it was either learn to use a computer or watch daytime TV. So I’m quite 
good with computers now. 
 
From these comments, it seems that Amanda was attempting to consider both 
non-disabled and disabled aspects of her self. While she felt “trapped” in her living 
room because of her disability, she also gave consideration to her non-disabled 
self because she did not want to give in to watching daytime TV. While this is one 
of the few hints that at some point, Amanda possibly exhibited characteristics of 
the disabled identity as an aspect of the total self, it seems likely that this was 
indeed one of the identity levels she reached. All of the participants in this study 
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changed identity levels at least once, and each one moved down the hierarchy. 
Amanda appears to have changed identity levels more times than any other 
participant before finding a stable identity. While she started at the top of the 
hierarchy, with the supernormal identity, she slowly slipped down it, finally coming 
to rest in the following identity level: the middle self. Because she passed through 
the restored self, it is logical to assume that she also passed through the disabled 
identity as an aspect of the total self on her journey to the middle self. 
 
4.4.4 Middle Self 
Amanda is the only participant in the study to display characteristics of the 
middle self as described in Yoshida’s (1993) work. The middle self incorporates 
three traditional elements: (1) the individual understands that s/he is in a 
wheelchair and this is the way it is and will be; (2) the individual understands there 
are limitations associated with having a SCI and does not view them as negative; 
and (3) the individual has a ‘collective disabled unconsciousness’, which is a 
consideration for others with spinal cord injuries or people with disabilities, in 
decisions s/he makes with respect to social interaction and everyday life (Yoshida, 
1993). 
 Amanda clearly demonstrates all three of these traditional elements. In 
relation to her understanding that she is in a wheelchair, she commented: 
We’ll make a joke of the fact that I’m in a wheelchair…We all went to the 
Rocky Horror Picture Show, and somebody said “what did you go as?” and 
I said “well I went as the professor because I already had the prop!”…I don’t 
want people to ignore the fact or not mention that I’m in a wheelchair…the 
things I like haven’t changed….I miss dancing more than I miss walking, but 
there’s nothing that I can do about it 
 
In addition, her understanding of her limitations and acceptance of them is 
also unmistakably evident: 
The fact that the girls have been trained to do everything for me has made 
me so independent because I can go anywhere, you know. I can go 
abroad, I can go cycling in the middle…and whoever’s with me will know 
how to change a catheter, if I choke, will know how to do an assisted cough, 
can deal with dysreflexia, can deal with any eventuality…There are some 
carers now that are trained to do bowel care and things to help people be 
more independent, but the district nurse still has to change their catheter 
every three months and it’s like…they don’t have to do that! And I always 
say that my carers do things with a lot better technique than any of the 
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medical professionals that have ever done it. And it makes me completely 
self-contained. 
 
 These comments clearly show that Amanda has accepted a level of 
dependence in her life and doesn’t view it as negative. However, in her mind, her 
‘dependence’ on her carers is really ‘independence’ from the district nurses and 
home-care usually used in these situations. She almost views her carers an 
extension of herself, because they do things according to her instructions. Thus, in 
a sense, dependence takes on ‘new meaning’.   
 Finally, Amanda also displayed a ‘collective disabled consciousness’. She 
not only raises money for spinal research, and does 200-mile cycle challenges to 
raise funds for charity; she has also become a social services provider herself: 
I ran my own care package for so long, and then two years ago my physio 
actually was looking after another guy who needed the same sort of care 
package as me. But because it’s direct payments, and you have to employ 
your own staff, he couldn’t do that, so then I started running two care 
packages. And because I was doing that I had to become an official 
business and get insurance and get registered with social services, so now 
I’m actually a social services provider, but a good one! 
 
 While Amanda finds the middle self to be a stable identity level for her, other 
participants slipped lower on the identity hierarchy. Michelle, who began at the 
identity level of restored self following her accident, appeared to have skipped the 
two intervening identity levels and passed right onto the next level in the hierarchy: 
the contingent personal identity. 
 
4.4.5 Contingent Personal Identity 
 The contingent personal identity (CPI) is the third identity level on Charmaz’ 
hierarchy, and the fifth on this proposed hierarchy for women who have suffered an 
SCI. A level of precarious health leads to viewing identity goals as uncertain, and 
those who aim for this identity level see SCI (or illness) as posing the primary risk 
of failure rather than failure resulting from their own efforts, as do those who aim 
for a supernormal identity (Charmaz, 1987). According to Charmaz (1987),  
people implicitly or explicitly settle for a contingent personal identity under 
the following three conditions: (1) when they believe their illness may 
dramatically alter their lives; (2) when they accept a less-valued self than 
that held prior to illness because of the intrusiveness of illness in their lives; 
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and (3) when their plans fail and they lose hope of attaining either a 
supernormal identity or a restored self (p.p. 308-309) 
 
 In this study, two participants showed an affinity for the contingent personal 
identity at some point after their accidents: Michelle and Rachel. The reasons for 
this are uncertain, due to the participants themselves seemly not knowing; 
however, these two participants were the most reliant on their families for support, 
which may indicate external influences on their long-term decisions. For Michelle, 
her transition from a restored self to a contingent personal identity seemed to begin 
about nine years after her injury: 
I decided I’d finish work, because work was changing, the job was 
changing, and it was getting faster. It was all to do with, like the new 
computers were coming in and that meant the pressures were different…I 
was working and not doing anything else because by the time I got in from 
work I was too tired 
 
These comments show the dramatic effect Michelle felt her injury was having on 
her life, and the intrusiveness. However, there appear to have been further factors 
in her transition to a CPI – a recurring shoulder injury, from before her SCI, caused 
her to give up some of her new activities: 
It’s an old shoulder injury…before I had my accident I’d dislocated it – it 
used to come in and out a lot. When I had my accident, they were a bit wary 
about doing anything in case it made things worse, so I used to just pop it 
back in…so then I was driving and just parked the car and put my arm on 
the steering wheel, turned around to look for my friend, case I was meeting 
them in the car park, and my arm came out and I couldn’t get it back in. So 
that’s when they took me to hospital and sorted me out, so now I’m just 
taking things easy with it…I had to give up the rugby and the table tennis 
 
 However, this assessment of time may not be related specifically to the 
contingent personal identity. While Michelle’s assessments of time led her to 
believe that her chances of attaining a preferred identity are uncertain but 
conceivable (Charmaz, 1987), other participants also used assessments of time to 
settle into differing identity levels in the hierarchy. In fact, a certain amount of time 
assessment comes through in all of the participants’ stories; however, Michelle’s 
comment is a good example of what all of them mentioned: 
One day they’ll have a cure, or they’ll make you walk…but you can’t live 
your life, just waiting for that 
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 As previously mentioned, Rachel also displayed an affinity for the contingent 
personal identity; however, unlike Michelle, who first aimed for a higher identity 
level and then slipped down the hierarchy, Rachel seems to have aimed for a 
contingent personal identity from the start. Based on the data generated, and in 
her own admission, it is uncertain why she aimed for such a low identity level right 
from the beginning; but it may have been due to the effect the accident had on her 
self-confidence: 
I think my confidence has decreased since being in the chair…I just sort of 
never had it since being in a chair…I can’t imagine going somewhere by 
myself…I think personality-wise I haven’t changed, but confidence has 
definitely changed. 
 
However, once again, external influences from family members may have 
affected her belief in her abilities subsequent to her SCI:   
My rehab and everything, I didn’t really put stuff into it.  I just was…I’m very 
nervous in my chair…I was very worried about falling out of my chair.  
Getting onto the balancing bed, or whatever it’s called, I just couldn’t do it.  I 
think I might have spent a couple of times on it, but was just like in tears 
and wanted to get off. Then just sort of came out and prepared to just 
living…I had a flat, [but] it was on the third floor, so I had to find somewhere 
to live. So we found this place and I moved in with my sister, cause mum 
and dad were still [overseas] and I obviously couldn’t go back there 
anymore, it just wasn’t feasible really with the wheelchair. 
 
For Rachel, it seems as though only the first two conditions for a contingent 
personal identity are met. The third condition, where failing plans cause one to lose 
hope of attaining supernormal or restored selves, never seems to have occurred. 
Starting during her time in the hospital, Rachel seemed to have come to an 
acceptance of a less-valued self than that held prior to the SCI. She stated: 
Job-wise and things like that, I think that sort of diminished with it.  You 
know, I would like to work, but it’s just like, what work could I do? And you 
know, sort of getting up every morning, sometimes it just doesn’t happen 
according to plan and things sort of throw a spanner in the works, so I just 
couldn’t…. 
 
In addition, her fragile hopes to work extend to her leisure time activities as well: 
Sometimes I just think “oh I’d love to go and play tennis” or you know, horse 
riding, I miss that. You know, I’d love to go and do horse riding, but I could 
just imagine getting all excited and falling right off the other side 
 
 Nevertheless, neither Michelle nor Rachel seem to stay at the level of the 
contingent personal identity for long. As time went by, both dropped down to the 
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final identity level on the hierarchy: the salvaged self (Charmaz, 1987). This may 
be due simply to the amount of time that had passed since their accidents – after 
years with no improvement, and in Michelle’s case, setbacks due to further injury, 
the hypothetical possibilities of the contingent personal identity slipped further 
away, and left them struggling to find a stable self. 
 
4.4.6 Salvaged Self 
 The salvaged self is the final and lowest identity level on the hierarchy 
(Charmaz, 1987). Aiming for this identity level means attempting to maintain some 
positive past self images as good and worthwhile despite the adverse 
circumstances in which these people find themselves (Charmaz, 1987).   
People generally attempt to salvage prior self-images at two turning points 
in the chronology of their SCI or illness: (1) when ill people initially recognize 
marked losses of self due to SCI or serious illness and; (2) following cycles of 
immobilization when disabled or ill (Charmaz, 1987). For Rachel, her descent into 
the salvaged self seems to have occurred at the first turning point, when she 
initially recognized marked losses of self, relatively quickly following her accident. 
At this stage, she seems to have attempted to maintain a positive self-image 
through her social life, her belief that she is still living her life the way she chooses, 
and her hopes that she will eventually find something she wants, and is able, to do: 
I think I do live my life the way I want to live my life, and I’m very happy.  It’s 
not like I go, ‘oh I wish I would…’. Obviously I would like to work, I would 
like to get out and do a job, but I do live a very full life and I get out and 
socialize a lot, so I’m not bothered about all that sort of stuff…I just don’t 
know what I actually want to do…it’s just finding that, what I want to do, and 
getting it and doing it. So one of these days I’ll figure out what I want to do 
in life, and go for it. 
 
In spite of this, Rachel was unable to fully maintain a salvaged self.  
According to Charmaz (1987), chronically ill persons, or disabled people, 
occasionally become so preoccupied with their losses that they cannot salvage any 
kind of positive self-image – their losses consume them. Rachel shows her 
difficulty in preserving a positive self-image:  
I feel quite lazy. I’m not striving to do more…I don’t want to make a fool of 
myself, put it that way.  You see people doing amazing things, and I think to 
myself “God, Rachel, if they can do that, why can’t you?’, but it’s just like 
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the confidence thing again, holds me back…I’m just scared to do sports and 
everything, and I just think, “well what can I do?”. And I know that’s a 
negative way to look at it, but I do kind of think…”I cant feed myself…if I 
was to go shopping I couldn’t get anything off the shelf”…I’ve just sort of 
accepted that this is it. 
 
For Michelle, her fall to the salvaged self appears to have occurred during 
the second turning point, following cycles of immobilization when disabled or 
during illness. Once she reached the stage where work was all she had the energy 
for, she retired from work in order to concentrate her efforts on the horses. At this 
point in time, she had reached the contingent personal identity; however, her fall 
down the hierarchy continued once she injured her shoulder. This led to her being 
“so immersed in [SCI] that [she could] not readily claim other identities in the 
external world. Consequently, [she turned her] attention toward carving out a 
tolerable existence in [her] present circumstances” (Charmaz, 1987, p. 311). 
Michelle stated:   
Now I’m mainly carriage driving for myself, and say judging, stewarding, 
and also do a lot of work with the driving for the disabled…and like, the 
RDA (riding for the disabled), you’ve got people coming that need your 
help, and your expertise to teach them. And even cause I’m sitting watching 
things, I mean I’m not hands-on as much, but the little things you miss…I 
tend to notice everything, I might notice there’s a strap out of keeper or 
something silly like that. 
 
 In addition, Michelle finds comfort in trying to help herself and still doing 
what she can, however restricted she may be (Charmaz, 1987).   
Interviewer: Are things more difficult now, as you’re getting older and your 
mum’s getting older? Are you both having any more troubles with being 
dependent on each other? 
 
Michelle: No, cause we just…there’s thing I can do for mum, and there’s 
things mum can do. We don’t do as much hooliganing and things that we 
used to do, but we just…you adapt don’t you? Like everyone in life as they 
get older. Like dishes that go in the oven, for mum they’ve got to be lighter 
ones, not the old fashioned big heavy dishes. Jars that we can’t open, we’ll 
just leave that out and when Debbie or anyone calls, they’ll open. Which is 
just like anybody else isn’t it? No different. 
 
 As each participant has moved through the hierarchy in an attempt to find a 
stable, sustainable identity level, another common issue was commented on in all 
of their stories: that of dependence and independence. 
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4.5 Dependence and Independence 
Independence is generally considered to be something disabled people 
desire above all else (French, 1993). Indeed, becoming dependent on others 
following an injury is one reason for feelings of discomfort with the changed body 
(Chau et al., 2008).  However, independence, like disability itself, means different 
things to different people. The most common definition of independence in relation 
to disability is that of physical independence. According to Oliver (1993): 
in common-sense usage, dependency implies the inability to do things for 
oneself and consequently the reliance on others to carry out some or all of 
the tasks of everyday life. Conversely, independence suggests that the 
individual needs no assistance whatever from anyone else…in reality, of 
course, no one in a modern industrial society is completely independent, 
for we live in a state of mutual interdependence.  The dependence of 
disabled people, therefore, is not a feature which marks them different in 
kind from the rest of the population, but as different in degree (pp. 50-51).  
 
This definition is often known as the “self-care activities” definition of 
independence, and is often used by medical professionals. Indeed, the women in 
this study often used this definition of dependence and independence when asked 
about the changes they have needed to adapt to since their respective injuries. 
Michelle explained:  
Interviewer: How have things changed for you since the injury? 
 
Michelle: Well that you’ve got to be dependent on someone…I do need 
help…you need to ask someone to do things. 
 
Rachel also commented on dependence in aspects of her life now: 
I find it hard having people around all the time, I used to like my own 
company…I taught the carers to do [my] makeup…it can be frustrating, 
cause you know how you do things yourself…cause sometimes people are 
a bit heavy handed…but I think once they’ve done it a couple of times, it’s 
like, just let them get on with it now. 
 
 Karen similarly struggled to come to terms with the limits of her physical 
dependence: 
And I really struggled…I came home and we tried with the transfers and we 
tried with this and that and everything else, and in the end my mum and 
dad got to the point where it was like “this is just hopeless”, you know.  For 
two or three things that you can do, you’re then spending a week in bed 
because you’ve just knocked your own skin or what have you…the 
pressure sores are rammed into you…I can remember being [in hospital] 
and these people going around in trolleys upside down…and that was the 
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one thing I was never going to do.  I was never going to spend my life on 
my front with my ass in the air because I’d got a pressure sore…you 
physically want to do these things, you want your bit of independence back.  
I wanted to be able to get myself up in the morning, I didn’t want to have to 
lay there until somebody came to get me up…So you try incredibly hard, 
but when it doesn’t work, it really gets you down.  The constantly back in 
bed made me feel like a bit of a failure…  
 
Karen further commented on the creation of dependence within the medical 
community: 
And the district nurse doesn’t come in until nine o’clock, I don’t want to be in 
bed at nine o’clock!...it’s not just the spinal side of it, you talk to the elderly 
care and it’s the same…you hear about these old people having to get up 
at nine o’clock in the morning and then having to go back to bed at four 
o’clock because that’s the only help that’s available to them, and I think that 
is very wrong. 
 
These comments help to show how disabled people are offered little choice about 
aids and equipment. In addition, times at which professionals can attend to help 
with matters like toileting, dressing, or preparing a meal are restricted, and the 
limited range of tasks professionals can perform are further limited because of 
professional boundaries, employer requirements or trade union practices (Oliver, 
1993). This, in turn, can have many negative consequences on a disabled person’s 
psycho-emotional well-being, sense of self and body-self relationships. Indeed, 
Amanda made similar observations which demonstrate the impact of dependence 
and a “one fits all” model to disability on psycho-emotional well-being: 
The moving and handling regulations, that’s a big thing that actually 
hampers your activities in Britain. Uh, Regain, the charity…they’re actually 
just for sports injured tetraplegics, they sent me a bike. But moving and 
handling regulations say that the carers can’t lift me into the bike and I have 
to be hoisted into the bike. Which is fine, we can bring the bike [inside] and 
hoist me into it. But the bike’s so big we can’t then get it out of the room.  
So technically I’d have to be lifted into it in the garden, which means they 
can’t really lift me into it because there isn’t a hoist in the garden, so I can’t 
use it. So it’s rubbish. My physio helps a lot cause he just picks me up and 
puts me in things…he helps me to overcome a lot just by picking me up and 
throwing me over things that lifting and handling regulations say he’s not 
supposed to do. 
 
Even though both women struggled with the dependence forced upon them 
by the medical community, both Karen and Amanda eventually came to view 
physical independence as being secondary to being independent in other aspects 
of their lives. This, in turn, has a series of consequences in terms of their emotional 
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well-being, as well as their freedom of thought and action. As French (1993) 
explained: 
Narrowly defined independence can give rise to inefficiency, stress and 
isolation, as well as wasting precious time…an over-emphasis on physical 
independence can rob disabled people of true independence by restricting 
their freedom of thought and action (p.47)  
 
Karen goes into detail: 
At the end of the day I view that my day is more important than getting up or 
going to bed and being able to put my trousers on myself. Being able to 
make sure the washing and the ironing’s done and there’s a meal on the 
table tonight, is more important than me being able to put my trousers on 
one day and then spend a week in bed and not being able to put a meal on 
the table and the washing…and it probably was one strong, hard thing to 
get used to, was losing that bit of independence but to gain other things.  
But that makes me more normal, that I can do all the normal wifely, 
motherly things. 
 
 While these comments show how Karen eventually learned to put her 
physical independence behind other aspects of her life in terms of importance, it 
also demonstrates how closely associated the pressure to appear ‘normal’ is with 
the pressure to be independent. While Karen has overcome the pressure to be 
independent, it appears that the pressure to be a ‘normal’ wife and mother are still 
present. All the same, Amanda, like Karen, also overcame the pressures to be 
physically independent; because both of these women remained higher up on the 
identity hierarchy, it may be that positive identities and self-esteem relate to 
overcoming pressures to be physically independent. Amanda now views her 
independence in terms of being able to be in control of, and make decisions about 
her life: 
When I employ people they always say “what exactly will I be doing?”, and 
the easiest way that I can explain it to them is “you’ll be doing exactly what 
anybody else does, except that you need to assist me to get up, get out of 
bed, get dressed. I need assistance with bowel and bladder management, 
and I need help around the house. You don’t need to know how to do 
anything because my brain and my mouth work just fine, so I’ll be able to 
tell you how to do everything. I just can’t physically do it myself…I feel just 
as if I were able-bodied, it’s just I find different ways of getting things 
done…the fact that the girls have been trained to do everything for me has 
made me so independent because I can go anywhere. I can go abroad, I 
can go cycling…and whoever’s with me will know how to change a catheter, 
if I choke will know how to do an assisted cough, can deal with dysreflexia, 
can deal with any eventuality. And that’s no big thing, you don’t need a 
medical degree to do that, yet there’s some ownership that nurses and 
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doctors have…I always say my carers do things with a lot better technique 
and a lot better than any of the medical professionals that have ever done 
it…It makes me completely self-contained. 
 
 Amanda clearly demonstrates that her independence is not linked to doing 
things alone or without help, but by obtaining assistance when and how she 
requires it (Morris, 1993; Oliver, 1993; Reindal, 1999; Rock, 1988).  Therefore, for 
Amanda, independence is promoted as a “mind process not contingent upon 
having a normal body” (Huemann, quoted in Crewe & Zola, 1983). Nevertheless, 
there are still other aspects of independence, not related to the physical body or 
the thinking mind. For example, Karen mentioned financial independence during 
the course of her interview: 
I mean, things that worry me a little bit…we just don’t have access to 
money…everything’s made so much more difficult…I don’t know if you 
know what horse boxes are like, but all horse boxes have what we call a 
living in the front, like a caravan.  How’re we going to do that with me? 
That’s going to cost us a fortune and we don’t have a fortune, so do I not go 
to shows?  Whatever way we look at it, it’s going to cost.  And that’s what 
annoys me so much about the accident, is everything costs so much more.  
And the money I was given twenty years ago is way gone, because they 
just don’t take in the cost of inflation and what have you.  We’ve 
squandered none of it…we bought a property, and the usual chairs and 
what have you…but you don’t realise this when you’re going through the 
court case, so that money isn’t available, it isn’t there, and it does stop my 
life. I’ve just had one of my benefits stopped because according to them I’m 
working. I am working; I don’t disagree with them, to a degree.  I’m working, 
but if I was able-bodied I wouldn’t have to pay [another employee] to do 
what I can’t.  I’d be doing both.  It’s not the same, I cannot get out there and 
do what I have to do…which is where my business fails all the time, 
because it’s almost having to employ two people instead of one.  And that’s 
what you can’t get through to people, that everything costs so much more. 
I’m one of these people that I don’t have the blue badge, I don’t want to 
park in a disabled spot, I don’t ring my health officer every time I need 
something, I don’t need a special mattress, I don’t need all your…I can 
cope without it. But it does make you very bitter to the fact that, hang on, 
I’ve probably saved you a fortune…you know, the fact that I could have a 
district nurse in here six days a week but I don’t…I should have my home 
help here helping me clean, but I don’t want that, I want to have the dignity 
of looking after my own house…I know what will happen is [I’ll] probably 
break myself with another loan, but I shouldn’t have to do that.  But then, 
that’s no worse than any other man or woman struggling to finance what 
they want to do either, to a degree.  But it is harder, you know.  Things are 
harder. 
 
 While there may be many varied aspects of independence in everyday life, it 
is an inescapable fact that they are difficult for disabled people to attain.  Whether 
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it is their own physical limitations, dependency forced on them by the structure of 
the society they live in, or excess financial burdens, disabled people are expected 
to cope in a way not expected of other people (French, 1993). This, in turn, may 
have had a significant impact on the well-being and self-esteem of the women in 
this study. As noted earlier, for the women in this study, dependence on others 
created a significant discomfort with their changed bodies (Chau et al., 2008). 
Related to the issue of dependence, another difficulty the women in this study 
faced was how to approach intimate relationships and motherhood. 
 
4.6 Relationships and Motherhood 
Having intimate relationships and becoming a mother are goals often taken 
for granted by able-bodied women. Waxman (1991) contends that the disability 
movement has not adequately addressed disabled women’s sexuality as a political 
issue, although “many of us find sexuality to be the area of our greatest 
oppression…we are more concerned with being loved and finding sexual fulfilment 
than with getting on a bus” (Waxman, 1991, p. 23). These ‘reproductive rights’ are 
described by Morris (1995) as: 
Having sexual relationships (whether they are heterosexual or lesbian 
relationships), family relationships, bearing and rearing children and making 
a home – all these are important to human and civil rights which, if denied 
to non-disabled women, would be the subject of outrage (p. 76) 
 
Reproductive rights are also important because social isolation, limited 
opportunities to establish satisfying relationships, and emotional, physical and 
sexual abuse can lead for some people, but certainly not all, to problems with low 
self-esteem and depression (Nosek, Howland, Rintala, Young, & Chanpong, 
2001). While all of the women in this study had varying experiences in relation to 
reproductive rights, these contrasting experiences help to show us the wide 
assortment of barriers and issues disabled women face. Of the four women in this 
study, Amanda was a single mother, Karen was married with a child, and Rachel 
and Michelle were single.  
 It has been pointed out that while: 
most able bodied women experience problems in being treated as a sexual 
object…many disabled women experience being treated as an asexual 
object…[and] may never have had the experience of flirting…being 
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harassed, or objectified” (Cole, 1988, p. 32; also Fine & Asch, 1988; Finger, 
1984).  
 
For example, Amanda explained: 
Interviewer: What makes you feel most womanly or feminine now? 
 
Amanda: People’s reaction to me, really…I’ve got a very good male 
friend…and the fact that he and his wife treat me as completely normal is a 
big thing. I suppose men’s reaction to me, is what I’m saying. If they treat 
me normally than I haven’t got that obstacle. So I suppose the thing that 
makes me feel most feminine is when other people see me as a woman. 
 
Interviewer: how often do you find that people don’t [see you as a woman]? 
 
Amanda: Oh…fifty percent of the time? I would say, roughly.   
 
Interviewer: How does it make you feel when people meet you and don’t 
see you as being a woman? 
 
Amanda: The cripple in the chair. It’s annoying and saddening, but I also 
think, “well it’s their loss”. But that’s probably a conclusion that I’ve come to 
over the years, it would have upset me more in the early days I think. 
 
However, the other women in this study did not feel they were treated as asexual 
objects.  Karen replied: 
When I first got together with my husband…luckily we’ve got a very open 
relationship and all the rest of it. It’s like, wouldn’t you like a woman that can 
wear sexy underwear? And his words were “it’s not quite the same putting it 
on as taking it off”. It’s never bothered him, it probably bothers me more 
than it bothers him…No, I can’t stride into a room looking tall and sexy and 
having set up the candles and all the rest of it…but as I say, it probably 
bothers me more than it bothers him. 
  
Karen further commented: 
I felt like [Aaron and his mother] had accepted me. I never ever felt like if I 
went home they’d shut the doors and ask “what are you doing with her?”, it 
really didn’t matter…He never ever made me feel like that. It’s always, I am 
who I am, and that’s all it ever was. Never felt like he was embarrassed to 
be seen with me or that we couldn’t go somewhere because he wouldn’t 
want to be seen…around a show with me in a great big wheelchair. 
 
Similarly, Rachel replied: 
Interviewer: Do you ever get the impression that other people don’t really 
look at you as a woman anymore? 
 
Rachel: No, I don’t. I hope not!...I don’t think they see me as different to like, 
a ‘normal’ person, someone else…they don’t even see the chair, and just 
sort of see me I guess 
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 However, even though they feel others perceive them in the same manner 
as before they were injured, Michelle and Rachel are not interested in seeking out 
intimate relationships.  Michelle stated: 
Interviewer: Do you date at all? 
 
Michelle: No.  I did do, I wouldn’t now. 
 
Interviewer: Why is that? What do you think is different that you wouldn’t 
date now? 
 
Michelle: I like to have loads of friends. I like friendships and nothing more, 
because I’d be asking them to help me and I don’t like that. I like friends 
where I can say “well I’m going somewhere, do you fancy coming with 
me?”…which is much nicer than, oh I don’t know, arguing and ‘oh can you 
do this’ and ‘can you do that’, or ‘I need this doing’. You know, all the other 
things that you don’t want to do while you’re out and enjoying yourself…no, 
I think friendships are better…you want to be able to go out and enjoy 
yourself, you want to enjoy that. You don’t want to burden them…you laugh 
and joke…not have the added arguments and the do’s and the don’ts or I 
can’t be bothered… 
 
Thus, for Michelle, it appears she avoids relationships so that she won’t “burden” 
anyone outside of her immediate family.  In addition, she seems to feel a 
relationship would add unnecessary complication and conflict to her life. While 
some of Rachel’s reasons for not seeking a relationship were similar to Michelle’s, 
she had other reasons that contrasted: 
I find it hard, like with men, you know I don’t think it’s gonna…boyfriend and 
stuff like that, like sex and stuff, I just can’t really see it happening.  I don’t 
know if I’ll ever be ok with all of it, I just can’t get my head around that…I did 
kind of have a boyfriend the other year, but it was just too stressful.  I just 
wasn’t ready for it…I think it was just my attitude towards it.  I’d just be like 
“why do you want to be with me?”, do you know what I mean?  I just 
couldn’t understand it, and I couldn’t get my head around it, so I don’t think I 
dealt with it well at all…I just don’t see myself…men never see me that way, 
I’m a bit more hard work than they need really. 
   
Therefore, while Rachel also seemed to think a relationship added complication to 
her life, and was “too stressful”, most of her issues in seeking a relationship appear 
to be linked to her low self-esteem.  
Amanda, like Michelle and Rachel, avoids intimate relationships.  However, 
Amanda had a number of very different reasons for avoiding a relationship.  While 
she was in a long-term relationship at the time of her accident, this failed in a few 
months as a direct result of her disability: 
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I had a boyfriend when I broke my neck. It was pretty serious, we’d been 
together for about two years…that relationship didn’t last, it didn’t survive 
the injury really…he was very open about it, and said that over that six 
months his mates were like “if you stay with her, you’re throwing your life 
away, you’re young, you need to cut your losses”…and when he came back 
he was a different person…he was scared of seeing me…I hadn’t had a 
chance to prove them all wrong, he just listened to everybody else…I felt he 
was taken from me while I was disabled…I was still weak, I was still at their 
mercy, I was still being dictated to. 
 
However, even following this heartbreak, Amanda attempted to get back into the 
dating scene following her accident, for various reasons: 
It’s different with women as well with sex. Nobody wants to talk about sex or 
anything, but I do this lecture for midwives about birth and all that…I’m 
numb from the chest down, and sensation-wise I can feel very little surface 
sensation, but I do feel deep sensation. I can feel movement, so sex was 
still a pleasurable activity. I could still have sexual feelings and take part 
you know…I couldn’t swing from the lampshades or anything… 
 
Nevertheless, her only relationship following her accident has since scared her 
away from any future relationships: 
I think that’s what went wrong with the relationship I had. I think now, that 
he was attracted to me because I was in a wheelchair and appeared 
vulnerable. I think that was the big attraction to him and I didn’t see that at 
all. So I was vulnerable, but not in the way that he thought. And that’s 
actually scared me off a lot of relationships because I don’t feel any 
different at all. But because of the way other people view me…I’m sure I got 
into the relationship because of the downtrodden way that I’d been 
rehabilitated…at first it was great and all that, but it actually ended up quite 
abusive. He was quite a nasty and controlling person, and I remember 
thinking “if you weren’t paralysed you wouldn’t be in this situation”. And then 
I felt “so why are you in this situation, because you’re not different”. I 
remember actually making the decision and I chucked him out…I had such 
a bad time with David, who was Michael’s dad, that I’ve never had another 
relationship again…it’s just a conscious decision to look after Michael and 
not subject him to any danger of that happening ever again. I’m aware that 
it’s not completely healthy, but I don’t think it’s because of the paralysis or 
spinal cord injury at all, I think it’s because of a totally separate experience I 
had. 
 
While even able-bodied women run the risk of becoming involved in abusive 
relationships, disabled women appear to be at an even higher risk, due to their 
seeming vulnerability.  Amanda again commented on her vulnerability when she 
received hate mail during her pregnancy: 
It made me feel vulnerable that people were out there thinking that. Before, 
I was very self-confident, and now I keep the doors locked, you know, so 
that people can’t walk in unless I want them to walk in. So from that respect 
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I feel vulnerable, but probably not the vulnerable that everybody else sees 
me as, if that makes sense 
 
Rachel also commented on her vulnerability: 
I do feel more vulnerable, obviously. I kind of think, if anything happens, I 
can’t just get up or, you know, escape from the situation 
 
 Due to the extra vulnerability felt by disabled women, trust appears to be an 
important aspect of a successful relationship – both trust in yourself and your 
partner.  Karen explained: 
I remember it taking a long time for me to trust myself with Aaron…it did 
take a long time for me to really, I suppose, fall hook, line, and sinker, and 
think “well, this could work”. But then you also think, “I’m 21, 22, I’ve got to 
start trusting myself or I’m going to be an old spinster on my own”. You 
know, if it doesn’t work, it’s not going to work, but that could happen to me 
whether I was able-bodied or not.I could end up going through ten 
relationships before I find the one I want to finally settle down with. That 
didn’t necessarily mean that just because I was in a wheelchair, that was 
the way it was going to be…I know I’m incredibly lucky, for him to be the 
first man I met after my accident, and still be with him now. 
 
In fact, for Karen, many of the issues in her relationship were due to outside 
influences from her family: 
Our relationship was alright, it was just everybody else around us that used 
to put an awful lot of pressure on. Made me very cross and very bitter 
towards my parents, although I could never thank them enough for what 
they did at the start, but they never made my life very easy with him. I know 
it’s probably the old ‘father protecting daughter’ syndrome, but there comes 
a point where you have to let go a little bit…They were absolutely petrified I 
was going to get hurt…but they also didn’t understand the fact that I’ve got 
to live my life normally, or as normal as possible…There’s many a normal 
relationship that doesn’t last long, so you know, after nineteen years, you 
think, “can he not be happy for me?”... I can understand his concerns at the 
beginning, you know, “this is just a novelty, she’s got some money”, you 
know, I can understand all that, but after nineteen years, if it doesn’t work 
now, it’s not for the want of trying...One thing that was never argued about 
is the accident, the wheelchair, anything related like that. It’s always been 
my parents. 
 
 Beyond the trials and tribulations revolving around attempting to form 
intimate relationships as disabled women, both Karen and Amanda went further 
and had children following their accidents.  According to Thomas (1997), the 
experiences of disabled women “have been largely overlooked in sociological 
studies of pregnancy, childbirth and early motherhood…the voices of disabled 
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women are almost totally absent in sociological work on reproduction and 
parenting” (p. 623).  Grue & Lærum (2002) further explain: 
Disabled women are often looked upon as passive receivers of help and 
social services, and not as women themselves capable of caring. Within a 
medical discourse of disability they are mainly perceived as patients and 
not as women capable of giving birth…disabled women are not expected to 
be mothers (p. 673) 
 
 While both Karen and Amanda have had children following their accidents, 
in most ways they had very different experiences related to pregnancy and 
motherhood.  However, both commented on the negative reactions they received 
from family members.  Amanda stated: 
When I told my brother, who’s a father of three, that I was pregnant he said, 
“How?” and I said, “you don’t know? There’s only one way!”  And certainly, 
when they realise I had a child after the accident, the first thing that comes 
to mind is “how did you have sex”? Sometimes I get fed up of answering the 
same questions and I’m tempted to say “well we go to a lab…” you know! 
 
Karen reflected on her father’s reaction to the news of her pregnancy: 
When I told my dad I was pregnant, he wasn’t over the moon, he was so 
worried about what the consequences could be for me. But I’ve got to give it 
a go, I couldn’t not, it was the next normal stage in my life 
 
 Nevertheless, following the initial hesitant reactions, Karen found a 
generally positive reaction to her pregnancy and motherhood: 
I was petrified – I didn’t know how I was going to cope with a baby…but I 
knew I’d got a good back up team, Aaron was brilliant…It’s just amazing 
what you learn to do…it wasn’t long before I was looking after him for eight, 
nine hours on my own, and it wasn’t a problem…I’ve never been a 
“mother’s mother”…I’m not a coffee morning type of person…I must admit, 
all the way through, doesn’t matter who I deal with, they’ve always been 
very helpful, even at school…obviously I’m not going to be in school 
everyday like a lot of mothers, so if there’s a problem, contact me! I don’t 
want a problem to get out of hand 
 
 Conversely, the negative reaction Amanda experienced from certain 
medical and social care professionals lasted throughout her pregnancy: 
I told my GP I was pregnant and a social worker said to my GP “advise her 
to have a termination, because as a disabled single mum, she won’t be 
allowed to keep the baby”. Three years after my accident, I had my son, 
Michael, and rather than support me, Social Services took me to court and 
was going to take my child into care at birth, because they said I was too 
disabled to look after him…the fight finished four days before I had him – I 
was under an awful lot of stress right the way through the pregnancy…It 
was terrible, I went to a pregnancy fair…I was about five months pregnant 
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and I was going around in a wheelchair, obviously pregnant, and the way I 
was treated made me feel like a freak. Like an abomination…These reps at 
the stalls would absolutely leap on any pregnant woman that walked past 
and give them a leaflet, whereas as I went past, they would not get eye 
contact and tidy their leaflets or turn their backs on me. And again it’s back 
to this thing that they didn’t know how to react, but what was I going to do? I 
wasn’t going to ask them anything about my disability; I was just going to 
ask them the same questions that any other woman would ask. But I felt 
stared at…I got a lot of very supportive letters when I was pregnant, but I 
also got some hideous ones…saying “you filthy pig, what right have you got 
to have sex?” and stuff like that…I don’t think anybody other than Jen, my 
friend, actually perceived it as something positive…Everybody saw it as “oh 
no, how am I going to cope with this?”. Social Services certainly saw it as 
“oh this is going to cost millions”…Everybody dealt with it as “oh, it’s a 
problem” apart from one person, who was my closest friend. 
 
Indeed, apart from her closest friends, this negative reaction continued for Amanda 
through motherhood: 
At first, at Michael’s school, people didn’t speak to me, and they were 
avoiding me because they didn’t know what to say to me. So the kids sort of 
avoided me too, and then eventually the kids just got used to me being 
“Michael’s mum” and I’ll go to parents evening and I’m present at things, so 
they get used to me being in a wheelchair and now they will actually come 
up and ride on the back, drive it around, sit on my lap. It’s the parents that 
feel awkward, and not the kids…It’s like, I’ll go down to collect Michael from 
school and it’s like “oh she’s come down in her wheelchair to collect”…but 
there’s nothing you can do about it, apart from ignore it and joke about it. 
 
However, even with the negative reactions she’s had to deal with over the years, 
Amanda loves being a mother: 
We’ve travelled all over the world, and obviously, wherever I go, Michael 
comes with me…He always comes out at the end of the [cycle] challenges, 
so he’s there when I finish and then we always have a week’s holiday in 
whatever country. So he’s walked on coral reefs and picked up 
starfish…Wrestling’s quite an important part of our life at the moment, I 
have to wrestle daily…cause you know, Michael doesn’t give me any 
consideration for being paralysed, you know I just have to do everything the 
same as everybody else. So yeah, I have to wrestle and all sorts. 
 
 In contrast, the Michelle and Rachel both felt they had never felt a strong 
desire to have children, even prior to their accidents. Following their injuries, both 
women commented on not wanting to put children through the difficulty of having a 
disabled mother. Rachel explained: 
It might sound like I’ve never wanted children, you know? My friends have 
got kids and that, I’m godmother to them, that’s fine for me, do you know 
what I mean? I don’t feel like “oh, it’s horrible, I can’t have children”, it’s just 
something I don’t think I’d want. I think also, from the point of view of the 
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children, I just don’t think it’s fair to them…I think they should have a 
childhood, and no matter what you say to them or whatever, I think they 
always would feel obliged to look after you in a way, and I’d hate that for a 
child. 
 
Likewise, Michelle commented: 
I don’t want to be a half mother, like some of them are. I’d always feel guilty 
that I wasn’t doing enough, or somebody else was having to do everything I 
should have done…I haven’t got hands, I can’t pick the baby up, or feed it, 
or do nappies, or when it’s toddling, grab hold of it. I can for a small time, but 
not 24/7. So no, I’d rather enjoy my friends and their children. 
 
Overall, the exceptionally varied experiences of these women in terms of 
relationships and motherhood aid us in understanding the many difficulties faced 
by women with disabilities. Indeed, many of the topics covered in this thesis are 
inexorably tied together; for example, body image inevitably has an effect on one’s 
willingness and ability to take part in intimate relationships. These associations and 
others will be examined in the following chapter. 
 
4.7 Summary 
 Each of the topics discussed in this section affects each other in a number 
of ways. As we have seen, a person’s level of comfort with their changed body can 
affect their perspective on dependence and independence. Similarly, the narrative 
each woman tells is influenced by the way they experience and view their body. 
Even their views on the possibility of relationships and motherhood following their 
accident are shaped by, not only their experience of their bodies, but also the 
narratives they tell and the identities they create for themselves. 
 Exactly how each of these areas interact and influence each other is not 
fully known; however, the four women in this study have deepened our insight into 
this process. Indeed, the discovery of a new narrative, the resilience narrative, will 
hopefully have some impact on how we understand disabled women, and how 
their experience of disability differs from men’s experiences. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Implications 
  At this point, the question I am thinking is: “so what? Why might this 
research be considered of value?”. The answer that comes to mind is “a lot!” 
Indeed, this research, I feel, has a number of interesting implications and 
differences from previous similar research on disability. 
 
5.1.1 Gender 
 Perhaps most importantly, this research has demonstrated that there is a 
significant difference in the experience of active women who have become 
disabled through sport, than the experience of active men who have become 
disabled through sport. For example, in their research on men and spinal cord 
injury, Smith and Sparkes (2002; 2004; 2005b; 2007; Sparkes & Smith, 2002, 
2003) argued that many men faced with major disruptive life events are framed by 
their relationships towards, and investments in, a disciplined and dominating body. 
These bodies have elective affinities for certain kinds of narrative. In contrast, the 
women in this study showed little affinity for the disciplined or dominating bodies 
and thus, little attraction towards the kinds of narrative these bodies usually tell. 
Instead, this study suggests that the women interviewed, even though they were 
highly active prior to their injuries, to have more of an investment in mirroring and 
communicative bodies. This indicates that the disciplined and dominating body 
types may have more connection to gender than activity levels prior to injury. 
Nevertheless, even within the ideal body types the women continued to 
demonstrate their difference. Frank (1995) believed that the communicative body is 
told in quest stories, but although all four women in this study displayed a 
communicative body, only Amanda showed a (weak) affinity for the quest 
narrative. Thus, both in the ideal bodies they exhibit and the narratives associated 
with these bodies, the women in this study differ from the men in previous studies.  
Indeed, the narratives the women told differed significantly from the 
narratives told by the men interviewed by Smith and Sparkes (2002; 2004; 2005b; 
2007; Sparkes & Smith, 2002, 2003). In their interviews, the vast majority of men 
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followed the restitution narrative, with a smaller contingent telling a quest narrative 
and only one speaking in the anti-narrative of chaos. In comparison, this study 
found none of the women telling a restitution narrative; although they were aware 
of the restitution narrative, none chose to take this narrative on board as a key way 
to shape their experiences. In fact, only Amanda showed even a vague affinity for 
any of the narratives described by Frank (1995), in her weak quest story. The other 
three women in this study all demonstrated a different narrative, a narrative not yet 
documented in the literature, which I have called the resilience narrative. This 
narrative defines itself as a story in which the person “bounces back” from SCI, 
quietly adapts to a new body, and is malleable in terms of what types of self they 
perform. It is a plot in which people claim to continue on with their lives with a 
minimal amount of change.   
 
5.1.2 Identity and Dependence / Independence 
This research also demonstrates a link between identity levels, views on 
relationships and perception of dependence / independence. Both Amanda and 
Karen demonstrated higher identity levels on the modified hierarchy, and these 
were also the two women in the study who had a view of dependence that 
stretched beyond simple physical dependence. In addition, both Amanda and 
Karen have had relationships and children since becoming disabled. In contrast, 
Michelle and Rachel have both slipped down the identity hierarchy until they 
reached the lowest level: the salvaged self. These two women both view 
dependence in a purely physical manner, and are unhappy with relying on others 
more than they already do. Furthermore, both Michelle and Rachel have no 
interest in forming intimate personal relationships or having children, feeling that 
they would not want to burden another person with their dependency. This 
apparent link between identity level, relationship views and perceptions of 
dependence allows us to see how interconnected these various topics are.    
 
5.2 Practical Implications 
 Having commented on the theoretical implications, we are left wondering 
about the practical implications of this study. How may we use what we have found 
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in the real world to improve the lives of women who have suffered traumatic spinal 
cord injuries? 
 
5.2.1 Alternative Narrative Resources 
 One major practical implication of this study is the use of alternative 
narrative resources. In previous studies on disabled men, we have seen problems 
arise when people become fixated on one type of body and find it hard to remind 
themselves that other body-self narratives might have to be found and told 
(Sparkes & Smith, 2002). In this study, however, we have seen four women move 
away from the popular narratives used by many disabled people in society, and 
draw on another narrative to fit their experiences into: the resilience narrative. This 
is very important, because this counter-narrative has the potential to add to the 
therapeutic and transformative possibilities of the collective story, as described by 
Richardson (1990), that challenges the mainstream stories that people attempt to 
fit their lives into: 
Collective stories that deviate from standard cultural plots provide new 
narratives; hearing them legitimizes replotting one’s own life…By 
emotionally binding together people who have the same experiences, 
whether in touch with each other or not, the collective story overcomes 
some of the isolation and alienation of contemporary life…It provides…the 
linking of separate individuals into a shared consciousness. Once linked, the 
possibility for social action on behalf of the collective is present, and, 
therewith, the possibility of societal transformation (Richardson, 1990, p. 26) 
 
These collective counter-narratives are immensely important, as Thomas (1999) 
comments: 
Without the counter-narratives of others who challenge social “norms” we, 
as isolated individuals, are trapped within the storylines of the prevailing 
narratives. If we do re-write our own identities then we strengthen the 
counter-narrative, and the dominant and oppressive social narratives begin 
to crumble (p. 55) 
 
However, it should be noted that while the resilience narrative is certainly one that 
hasn’t been documented in the literature to date, it does not fully challenge social 
“norms”. While it is a different narrative from the commonly used restitution 
narrative, which society approves of, it is still one which involves little social action 
or call for change. It is simply one which accepts the different paths might take us 
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down, and “moves on”. Nevertheless, it still gives disabled women the ability to 
access a different kind of collective story with which to re-plot their lives 
 
5.2.2 Body Image 
 As we have seen in the previous chapter, body image came across as an 
important aspect in these women’s lives. This may be tied to the participants’ 
affinities for the mirroring body, which attempts to recreate the body in the image of 
other bodies. Indeed, the mirroring body’s fear of disfigurement played a role in the 
psycho-emotional well being of all the women in this study. Indeed, the women in 
this study, overall, seem to be locked into the typical “feminine ideals” about body 
image that perpetuate social “norms”. One practical implication that may be taken 
from this study would be the use of techniques in order to improve the body image 
of disabled women; however, care needs to be taken when undertaking such 
techniques, because it washes out the effect that society itself has in creating 
these negative body images. As such, another strategy could be to challenge 
societal views of the “normative” body. One way to do this may be to give women 
access to different stories of being a woman who is also disabled – another 
collective story.  
 
5.3 Contributions to the Field of Study 
 This work makes a number of contributions to various fields of study: the 
sociology of the body; feminism; medical sociology; and disability studies. 
 This work contributes to the sociology of the body in the following ways. It 
highlights how the body is a real, material entity that is shaped by narratives out 
there in society. Equally, it reminds us that people can resist and edit these 
narratives, thereby highlighting the agency of the body. In addition, it demonstrates 
that the body is both a social construction and a biological reality. 
 This work contributes to feminism by showing that disability studies does 
have many contributions to make in relation to this field. As mentioned in Chapter 
2, disabled women have been caught between the field of disability studies, in 
which they have been invisible as women, and feminism, where their disability has 
been ignored or subsumed (Lloyd, 2001). This study has attempted to view the 
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participants’ lives from both disabled and feminist perspectives, and has allowed 
us to delve deeper into the reproductive rights of disabled women. 
 This work contributes to medical sociology by bringing the notion of 
resilience to the table. In addition, it questions the pendular model of identity 
reconstruction proposed by Yoshida (1993), and adds new layers to the identity 
hierarchy proposed by Charmaz (1987).  
 Finally, this work contributes to disability studies in the following ways. It 
helps to stress the importance of independence of thought and action, as opposed 
to physical independence in relation to self-care activities. In addition, it shows us 
that the psycho-emotional dimensions of disability may be an especially important 
aspect to focus on in relation to disabled women. All of the women in this study 
displayed aspects of the mirroring body-self, which fears disfigurement; therefore, 
psycho-emotional disability may have more significant effects on disabled women 
than disabled men. 
 
5.4 Limitations and Future Directions 
 This study, like any study, had its fair share of limitations. The biggest 
limitation for this study was the small sample size. While this was the best sample 
size I could attain given the time constraints and lack of participant response, it 
would have been interesting to see if the results found in this study are widespread 
among women with disabilities, or only an occurrence in this sample. Future 
studies could look into researching more women disabled through sport, and also 
including women disabled via other means. In this manner, they could uncover 
whether the differences we have found are due to gender differences, or the 
manner of the injury.  
 In addition, due to time constraints and scheduling difficulties, each 
participant was only interviewed once, with follow-up questions answered via 
multiple telephone calls and e-mail contact. While each of these interviews was in 
depth and uncovered many interesting topics, and both these techniques for data 
collection are increasingly being used and legitimised, further interviews to expand 
upon particularly interesting areas may have been useful. Future research could 
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focus on following participants’ stories over an extended period of time and 
attempting to observe identity level shifts as they occur.   
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 This research has presented data from four women’s accounts of their life 
stories to date. This research has been very important because it demonstrates 
how differently women respond to a traumatic spinal cord injury via sport. It has 
illuminated some possible connections between topics often viewed as separate. 
In addition, it has illuminated the emergence of a new narrative, the resilience 
narrative. The findings in this study are far from definitive; rather, they reveal some 
exciting possibilities. Therefore the findings need to be treated with caution, for 
many other questions yet remain. My hope is that this research encourages others 
to research issues surrounding women, SCI and sport. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Spinal Injury Chart 
 
 
 
Level of Injury Motor Abilities 
C1-C3 Limited movement of head and neck 
C3-C4 Usually has head and neck control. Individuals at C4 level may shrug their 
shoulders 
C5 Typically has head and neck control, can shrug shoulder and has shoulder 
control. Can bend elbows and turn palms face up. 
C6 Has movement in head, neck, shoulders, arms and wrists. Can shrug 
shoulders, bend elbows, turn palms up and down and extend wrists. 
C7 Has similar movement as an individual with C6 with added ability to 
straighten elbows. 
C8-T1 Has added strength and coordination of fingers with limited or even normal 
hand function. 
T2-T6 Has normal motor function in head, neck, shoulders, arms, hands and 
fingers. Has increased use of rib and chest muscles and may have some 
trunk control. 
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